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Summary
The thesis consists of five chapters. Each chapter is self-contained and can be read
independently.
Chapter 1 is entitled "Lightning, IT Diffusion and Economic Growth across US
States", and is joint work with Thomas Barnebeck Andersen, Jeanet Bentzen and Carl-
Johan Dalgaard. In this study we show that a particular feature of climate, the fre-
quency of lightning strikes, is associated with slower growth in labor productivity
across the 48 contiguous US states after 1990; before 1990, there is no correlation be-
tween growth and lightning. The effect of other climate variables (e.g., temperature,
rainfall, and tornadoes) does not conform to this pattern. A viable explanation is that
lightning influences IT diffusion. By causing voltage spikes and dips, a higher fre-
quency of ground strikes leads to damaged digital equipment and thus higher IT user
costs. Accordingly, lightning density (the number of strikes per square km per year)
should adversely affect the speed of IT diffusion. We find that higher lightning densi-
ties indeed seem to have slowed IT diffusion across US states, conditional on standard
controls. Hence, an increasing macroeconomic sensitivity to lightning may be due to
the increasing importance of digital technologies for the growth process.
Chapter 2 is entitled "On the Impact of Digital Technologies on Corruption: Ev-
idence from US States and across Countries", and is also joint work with Thomas
Barnebeck Andersen, Jeanet Bentzen and Carl-Johan Dalgaard. In this chapter we
analyze whether increased Internet use has reduced the extent of corruption. To ex-
amine this question we develop a novel identification strategy for Internet diffusion.
As aforementioned, by instigating equipment damage, power disruptions increase the
user cost of IT capital, and reduce thereby the speed of Internet diffusion and the spread
of computer use. Lightning activity is a natural phenomenon causing power disrup-
tions every year, globally. Using global satellite data and data from ground based light-
ning detection sensors, we construct lightning density data for a large cross section of
countries and for the contiguous US states. Empirically, lightning density is a strong
instrument for Internet diffusion. In conformity with OLS estimates, our instrumental
variables (IV) estimates show that Internet diffusion has indeed reduced the extent of
corruption across countries and across US states.
Chapter 3 is entitled "The Impact of Aid on Bureaucratic Quality: Does the Mode
of Delivery Matter?", and is joint work with Rainer Thiele. In this chapter we study
the impact of development aid on bureaucratic quality, taking into account the fact that
some forms of aid are more likely to affect bureaucratic quality than others. In order to
make a causal interpretation of the results, we set up an indentification strategy exploit-
ing the relationship between aid allocation, country size, and rates of infant mortality.
Using data for the cross section of countries receiving foreign aid from 1995 to 2005, we
find that aid given in the form of grants appears to have impaired the well functioning
xi
of bureaucracies, whereas aid given in the form of loans seems to have had no effect.
The negative impact of grants is found to be larger when they are given as budget
support rather than as assistance to specific projects or general public programs.
Chapter 4 is entitled "Does Foreign Aid increase Foreign Direct Investment?" and
is joint work with Eva Rytter Sunesen. We examine the idea that foreign aid and For-
eign Direct Investment (FDI) are complementary sources of finance for development
(which is conventionally accepted by the international development community). We
show that the theoretical relationship between foreign aid and FDI is ambiguous in the
context of a small open economy: aid raises the marginal productivity of capital if it is
used to finance inputs that are complementary to capital in the aggregate production
process (like public infrastructure or human capital investments), but aid crowds out
other private investments if it takes the form of pure physical capital transfers. We turn
to an empirical analysis and study the relationship between FDI and different types of
development aid. Our results show that aid invested in complementary inputs draws
in FDI, while aid invested in physical capital crowds it out. The combined effect of
these two types of aid is small but on average positive.
Chapter 5 is entitled "Aid and Sectoral Labor Productivity", and is joint work with
Rainer Thiele. This chapter examines empirically the proposition that aid to poor coun-
tries is detrimental for external competitiveness, giving rise to Dutch disease type ef-
fects. At the aggregate level, aid is found to have a positive effect on output growth.
A sectoral decomposition shows that the effect is significant and positive both in the
tradables and the nontradables sectors, conditional on a number of growth covariates.
The paper thus finds no empirical support for the hypothesis that aid reduces exter-
nal competitiveness in developing countries. We explore possible reasons, and point
to the existence of large idle labor capacity and high levels of dollarization in financial
liabilities at the firm level.
xii
Sammenfatning (Summary in Danish)
Afhandlingen består af fem kapitler, som hver især er selvstændige studier og kan
læses uafhængigt af hinanden.
Kapitel 1, "Lightning, IT Diffusion and Economic Growth across US States" (Lynned-
slag, IT Udbredelse og Økonomisk Vækst på Tværs af Amerikanske Delstater), er for-
fattet i samarbejde med Thomas Barnebeck Andersen, Jeanet Bentzen og Carl-Johan
Dalgaard. I dette studie viser vi, at der efter 1990 er en negativ sammenhængmellem et
bestemt aspekt af klimaet, nemlig frekvensen af lynnedslag, og vækst i arbejdskraftens
produktivitet på tværs af de 48 sammenhængende amerikanske delstater; før 1990 er
der ingen korrelation mellem lynnedslag og vækst. Effekten af andre klima-relaterede
variable (så som temperatur, nedbør og tornadoer) følger ikke same mønster. En plau-
sibel forklaring er at lynnedslag påvirker udbredelsen af informations teknologi (IT).
Lynnedslag beskadiger digitalt udstyr ved at forårsage udsving i elektrisk spænding.
En højere frekvens af lynnedslag medfører derfor højere IT brugeromkostninger. Man
kan derfor forestille sig, at lyn-tæthed (antallet af lyn per kvadratkilometer per år)
har en negativ effekt på udbredelsen af IT. Vi finder at højere lyn-tæthed faktisk har
bremset udbredelsen af IT på tværs af amerikanske delstater, også når vi betinger på
standard-kontrol variable. Dette betyder at en øget, makroøkonomisk følsomhed over-
for lynnedslag kan skyldes den stigende vigtighed af digitale teknologier for økonomisk
vækst.
Kapitel 2, "On the Impact of Digital Technologies on Corruption: Evidence from
US States and Across Countries" (Om Effekten af Digitale Teknologier på Korrup-
tion: Resultater fra amerikanske delstater og på tværs af lande), er også skrevet sam-
men med Thomas Barnebeck Andersen, Jeanet Bentzen og Carl-Johan Dalgaard. I
dette kapitel analyserer vi, hvorvidt øget brug af internettet har ført til en reduktion
i omfanget af korruption. For at undersøge dette spørgsmål udvikler vi en innovativ
identifikations-strategi for effekten af internetbrug. Som ovennævnt, ved at medføre
skade på elektronisk udstyr øger strømafbrydelser omkostningerne ved brug af IT,
hvilket medfører at brugen af computere og internet vokser langsommere. Lynned-
slag er et naturligt fænomen, sommedfører mange strømafbrydelser hvert år over hele
kloden. Ved brug af verdensomspændende satellit data, samt data fra jord-baserede
lyn-sensorer, konstruerer vi lyn-tæthedsdata for et stort antal lande og for de sam-
menhængende amerikanske delstater. Empirisk viser lyn-tæthed sig at være et stærkt
instrument for internet udbredelse. Samstemmende med vores OLS estimater viser
vores IV estimater at internet-udbredelse faktisk har reduceret omfanget af korruption
på tværs af lande og på tværs af amerikanske delstater.
Kapitel 3 hedder "The Impact of Aid on Bureaucratic Quality: Does theMode of De-
livery Matter?" (Effekten af Udviklingsbistand på Kvalitet i Bureaukratiet: Hvilken Be-
tydning har Leveringsmåden?) og er forfattet i samarbejde med Rainer Thiele. I dette
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kapitel studerer vi effekten af udviklingsbistand på kvalitet i det offentlige bureaukrati
i modtagerlandene. Vi tager højde for det forhold, at nogen former for udviklingsbis-
tand har større potentiale for at påvirke bureaukratisk kvalitet end andre. For at kunne
tillægge vores resultater en kausal fortolkning, baserer vi vores identifikationsstrategi
på effekterne af befolkningsstørrelse og børnedødelighed på allokering af bistand. Vi
anvender data for det tværsnit af lande, som modtog udviklingsbistand mellem 1995
og 2005. Vi finder at bistand givet som "gaver" (dvs. som ikke skal tilbagebetales)
ser ud til at have beskadiget bureaukratiernes funktionsevne indenfor den analyserede
periode, mens bistand givet i form af lån ikke har nogen effekt. Vi finder også at den
negative effekt af gave-bistand er større når bistanden gives som budget-støtte end
når den gives som generel eller teknisk assistance til bestemte offentlige projekter og
programmer.
Kapitel 4, "Does ForeignAid increase ForeignDirect Investment?" (Fører Udviklings-
bistand til Højere, Direkte, Udenlandske Investeringer?) er skrevet sammen med Eva
Rytter Sunesen. Vi undersøger den ide, at udviklingsbistand og direkte, udenlandske
investeringer (FDI) er komplementære kilder til finansiering af økonomisk udvikling
– et forhold som i det internationale udviklingsmiljø generelt antages at gælde. Vi
viser at fra et teoretisk synspunkt er forholdet mellem udviklingsbistand og FDI i en
lille åben økonomi er tvetydigt. Bistand øger kapitalens marginalprodukt hvis den
bruges til at finansiere inputs som er komplementære til kapital i den aggregerede pro-
duktionsproces (så som offentlig infrastruktur og investeringer i human kapital), men
bistand fortrænger private investeringer hvis den gives som investering i fysisk kapi-
tal. Vi vender os dernæst til en empirisk analyse og studerer forholdet mellem FDI og
forskellige typer af udviklingsbistand. Vore resultater viser at bistand investeret i kom-
plementære inputs tiltrækker FDI, mens bistand investeret i fysisk kapital fortrænger
det. Den første effekt er en smule stærkere end den sidste, således at den samlede effekt
er positiv, men temmelig svag.
Kapitel 5, "Aid and Sectoral Labor Productivity" (Ulandsbistand og sektor-specifik
produktivitet i arbejdskraften) er samforfattet med Rainer Thiele. Dette kapital under-
søger empirisk den påstand, at bistand til fattige lande er skadelig for international
konkurrencedygtighed, fordi bistand medfører effekter at typen "Dutch disease". På
det aggregerede niveau finder vi, at bistand har en positiv effekt på økonomisk vækst.
En sektor-specifik dekomponering viser at denne effekt er positiv og signifikant både i
sektoren for goder, som handles internationalt, og i sektoren for goder, som ikke han-
dles, også når vi betinger på en række faktorer, som er korreleret med økonomisk
vækst. Dermed finder papiret ikke nogen støtte for den hypotese, at udviklingsbis-
tand reducerer international konkurrencedygtighed i udviklingslande. Vi undersøger
mulige årsager til dette, og peger på tilstedeværelsen af store, ledige arbejdskraft-
ressourcer og på det høje niveau af "dollarisering" i firmaernes finansielle passiver.
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Abstract
Empirically, a higher frequency of lightning strikes is associated with slower
growth in labor productivity across the 48 contiguous US states after 1990; before
1990 there is no correlation between growth and lightning. Other climate variables
(e.g., temperature, rainfall, and tornadoes) do not conform to this pattern. A viable
explanation is that lightning influences IT diffusion. By causing voltage spikes and
dips, a higher frequency of ground strikes leads to damaged digital equipment and
thus higher IT user costs. Accordingly, the flash density (strikes per square km per
year) should adversely affect the speed of IT diffusion. We find that lightning in-
deed seems to have slowed IT diffusion, conditional on standard controls. Hence,
an increasing macroeconomic sensitivity to lightning may be due to the increasing
importance of digital technologies for the growth process.
Keywords: Climate, IT diffusion, economic growth.
JELClassification: O33, O51, Q54.
1 Introduction
There is compelling evidence to suggest that climate and geography profoundly af-
fected the historical growth record (Diamond, 1997; Olsson and Hibbs, 2005; Putter-
man, 2008; Asraf and Galor, 2008). Today, climate shocks, like temperature changes,
still affect growth in poor countries (Dell et al., 2008). But are climate and geography
also important in highly developed economies, where high-tech industry and services
are dominant activities?
Some research suggests that geography is still a force to be reckoned with, even
in rich places. Access to waterways, for instance, appears to matter (Rappaport and
We thank Daron Acemoglu, Roland Benabou, Michael Burda, Raquel Fernandez, Heino BohnNielsen,
Ariel Reshef, Jon Temple, Ragnar Torvik, David Weil and seminar participants at the 2009 NBER summer
institute, the 2009 Nordic Conference in Development Economics, the 3rd Nordic Summer Symposium in
Macroeconomics and NTNU Trondheim for comments and suggestions.
†All the authors are affiliated with the Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen.
Contact: Thomas Barnebeck Andersen (thomas.barnebeck.andersen@econ.ku.dk), Jeanet Bentzen
(jeanet.bentzen@econ.ku.dk), Carl-Johan Dalgaard (carl.johan.dalgaard@econ.ku.dk), and Pablo Selaya
(pablo.selaya@econ.ku.dk).
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Sachs, 2003). However, a geographic characteristic that exhibits a time-invariant impact
on prosperity is difficult to disentangle from other slow moving growth determinants
that may have evolved under the influence of climate or geography. In particular, cli-
mate and geography quite possibly influenced the evolution of economic and political
institutions.1
The present paper documents that a particular climate related characteristic – light-
ning activity – exhibits a time-varying impact on growth in the world’s leading econ-
omy. Studying the growth process across the 48 contiguous US states from 1977 to
2007, we find no impact from lightning on growth prior to about 1990. However, dur-
ing the post 1990 period there is a strong negative association: states where lightning
occurs at higher frequencies have grown relatively more slowly. What can account for
an increasing macroeconomic sensitivity to lightning?
In addressing this question one may begin by noting that the 1990s was a period
of comparatively rapid US growth; it is the period where the productivity slowdown
appears to finally have come to an end. Furthermore, the 1990s is the period during
which IT appears to have diffused throughout the US economy at a particularly rapid
pace. In fact, IT investment is often seen as a key explanation for the US growth revival
(e.g., Jorgenson, 2001). On a state-by-state basis, however, the process of IT diffusion,
measured by per capita computers and Internet users, did not proceed at a uniform
speed.
An important factor that impinges on IT investment and diffusion is the quality of
the power supply. That a high quality power supply is paramount for the digital econ-
omy is by now well recognized; as observed in The Economist (2001): "For the average
computer or network, the only thing worse than the electricity going out completely
is power going out for a second. Every year, millions of dollars are lost to seemingly
insignificant power faults that cause assembly lines to freeze, computers to crash and
networks to collapse. [...] For more than a century, the reliability of the electricity grid
has rested at 99.9% [...] But microprocessor-based controls and computer networks de-
mand at least 99.9999% reliability [...] amounting to only seconds of allowable outages
a year." Indeed, a sufficiently large power spike lasting only one millisecond is enough
to damage solid state electronics such as microprocessors in computers. Therefore, as a
simplematter of physics, an irregularly fluctuating power supply reduces the longevity
of IT equipment, and thus increases the user cost of IT capital.
A natural phenomenon that causes irregular voltage fluctuations is lightning activ-
ity. Albeit the impulse is of short duration, its size is impressive. Even in the pres-
ence of lightning arresters on the power line, peak voltage emanating from a lightning
strike can go as high as 5600 V, which far exceeds the threshold for power disruptions
1An apparent impact from "diseases" on comparative development may be convoluting the impact
from early property rights institutions in former colonies (Acemoglu et al., 2001); the impact of access to
waterways, as detected in cross-country data, may also be related to the formation of institutions (Ace-
moglu et al., 2005).
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beyond which connected IT equipment starts being damaged (e.g., Emanuel and Mc-
Neil, 1997). Moreover, the influence from lightning is quantitatively important: to this
day lightning activity causes around one third of the total number of annual power
disruptions in the US (Chisholm and Cummings, 2006). It is therefore very plausible
that lightning may importantly have increased IT user costs.2 Naturally, in places with
higher IT user cost one would expect a slower speed of IT diffusion; lightning prone
regions may be facing a climate related obstacle to rapid IT diffusion.
Even though a link between lightning and IT diffusion is theoretically plausible, it
does not follow that the link is economically important. Nor is it obvious that IT can
account for the lightning-growth correlation.
We therefore also study the empirical link between lightning and the spread of com-
puters and Internet across the US. We find that the diffusion of computers and the In-
ternet has progressed at a considerably slower pace in areas characterized by a high
frequency of lightning strikes. This link is robust to the inclusion of standard con-
trols for computer diffusion (Caselli and Coleman, 2001). Moreover, lightning ceases
to be correlated with growth post 1990, once controls for IT are introduced. While the
lightning-IT-growth hypothesis thus seems well founded, other explanations cannot be
ruled out a priori.
An alternative explanation is that the correlation between growth and lightning
picks up growth effects from global warming. If global warming has caused lightning
to increase over time, and simultaneously worked to reduced productivity growth,
this could account for the (reduced form) correlation between lightning and growth.
We document that this is unlikely to be the explanation for two reasons. First, we show
that from 1906 onwards US aggregate lightning is stationary; on a state-by-state basis,
we find the same for all save two states. There is thus little evidence to suggest that
lightning density is influenced by a global warming induced trend. Second, we attempt
to deal with the potential omitted variables problem by controlling directly for climate
shocks which also could be induced by climate change. We examine an extensive list of
climate variables, including rainfall, temperature, and frequency of tornadoes. None
of these variables impacts on the correlation between lightning and state-level growth
rates. Nor does any other climate variable exhibit the kind of time-varying impact on
growth that we uncover for lightning.
Another potential explanation is that the lightning-growth correlation is picking
up "deep determinants" of prosperity that exhibit systematic variation across climate
zones, just as lightning does. For instance, settler mortality rates, the extent of slavery
and so forth. However, the correlation between lightning and growth is left unaffected
2Naturally, the "power problem" may be (partly) addressed, but only at a cost. The acquisition of
surge protectors, battery back-up emergency power supply (so-called uninterruptable power supply, UIP)
and the adoption of a wireless Internet connection will also increase IT user costs through the price of
investment. Hence, whether the equipment is left unprotected or not, more lightning prone areas should
face higher IT user cost.
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by their inclusion in the growth regression.
In sum, we believe the most likely explanation for the lightning-growth correlation
is to be found in the diffusion mechanism. The analysis therefore provides an example
of how technological change makes economies increasingly sensitive to certain climate
related circumstances. This finding is consistent with the temperate drift hypothesis (Ace-
moglu et al., 2002), which holds that certain climate related variables may influence
growth in some states of technology, and not (or in the opposite direction) in others.
The paper is related to the literature that studies technology diffusion; particularly
diffusion of computers and the Internet (e.g., Caselli and Coleman, 2001; Beaudry et
al., 2006; Chinn and Fairlie, 2007). In line with previous studies, we confirm the impor-
tance of human capital for the speed of IT diffusion. However, the key novel finding
is that climate related circumstances matter as well: lightning influences IT diffusion.
In this sense the paper complements the thesis of Diamond (1997), who argues for an
impact of climate on technology diffusion. Yet whereas Diamond argues that climate is
important in the context of agricultural technologies, the present papermakes plausible
that climate also matters to technology diffusion in high-tech societies.
The analysis proceeds as follows. In the next section we document the lightning-
growth link. Then, in Section 3, we discuss likely explanations (IT diffusion, other
forms of climatic influence, institutions and integration) for the fact that lightning cor-
relates with growth from about 1990 onwards. Section 4 concludes.
2 Lightning and US growth 1977-2007
This section falls in two subsections. In Section 2.1 we present the data on lightning
and discuss its time series properties. In particular, we demonstrate that lightning is
stationary; and that, for panel data purposes, lightning is best thought of as a state
fixed effect. Next, in Section 2.2, we study the partial correlation between lightning
and growth across the US states.
2.1 The Lightning Data
The measure of lightning activity that we employ is the flash density, which captures
the number of ground flashes per square km per year. We have obtained information
about the flash density from two sources. The first source of information is reports from
weather stations around the US. From this sourcewe have yearly observations covering
the period 1906-1995 and 40 US states. From about 1950 onwards we have data for
42 states. The second source of information derives from ground censors around the
US. This data is a priori much more reliable than the data from weather stations.3 In
3Lightning events recorded at weather stations are based on audibility of thunder (i.e., these are ba-
sically recordings of thunder days), whereas ground sensors measure the electromagnetic pulse that em-
anates from lightning strikes (i.e., these are recordings of actual ground strikes). In the context of IT
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addition, it is available for all 48 contiguous states, but it only comes as an average for
the period 1996-2005.4
In order to understand the data better, we begin by studying its time series proper-
ties. Figure 1 shows the time path for aggregate US lightning over the period 1906-95.
Figure 1: The average flash density in the US: 40 states
Source: Lightning observations from weather stations, transformed from thunder days
(TD) into flash density (FD) using the formula FD = 0.04 TD1.25. See Data Appendix
for details.
Notes: Only 40 states have complete information for the period 1906-1995. The "left-
out" (contiguous) states are Connecticut, Delaware, New Hampshire, New Jersey,
Rhode Island, Vermont, Mississippi, andWest Virginia. The figure shows the weighted
average, where the weight is determined by state size.
The aggregate flash density is calculated as the state-size weighted average over
the 40 states with data for this extended period. Visual inspection suggests that there
is no clear trend. More formally, to test whether lightning contains a stochastic trend,
we use an augmented Dickey-Fuller (DF) test with no deterministic trend. Lag length
is selected by minimizing the Schwarz information criterion with a maximum of five
lags. For aggregate US lightning the optimal lag length is one and the DF statistic
equals -4.516. Hence the presence of a unit root is resoundingly rejected.
At the state level the presence of a unit root is also rejected at the 5% level in 38 of
the 40 states, cf. Table 1. In light of the fact that DF tests have low power to reject the
null of a unit root, we are in all likelihood safe to conclude that state-level lightning is
diffusion it is ground strikes that matter, and not the type of lightning occurring between clouds, say.
4Further details are given in the Data Appendix.
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Table 1. Dickey-Fuller tests for unit root in lightning
test-statistic p-value No. obs. No. lags
Aggregate US -4.52 0.0000 88 1
Alabama -5.31 0.0000 88 1
Arizona -3.38 0.0118 87 2
Arkansas -8.98 0.0000 89 0
California -8.40 0.0000 89 0
Colorado -8.69 0.0000 89 0
Florida -8.19 0.0000 89 0
Georgia -8.58 0.0000 89 0
Idaho -3.48 0.0085 87 2
Illinois -9.61 0.0000 89 0
Indiana -8.24 0.0000 89 0
Iowa -9.42 0.0000 89 0
Kansas -4.46 0.0002 88 1
Kentucky -2.94 0.0412 87 2
Louisiana -4.62 0.0001 88 1
Maine -2.75 0.0662 87 2
Maryland -5.32 0.0000 88 1
Massachusetts -9.25 0.0000 89 0
Michigan -8.76 0.0000 89 0
Minnesota -10.28 0.0000 89 0
Missouri -9.92 0.0000 89 0
Montana -9.01 0.0000 89 0
Nebraska -3.64 0.0051 87 2
Nevada -10.02 0.0000 89 0
New Mexico -3.58 0.0062 87 2
New York -4.01 0.0013 88 1
North Carolina -5.40 0.0000 88 1
North Dakota -7.84 0.0000 89 0
Ohio -3.59 0.0059 87 2
Oklahoma -11.61 0.0000 89 0
Oregon -7.09 0.0000 89 0
Pennsylvania -2.20 0.2045 86 3
South Carolina -8.01 0.0000 89 0
South Dakota -8.62 0.0000 89 0
Tennessee -7.32 0.0000 89 0
Texas -5.45 0.0000 88 1
Utah -5.55 0.0000 88 1
Virginia -7.41 0.0000 89 0
Washington -8.75 0.0000 89 0
Wisconsin -9.45 0.0000 89 0
Wyoming -7.71 0.0000 89 0
Notes. The Augmented Dickey-Fuller test with no deterministic trend for each of the 40 states
over the period 1906-1995. Lags selected by Schwarz’s information criteria. Lightning is aver-
age number of flashes per year per square km, measured at weather stations.
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Figure 2: The average flash density 1977-95 versus 1996-2005: 42 states.
Sources: 1977-95 based on Thunder days (TD) from weather station observations, con-
verted into flash density (FD) using the formula FD = 0.04 TD1.25. 1996-2005 data
are based on ground detectors. See Appendix for further details. Notes: The correla-
tion is 0.90, and a regression, FL96 05 = a + bFL77 95 returns: a =  0.99, b = 1.05,
R2 = 0.81.
also stationary.
These findings are of some independent interest in that they suggest that global
warming has not interfered with the evolution of lightning trajectories in the US in
recent times. In other words, there is little basis for believing that the flash density has
exhibited a trend during the last century.
In the analysis below we focus on the period from 1977 onwards, dictated by the
availability of data on gross state product. Consequently, it is worth examining the
time series properties of the lightning variable during these last few decades of the
20th century.
During this period the flash density is for all practical purposes a fixed effect. In the
Appendix (Table A1) we show state-by-state that the residuals obtained from regress-
ing lightning on a constant are serially uncorrelated. That is, deviations of the flash
density from time averages are, from a statistical perspective, white noise. To show
this formally, we use the Breusch-Godfrey test and a Runs test for serial correlation. By
the standards of the Breusch-Godfrey test, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no
serial correlation in 38 states out of 42 states; using the Runs test, we fail to reject the
null in 40 states. Importantly, no state obtains a p-value below 0.05 in both tests. This
suggests that for the 1977-95 period lightning is best described as a state fixed effect.
7
(Table A1 in the appendix shows the results of these tests).
Figure 3: The distribution of flash densities across the US: 1997-2007.
Source: Vaisala Group, www.vaisala.com
As remarked above, we have an alternative source of data available to us, which
contains information for the 1996-2005 period. How much of a concurrence is there
between data for the 1977-95 period and the data covering the end of the 1990s and
early years of the 21st century? Figure 2 provides an answer. Eyeballing the figure
reveals that the two measures are very similar. In fact, we cannot reject the null that the
slope of the line is equal to one. This further corroborates that lightning is a state fixed
effect.
These findings have induced us to rely on the data deriving from ground censors
in the analysis below. As noted above, this latter lightning data is of a higher qual-
ity compared to the measure based on weather stations and it covers more US states.
Moreover, since deviations from the average flash density are white noise, we lose no
substantive information by resorting to a time invariant measure. Still, it should be
stressed that using instead the historical lightning measure based on weather stations
(or combining the data) produces the same qualitative results as those reported below.
These results are available upon request.
The cross-state distribution of the 1997-2007 data is shown in Figure 3. Summary
statistics for the period for which we have data (1996-2005) are provided in Table A2 in
the appendix.
There is considerable variation in the flash density across states. At the lower end
we find states like Washington, Oregon, and California with less than one strike per
square km per year. It is interesting to note that the two states who are world famous
8
for IT, Washington and California, are among the least lightning prone. At the other
end of the spectrum we find Florida, Louisiana, and Mississippi with seven strikes or
more. It is clear that lightning varies systematically across climate zones. Hence, it is
important to check, as we do below, that lightning’s correlation with growth is not due
to other climate variables like high winds, rainfall and so on.
2.2 The Emergence of a Lightning-Growth Nexus
Figures 4 and 5 show the partial correlation between growth in labor productivity and
the flash density, controlling only for initial labor productivity.
Figure 4: The correlation between state growth and (log) flash density, conditional
on a constant and initial income per worker: 1977-1992.
We have data on gross state product (GSP) per worker for the period 1977-2007.5
Hence, for this first exercise we have simply partitioned the data into two equal sized
15 year epochs. As seen from the two figures, there is a marked difference in the par-
tial correlation depending onwhich sub-periodwe consider. During the 1977-92 period
there is no association between growth and lightning; the (OLS) point estimate is essen-
tially nil. However, in the second sub-period the coefficient for lightning rises twenty
5State level data on personal income is also available, and for a longer period. But personal income
does not directly speak to productivity. By contrast, GSP per worker is a direct measure of state level labor
productivity. Moreover, the GSP per worker series is available in constant chained dollar values, which
is an important advantage in the context of dynamic analysis. See the Data Appendix for a description of
the GSP per worker series.
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Figure 5: The correlation between state growth and (log) flash density, conditional
on a constant and initial income per worker: 1992-2007.
fold (in absolute value) and turns statistically significant; places with higher flash den-
sity have tended to grow at a slower rate during the 1990s and the first decade of the
21st century.
While this exercise is revealing, there is no particular reason to believe that the
lightning-growth correlation emerged precisely in 1992. Hence, to examine the issue
in more detail, we study the same partial correlation by running "rolling" regressions
over 10 year epochs, starting with 1977-87.6 That is, we estimate an equation of the
following kind:
log

yit
yit 10

= b0 + b1 log(yit 10) + b2 log(lightningi) + εit
and examine the evolution of b2 as t increases. Figure 6 shows the time path for b2 as
well as the associated 95% confidence interval.
In the beginning of the period there is not much of a link between lightning and
growth; if anything the partial correlation is positive. As one moves closer to the 1990s
the partial correlation starts to turn negative and grows in size (in absolute value).
By 1995 the lightning-growth correlation is statistically significant at the 5% level of
confidence. As one moves forward in time the partial correlation remains stable and
6The exact choice of time horizon does not matter much; below we run regressions with 5, 10, and 15
year epochs that complement the present exercise.
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Figure 6: The lightning-growth nexus: 1977-2007.
Notes: The figure shows estimates for b2 (and the associated 95 percent confidence
interval) from regressions of the form: log(yt)   log(yt 10) = b0 + b1log(yt 10) +
b2log(lightning) + e, where y is gross state product per worker and t = 1987, . . . , 2007.
48 states; estimated by OLS.
significant. Hence, this exercise points to the same conclusion as that suggested by
Figures 4 and 5: the negative partial correlation between lightning and growth emerged
in the 1990s.
Albeit illustrative, both exercises conducted so far are ad hoc in the sense that they
do not allow for a formal test of whether the impact from lightning is rising over time.
Hence, as a final check, we run panel regressions with period length of 5, 10, and 15
years. The results are reported in Table 3 below.
Since lightning, for all practical purposes, is a fixed effect (cf. Section 2.1), Table 3
reports the results from running pooled OLS regressions. Specifically, we estimate the
following equation:
log

yit
yit T

= b0 + b1 log(yit T) + b2t log(lightningi) + µt + εit
where T = 5, 10, 15 and b2t accordingly is allowed to vary from period-to-period by
way of interaction with time dummies. This way we can track the statistical and eco-
nomic significance of lightning over time. Note also that we include time dummies
independently of lightning, so as to capture a possible secular trend in growth over the
period in question.
Turning to the results we find that the impact of lightning increases over time, and
11
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turns statistically significant during the 1990s.7 The significance of lightning is partic-
ularly noteworthy as it is obtained for the relatively homogenous sample of US states.
As is well known, the growth process for this sample is usually fairly well described by
the initial level of income alone, suggesting only modest variation in structural charac-
teristics that impinge upon long-run labor productivity (e.g., Barro and Sala-i-Martin,
1992). As a result, the scope for omitted variable bias contaminating the OLS estimate
for lightning is a priori much more limited than, say, in a cross-country setting. How-
ever, in the next section we do find that one particular growth determinant renders
lightning insignificant: IT penetration.
The impact from lightning is economically significant as well. Consider the results
pertaining to the "intermediate case", which involves 10 year epochs. Taken at face
value, the point estimate for the 1990s imply that a one standard deviation increase in
lightning intensity (about 2.4 flashes per year per sq km) induces a reduction in growth
by about 0.2 percentage points , conditional on the level of initial labor productivity
and the time effects. This is about 12.5 % of the gap between the 5th percentile and
the 95th percentile in the distribution of GSP per worker growth rates for the period
1977-2007 (for the 48 states in our sample). By extension, variation in lightning by four
standard deviations (roughly equivalent to moving from the 5th percentile to the 95th
percentile in the lightning distribution across US states) can account for about 50% of
the "95/5" growth gap.8 Needless to say, this is a substantial effect.
These results uniformly support the same qualitative conclusion: a macro economic
sensitivity to lightning has emerged over time in the US. The question is why?
3 Hypotheses and Explanations
3.1 IT Diffusion
We begin this section by examining the theoretical foundation behind the claim that
lightning (or, more appropriately, the flash density) should have an impact on growth
via IT diffusion. Subsequently we examine the hypothesis empirically.
Theory: The simple analytics of why lightning matters to IT diffusion.
The simplest way to think about IT diffusion is via basic neoclassical investment theory.
That is, IT diffusion occurs in the context of IT capital investments. In what follows we
develop a simple model that links the flash density (our independent variable in the
7The general time dummies (not reported) corroborate the prior of a revitalization of productivity
growth during the 1990s.
8Log normality of lightning is not accurate; but on the other hand not terribly misleading either. It does
exaggerate the actual variation in lightning slightly; the observed variation is about 7 flashes, compared
to the "back-of-the-envelope" calculation implying roughly 9.
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regressions above) to IT capital accumulation, and thus IT diffusion and growth in
output.
Consider a representative firm producing output, Y, with the technology F(C). C
is the stock of IT capital, whereas F() is a neoclassical production function, featuring
positive and diminishing returns; for simplicity we ignore other inputs in production.
The price of output is normalized to one and markets are competitive.
We assume the capital stock cannot be adjusted to its optimal level instantaneously.
A reason would be the presence of (convex) installation costs. For simplicity, we ig-
nore adjustment costs in the formal analysis, and assume instead that the IT capital
stock simply follows an ad hoc adjustment rule capturing whatever frictions that pre-
vent firms from adjusting the capital stock fully.9
Specifically, assuming time is continuous, the adjustment rule is

C = λ(C   C),
where

C = dC/dt is the instantaneous change in the capital stock, λ is a positive para-
meter, C is the optimal IT capital stock (to be determined below), and C is the current
(or initial) stock of IT capital. Hence, in each period the capital stock is mechanically
adjusted towards its optimal level.
In the absence of convex adjustment costs, the optimal IT capital stock, C, is given
by the first order condition from the static profit maximization problem:
F0(C) = u
where u is the user cost of capital. Ignoring taxes, the user cost formula is (Hall and
Jorgenson, 1967):
u = p(r+ δ  pi),
where p is the relative investment price, r is the real rate of return, δ is the depreciation
rate of IT capital, and pi is the instantaneous rate of change in the relative investment
price.
Next, we assume the depreciation rate is increasing in the number of lightning
strikes, n, in the surrounding area of the power conductor. That is,
δ = δ(n), δ0(n) > 0.
The basic idea is that lightning strikes lead to power disturbances, which reduce the
longevity of IT capital. This assumption has a sound physical foundation. Solid-state
electronics, such as computer chips, are constructed to deal with commercial power
supply in the form of alternating current. The voltage of the current follows a sine
wave with a specific frequency and amplitude. If the sine wave changes frequency or
amplitude, this constitutes a power disruption. Digital devices convert alternating cur-
9Nothing much is lost by this simplification. The key result obtained below, that the flash density
reduces growth, can also be derived invoking convex costs of adjustment, at the costs of more algebra. In
the interest of brevity, however, we stick with the simpler model.
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rent to direct current with a much reduced voltage; digital processing of information
basically works by having transistors turn this voltage on and off at several gigahertz
(Kressel, 2007). If the power supply is disrupted, the conversion process may be cor-
rupted which causes damage to the equipment, reducing its longevity.
It is important to appreciate that even extremely short lasting power disruptions
are potentially problematic. Voltage disturbances measuring less than one cycle (i.e.,
1/60th of a second in the US case) are sufficient to crash and/or destroy servers, com-
puters, and other microprocessor-based devices (Yeager and Stalhkopf, 2000; Electric-
ity Power Research Institute, 2003). A natural phenomenon which damages digital
equipment, by producing power disruptions, is lightning activity (e.g., Emanuel and
McNeil, 1997; Shim et al., 2000, Ch. 2; Chisholm, 2000). In reduced form then, more
lightning strikes to the power supply implies higher IT capital depreciation.10 We cap-
ture the physical links between lightning strikes and equipment damage by assuming
δ0(n) > 0.
Finally, the number of strikes, n, per year (per 100 km line length) can be determined
as (Chisholm, 2000)
n = 3.8  f  h0.45,
where f is the flash density and h is the height (in meters) of the conductor above
ground. This completes the model.
To see how the flash density impacts on IT diffusion, substitute n into the user cost
expression, and invoke the first order condition from profit maximization. Then the
optimal IT capital stock, C, is given by
C = Φ

p
h
r+ δ
n
3.8  f  h0.45
o
  pi
i
where Φ = F0 1. As a consequence, using the adjustment rule, the growth rate of the
IT capital stock becomes

C
C
= λ
Φ
 
p

r+ δ

3.8  f  h0.45	  pi
C
  λ.
This expression forms the basis for the following observation:
10Note that lightning may enter a firm or household in four principal ways. First, lightning can strike
the network of power, phone, and cable television wiring. This network, particularly when elevated, acts
as an effective collector of lightning surges. The wiring conducts the surges directly into the residence,
and then to the connected equipment. In fact, the initial lightning impulse is so strong that equipment
connected to cables up to 2 km away from the site of the strike can be damaged (BSI, 2004). Technically
speaking, this is the mechanism we are capturing in the simple model above. Second, when lightning
strikes directly to or nearby air conditioners, satellite dishes, exterior lights, etc., the wiring of these de-
vices can carry surges into the residence. Third, lightning may strike nearby objects such as trees, flag-
poles, road signs, etc., which are not directly connected to the residence. When this happens, the lightning
strike radiates a strong electromagnetic field, which can be picked up by the wiring in the building, pro-
ducing large voltages that can damage equipment. Finally, lightning can strike directly into the structure
of the building. This latter type of strike is extremely rare, even in areas with a high lightning density.
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Proposition 1 Conditional on the initial capital stock, a higher flash density leads to a lower
growth rate of the IT capital stock.
Proof. Since Φ0 < 0 and λ > 0 the result follows immediately from differentiation.
QED
Hence, in areas with a greater flash density, the speed of IT diffusion - as measured
by IT capital accumulation - will proceed at a slower pace. The intuition is that a higher
flash density rate increases the frequency of power disturbances, IT capital deprecia-
tion, the user cost of IT capital, and thus lowers IT investments. Moreover, as output
is increasing in the IT capital stock, Y = F(C), growth in output will similarly tend
to be slower in areas with greater lightning activity, conditional on the initial level of
output.11
It is worth reiterating that firms may take pre-emptive actions so as to reduce the
impact of lightning on the cost of capital; this could be done by investing in surge
protectors, say. However, the crux of the matter is that this imposes an additional cost
to be carried in the context of IT investments; in terms of the model above, it amounts
to an increasing investment price, p. Hence, even if we take the likely "pre-emptive
measures" into account, more lightning prone areas will tend to feature slower growth
in IT capital, and thus slower output growth.
While the above theoretical considerations speak to a direct impact of lightning on
IT investment, there could be an important complementary mechanism at work. The
choice of firm location may depend on the quality of power supply, and thus lightning.
Specifically, it may be the case that IT intensive firms choose to locate in areas where
lightning intensity is modest, due to the resulting (slightly) higher power quality. Inter-
estingly, The National Energy Technology Laboratory operated by the US Department
of Energy reports that a recent firm level survey had 34% respondents saying that they
would shift business operations out of their state if they experienced ten or more unan-
ticipated power disturbances over a quarter of a year.12 Hence, it seems plausible that
this mechanism also could affect comparative IT penetration across US States.
These mechanisms, linking lightning to growth, are likely to have become increas-
ingly important over time for a number of reasons. First, IT capital investments ac-
counted for a substantial part of output growth, starting in the 1990s (e.g., Jorgenson,
2001). Consequently, factors that impact on IT capital accumulation (e.g., the flash
density) should also become more important to growth. Second, the 1990s was the era
during which the Internet emerged (in the sense of theWorldWideWeb); a conceivable
reason why firms chose to intensify IT investments during the same period.13 From a
11It should be clear that the advocated mechanism is robust in a general equilibrium setting. Through
elevated capital depreciation, higher lightning density would work to reduce the long-run (steady state)
level of capital per worker in any neoclassical growth model. Hence, conditional on the initial capital
stock, growth will be reduced in transition by an increasing flash density.
12http://www.netl.doe.gov/moderngrid/
13The WWW was launched in 1991 by CERN (the European Organisation for Nuclear Research). See
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physical perspective, however, the network connection is another way in which light-
ning strikes may reach the computer, in the absence of wireless networks (which have
not been widespread until very recently). Third, the 1990s saw rapid increases in the
computing power of IT equipment. In keeping with Moore’s law, processing speed
doubled roughly every other year. This is an important propagation mechanism of the
lightning-IT investment link. The reason is that the sensitivity of computers to small
power distortions increases with the miniaturization of transistors, which is the key to
increasing speed in microprocessors (Kressel, 2007).
In sum, these factors would all contribute to increasing the importance of the flash
density to IT investments, and thus to growth, during the 1990s. But the question
is whether empirically this theory can account for the apparent increasing macroeco-
nomic sensitivity to lightning.
Empirical analysis: Lightning, IT diffusion and Economic Growth.
In order for the above theory to be able to account for the lightning-growth correlation,
two things need be true. First, it must be the case that lightning is a strong predictor of
IT across the US states. Second, there should be no explanatory power left in lightning
vis-à-vis growth, once we control for IT. We examine these two requirements in turn.
In measuring the diffusion of IT capital across the US we employ two measures.
Bothmeasures derive from a supplement to the 2003 Current Population Survey, which
contained questions about computer and Internet use. The first measure is percentage
of households with access to Internet, and the second measure is percentage of house-
holds with a PC. A couple of remarks on these data are necessary.
First, we only have one observation for both IT variables. Consequently, we have
to settle for cross section regressions. Second, one may question whether there is value
in using both variables, since having access to a computer is a prerequisite for the use
of the Internet. Yet, the emergence of the WWW is a much more recent technology
than the PC, as the former derives from 1991. The personal computer started spread-
ing earlier. Hence, the initial conditions that may matter to the speed of adoption are
discernible by time. For instance, whereas educational attainment in the 1970s should
influence the spread of the personal computer, the Internet is affected by education lev-
els in the 1990s. Hence, the two empirical models of IT diffusion will have to differ in
terms of the "dating" of the right hand side IT diffusion determinants. As a result, we
employ both.
A natural point of departure is with the simple correlation between the flash density
and the two IT measures for the 48 states in our sample. Figure 7 and 8 depict them.
Visually, the strong negative correlations between the flash density and PC and
Internet users, respectively, are immediately obvious. By 2003, states that experience
Hobbes’ Internet Timeline v8.2 http://www.zakon.org/robert/internet/timeline/
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Figure 7: Lightning versus Internet users per 100 households in 2003.
Sources: See Data Appendix Notes: The raw correlation between the two series is
 0.62.
lightning strikes at a higher frequency also have relatively fewer users of computers
and the Internet.
A more systematic approach involves more controls of course. Human capital is
probably the first additional determinant of diffusion that comes to mind. The idea
that a more educated labor force is able to adopt new technologies more rapidly is an
old one, going back at least to the work of Nelson and Phelps (1966). Another natural
control is the level of GSP per worker. Aside from being a catch-all control for factors
that facilitate diffusion, it can also be motivated as a measure of the "distance to the
frontier". A priori the sign of the coefficient assigned to GSP per worker is therefore
ambiguous. A positive sign is expected if initially richer areas are able to acquire IT
equipment more readily. A negative sign could arise if richer areas, by closer proximity
to the technology frontier, are less able to capitalize on "advantages of backwardness".
In addition to labor productivity and human capital, we follow Caselli and Cole-
man (2001) in choosing relevant additional determinants of IT diffusion (they also in-
clude human capital and income per capita). First, we use measures for the compo-
sition of production; it seems plausible that IT may spread more rapidly in areas fea-
turing manufacturing rather than agriculture. Second, we employ proxies for global
links, measured by international movements of goods and capital, and a measure of
18
Figure 8: Lightning versus personal computers per 100 households in 2003.
Sources: See Data Appendix.
local market size: state population. Third, we employ various historical variables as
controls. Caselli and Coleman, studying cross-country data, include a measure of eco-
nomic institutions, which we are not able to do directly in our US sample. However, by
including various plausible historical determinants of productivity (e.g., soldier mor-
tality, the pervasiveness of slavery in the late 19th century, and so on) we hope to pick
up the same type of information.14 Of course, in a US context one would a priori expect
cross-state differences in institutional quality to be orders of magnitude smaller than in
cross-country data.
In Table 4 we report the results for Internet users; Table 5 contains similar regres-
sions for personal computers. Since PCs emerged in the 1980s we measure the deter-
minants of PC diffusion around 1980 whenever feasible. By contrast, since the WWW
emerged in 1990, we measure the same initial conditions around 1990.
In column 1 of Table 4 we examine the simple correlation between Internet users
and the flash density; the latter is highly significant and can account for nearly 40%
of the variation in Internet users as of 2003. In the next 6 columns we include GSP
per worker in 1991 along with various human capital measures. As is clear, most of
the human capital variables are highly significant, along side GSP per worker and the
14Details on all the data mentioned above are given in the Data Appendix.
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Table 4. Lightning and Internet diffusion
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Lightning -3.57*** -3.57*** -3.63*** -1.21*** -2.30*** -2.51*** -3.10***
[0.61] [0.62] [0.63] [0.44] [0.46] [0.52] [0.53]
(log) Real GSP per worker, 1991 9.95*** 8.95** 8.99*** 1.66 3.09 3.07
[3.46] [3.61] [2.85] [3.30] [3.08] [4.43]
Enrollment rate, 1991 -11.54
[14.57]
High school degree or higher, 1990 71.04***
[9.86]
Bachelor’s degree or higher, 1991 0.86***
[0.14]
College degree or higher, 1998 66.96***
[10.12]
Graduate or professional degree, 1990 125.56***
[45.86]
Constant 57.18*** -49.77 -28.33 -95.32*** 20.97 7.28 15.33
[0.72] [37.19] [44.27] [31.10] [34.28] [32.29] [45.65]
Observations 48 48 48 48 48 48 48
R-squared 0.38 0.45 0.46 0.73 0.66 0.64 0.54
Table 5. Lightning and computer diffusion
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Lightning -3.68*** -3.67*** -3.56*** -1.40*** -2.13*** -2.74*** -3.26***
[0.56] [0.58] [0.60] [0.46] [0.49] [0.53] [0.51]
(log) Real GSP per worker, 1977 2.40 2.81 -1.27 -2.82 -1.44 -1.39
[3.87] [4.24] [3.02] [3.00] [3.20] [3.42]
Enrollment rate, 1980 7.35
[17.82]
High school degree or higher, 1980 47.65***
[8.76]
Bachelor’s degree or higher, 1977 4.47***
[0.73]
College degree or higher, 1998 59.70***
[10.84]
Graduate or professional degree, 1990 112.71***
[35.25]
Constant 64.97*** 39.4 28.51 44.79 41.57 65.37* 71.79*
[0.72] [41.23] [53.08] [31.95] [31.36] [34.08] [36.05]
Observations 48 48 48 48 48 48 48
R-squared 0.43 0.43 0.43 0.63 0.65 0.61 0.52
Notes. OLS estimates. The dependent variable in Table 4 is percentage of households with a personal
computer at home in 2003. The dependent variable in Table 5 is the percentage of households with access
to the Internet at home in 2003. Lightning is the (log) average number of flashes per year per square
km, measured by flash-detectors. The rest of the covariates are described in the Data Appendix. Robust
standard errors in brackets. Asterisks ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10%, respectively.
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flash density. This is consistent with previous findings (e.g., Caselli and Coleman, 2001;
Beaudry et al., 2006). Still, the best fit is obtained when we employ the fraction of
state population with a high school diploma or more (column 4); along with the flash
density and (log) GSP per worker the three variables can account for three quarters of
the variation in Internet users.
In an effort to check for robustness Table 4A introduces additional controls (on top
of human capital, income, and lightning), one by one. Nowhere is the influence from
the flash density eliminated. Rather, the point estimate appears robust to the inclusion
of alternative IT diffusion controls, economically as well as statistically.
Next consider Table 5. Column 1 confirms that lightning is strongly correlated with
personal computer users; the R2 is in fact slightly higher than what is true for Internet
users. In general the results for personal computers are rather similar to those involving
Internet diffusion. Nevertheless, there are two differences worth remarking on.
First, it appears that the measure of human capital that holds the strongest explana-
tory power vis-à-vis computers is the fraction of the state population with a bachelor
degree or above (BA), rather than the high school variable. The difference in R2 in the
two specifications is marginal though (cf. columns 4 and 5). To ease comparability
we have therefore chosen to stick with the high school measure in the context of the
robustness checks. But the results are very similar if we used the BA variable instead.
Second, initial GSP per worker is not significant in the regressions. Nevertheless, on
theoretical grounds we have chosen to keep it in the regressions to follow.
Examining columns 1-17 of Table 5A it is clear that lightning is robust to the inclu-
sion of plausible alternative determinants of diffusion.15 Again the point estimate for
the flash density is very stable. Interestingly, comparing Tables 4A and 5A, one may
observe that the size of the coefficient assigned to the flash density is numerically very
similar in the two separate specifications. This could be taken to suggest that it is the
same basic mechanism that affects both computer and Internet diffusion, in keeping
with the theory developed above.
The lightning-IT correlation can obviously not be ascribed to reverse causality. More-
over, since the remaining diffusion determinants are lagged, the risk that endogeneity
of these variables is contaminating the OLS estimate for lightning is diminished. How-
ever, there is a particular issue which may render the results of the analysis above
misleading: clustering.
Lightning density is characterized by a degree of geographical clustering for which
reason we need to worry about cluster fixed effects. If cluster fixed effects are uncorre-
lated with the independent variables, OLS remains consistent but will underestimate
the variances of regression parameters. If, on the other hand, cluster fixed effects are
correlated with the independent variables, OLS turns inconsistent as well (Cameron
15We do not have data on exports sufficiently far back in time so as to allow it to enter in Table 5a. This
accounts for the fact that Table 5a is one column smaller than Table 4a.
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and Trivedi, 2005). The appropriate remedy depends on the structure of the clusters.
With small clusters (i.e., many clusters and few observations within each cluster), the
response is fairly straightforward. We can simply obtain cluster robust standard errors
on account of independence across clusters.
However, with only 48 states, we face a problem of large clusters (i.e., few clusters
and many observations within each cluster), for which reason the OLS cluster robust
variance matrix is not a feasible option (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005; Angrist and Pis-
chke, 2009). What we can do instead is to introduce cluster fixed effects via the cluster
dummy variables model, as outlined in Cameron and Trivedi (2005). Introducing clus-
ter fixed effects in this way serves to remove the intraclass error correlation that causes
the potential inconsistency and the bias in the variance matrix in the first place. In
order to implement the cluster dummy variables model, we need to decide on the ap-
propriate clusters. Since there is no a priori cluster partition, we employ two alternative
partitions.
The first partition is based on a decomposition of the US power grid. The US has
no "national power grid." Instead, the contiguous US states are divided into two main
grids, the Eastern Interconnected System and the Western Interconnected System, and
a minor grid, namely the Texas Interconnected System. Electric utilities in an intercon-
nection are electrically tied together during normal system conditions and work at a
synchronized frequency operating at an average of 60Hz. The Eastern and Western In-
terconnects have only very limited interconnections with each other, while a few states,
including Texas, are linked to both. By construction, this partition ensures cluster in-
dependence across the main two grids; i.e., climatic influences on the Western Inter-
connect will not influence the Eastern Interconnect, and vice versa. Thus, power dis-
turbances are independent across the two main interconnections but dependent within
interconnections.
The second partition is simply based on the four US Census Bureau regions, namely
Midwest, Northeast, South, andWest. Visually, this partition corresponds well with the
spatial distribution of lightning (see Figure 3).16
Tables 6 and 7 report results from regressions where cluster dummy variables are
included. In both tables, column 1 is without dummies, whereas columns 2 and 3
have Census regions and interconnection based dummies, respectively. In both tables,
lightning retains significance regardless of the inclusion of cluster dummy variables.
However, while the Census based clusters are jointly significant in both tables, the
16We did not pursue the issue of cluster fixed effects in Section 2.2 since it is difficult to see how a
cluster fixed effect can account for the time varying partial correlation between growth and lightning.
Nevertheless, for completeness, we have run the regressions from Table 3 while including the cluster
fixed effects as discussed above. For the case of 10 year epochs, results are basically identical to those
reported above. The same goes for 5 and 15 year epochs when we rely on interconnection dummies.
When we use Census regions and 5 and 15 year epochs, parameters are roughly unchanged but we lose a
bit in terms of precision. However, we do obtain significance at the 12 percent level. Overall, there does
not seem to be an omitted variables problem on account of cluster effects.
24
Table 6. Lightning and Internet diffusion
(controlling for cross sectional dependence)
(1) (2) (3)
Lightning -1.21*** -1.89** -1.46**
[0.44] [0.71] [0.55]
(log) Real GSP per worker, 1991 8.99*** 5.80* 7.12***
[2.85] [3.07] [2.60]
High school degree or higher, 1990 71.04*** 91.49*** 73.18***
[9.86] [14.39] [10.26]
Constant -95.32*** -79.30** -77.34***
[31.10] [32.51] [28.50]
Regional dummies: no US Census NERC
(4 regions) (3 regions)
H0: all reg dummies = 0 (pval) 0.03 0.15
Observations 48 48 48
R-squared 0.73 0.79 0.76
Table 7. Lightning and computer diffusion
(controlling for cross sectional dependence)
(1) (2) (3)
Lightning -1.40*** -2.10*** -1.62***
[0.46] [0.66] [0.52]
(log) Real GSP per worker, 1977 -1.27 -1.8 -1.7
[3.02] [2.66] [3.03]
High school degree or higher, 1980 47.65*** 71.90*** 53.48***
[8.76] [13.74] [9.02]
Constant 44.79 30.21 44.36
[31.95] [27.38] [32.65]
Regional dummies: no US Census NERC
(4 regions) (3 regions)
H0: all reg dummies = 0 (pval) 0.03 0.07
Observations 48 48 48
R-squared 0.63 0.71 0.69
Notes. OLS estimates. The dependent variable in Table 6 is the percentage of households with access to
the Internet in 2003. The dependent variable in Table 7 is the percentage of households with a personal
computer at home in 2003. Lightning is the (log) average number of flashes per year per square km,
measured by flash-detectors. The rest of the covariates are described in the Data Appendix. The set
of regional dummies in column (2) is the US Census Bureau’s regional division of the country (West,
Midwest, Northeast, South), and the regional dummies in column (3) is the major interconnected power
systems of the North American Electric Reliability Corporation, NERC (Western, Eastern, Texas). Robust
standard errors in brackets. Asterisks ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10%, respectively.
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interconnection dummies are only significant in Table 7; i.e., when computer use is the
dependent variable. It is also interesting to note that standard errors are always larger
when cluster dummies are added. This is consistent with OLS underestimating the
variances of regression parameters in the presence of cluster dependencies. The point
estimates, however, are not statistically different across the columns of each respective
table. Consequently, omission of the cluster dummies does not appear to induce an
omitted variables bias. In sum, taking cluster issues into account does not impact on
our results.
In spite of these checks it is impossible to completely rule out that the partial corre-
lation between lightning and IT could be attributed to one or more omitted variables in
the analysis above. Still, a causal interpretation is well founded on theoretical grounds,
and the empirical link between IT and lightning is clearly robust to a reasonable set
of alternative IT determinants, and cluster fixed effects. Moreover, the point estimate
seems stable across specifications. It falls in a reasonably confined interval, no matter
which determinant we include on top of human capital and labor productivity. These
characteristics provide a reasonable basis for believing the estimates above can be taken
to imply that lightning is causally impacting on the speed of IT diffusion.
If we take the parameter estimate for lightning seriously, what is the economic
strength of the link? Using the estimate from column 4 in Table 4 we find that a one
standard deviation increase in lightning leads to a reduction in Internet users by about
1 percent.17 In 2003 the states with the lowest Internet penetration (the 5th percentile)
had about 44% of the population being able to access the Internet; at the other end of
the spectrum (the 95th percentile) about 60% of the population was online. Hence the
estimate for lightning implies that a one standard deviation change in lightning can ac-
count for about 7% of the 95/5 gap; four standard deviations therefore motivates about
25% of the difference.
The final issue is whether IT can account for the link between growth and light-
ning. Table 8 shows the relevant regression results. We focus specifically on the 1991-
2007 period, as this is the period during which lightning is significantly correlated with
growth.
In column 1 of Table 8 the lightning-growth correlation is reproduced. In the fol-
lowing two columns we add the two IT measures. Individually, both are significantly
and positively correlated with growth as expected. The interpretation of the two right
hand side variables is slightly different though. As noted above, the Internet originated
in 1991. As a result, the independent variable can be seen as a proxy for Internet in-
vestments over the period; in 1991 the number of Internet users inevitably was close to
zero, so the 2003 value effectively captures changes in Internet users over the relevant
period. Needless to say the same is not true for PCs, which started diffusing far earlier.
If the IT investment rate is the relevant control, the PC variable is therefore measured
17Recall, the standard deviation of the flash density variable is 2.4 in our 48 state sample.
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Table 8. Growth, lightning, and IT
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(log) Real GSP per worker, 1991 -0.66 -0.82* -0.99** -0.76* -0.92** -1.19***
[0.41] [0.44] [0.45] [0.42] [0.43] [0.44]
Lightning -0.16** -0.09 -0.06 -0.09
[0.08] [0.10] [0.09] [0.09]
Computer presence, 2003 2.82** 1.72 -7.67
[1.20] [1.56] [4.58]
Internet presence, 2003 3.32*** 2.58* 9.65**
[1.13] [1.36] [4.33]
Constant 8.57* 8.39* 10.19** 8.48* 9.85** 13.76***
[4.40] [4.52] [4.57] [4.45] [4.44] [4.79]
Observations 48 48 48 48 48 48
R-squared 0.15 0.15 0.19 0.17 0.20 0.24
Notes. OLS estimates. The dependent variable is the yearly growth rate of GSP per worker over the period
1991-2007. Computer presence is the % of households with a computer at home, and Internet presence
is the % of households with access to Internet at home. Lightning is the (log) average number of flashes
per year per square km, measured by flash-detectors. Robust standard errors in brackets. Asterisks ***, **,
and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10%, respectively.
with error. This may account for the fact that the economic size of the impact of the
Internet variable is larger than that of PCs in Table 8.
The key result of the exercise is reported in columns 4-6. When the IT variables are
added to the equation, the flash density looses significance. The loss of significance
is mainly attributably to a lower point estimate, which essentially is cut in half. A
reasonable interpretation is that lightning appears in the growth regression due to its
impact on IT diffusion. Column 6 introduces all three variables at once. Despite the
obvious multicollinearity in this experiment (which explains the somewhat wobbly
behavior of the Internet slope estimates), Internet remains significant: this means that
the Internet dominates lightning (and computers) as a predictor of cross state growth
rates in the Internet era: 1991 onwards.
We believe the above analysis builds a fairly strong case in favour of the IT diffusion
hypothesis; that is, the thesis that lightning appears as a growth determinant in the
1990s due to the growing influence of digital technologies on economic growth.
3.2 Climate Shocks
While the IT diffusion hypothesis is a viable explanation for the lightning-growth cor-
relation, it is not a priori the only plausible one. Perhaps other climate related variables
exert an impact on growth, and at the same time happen to be correlated with the flash
density.
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To begin with, lightning correlates with various kinds of weather phenomena that
arise in the context of thunderstorms. Aside from lightning, thunderstorms produce
four weather phenomena: tornadoes, high winds, heavy rainfall, and hailstorms. It
seems plausible that these climate variables can induce changes in the growth rate in
individual states in their own right. Each of them destroy property (physical capital),
people (human capital), or both (Kunkel et al., 1999). By directly affecting the capital-
labor ratio, the consequence of, say, a tornado could be changes in growth attributable
to transitional dynamics. The nature of the transitional dynamics (i.e., whether growth
rises or falls) is unclear, as it may depend on whether the tornado destroys more phys-
ical or human capital (e.g., Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995, Ch.5).18 Nevertheless, since
the lightning-growth correlation pertains to a relatively short time span (so far), it is
hard to rule out that the above reasoning could account for it.
In addition, lightning correlates with temperature; hotter environments usually fea-
ture a higher flash density. Temperature has been documented to correlate with eco-
nomic activity within countries (e.g., Nordhaus, 2006; Dell et al., 2009); therefore, we
cannot rule out a priori that the link between lightning and growth is attributable to
the intervening influence of temperature.19
Hence, in an effort to examinewhether climate shocks could account for the lightning-
growth correlation, we gathered data on all of the above weather phenomena: temper-
ature, precipitation, tornadoes, hail size, and wind speed. In addition, we obtained
data on topography (i.e., elevation) and latitude. The latter is a useful catch-all mea-
sure of climate. For good measure, we also obtained data on sunshine, humidity, and
cloud cover (albeit it is not entirely clear why these weather phenomena should matter
to growth). In total, we have data on ten alternative climate/geography variables; the
details on the data are found in the Data Appendix.
With these data in hand, we ask two questions. First, ignoring lightning, do any
of these weather phenomena exhibit a correlation with growth which is similar to that
of lightning? That is, do any of them appear to become more strongly correlated with
growth during the period 1977-2007? Second, taking lightning into account, do any of
the above mentioned variables render lightning insignificant?
Tables 9 and 10 report the answer. As the lightning correlation does not depend
appreciably on whether we invoke 5, 10 or 15 year epoch length we have chosen to
focus on 10 year epochs. Results for 5 and 15 year epochs are similar, and available
upon request.
Columns 2-11 of Table 9 examine the potentially time varying impact from each
weather variable; column 1 reproduces the lightning regularity from Section 2.2. It is
18In a US context one may suspect a relatively larger impact on physical capital compared to human
capital; if so climate shocks would tend to instigate a growth acceleration in their aftermath, as a higher
marginal product of capital induces firms to invest in physical capital.
19Nordhaus (2006) and Dell et al. (2009) document a correlation between temperature and income
levels, not growth. In fact, Dell et al. (2008) find that temperature is not correlated with growth in rich
places, using cross-country data. Nevertheless, the link seems worth exploring.
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plain to see that none of the weather variables exhibit a similar growth correlation as
that involving lightning. In fact, it is always the case that the variable in question is
either insignificant, or tends to become less correlated with growth over time.
In Columns 2-11 of Table 10 we simultaneously include lightning and the various
alternative climate/geography controls. In all cases, lightning remains significantly
correlated with growth. In fact, when comparing the point estimate for lightning with
or without (column 1) additional controls, it emerges that the point estimate is virtually
unaffected.
In sum, these results suggest that the lightning-growth correlation is unlikely to be
attributable to other weather phenomena.
3.3 Institutions and Integration
An extensive literature examines the impact from historical factors on long-run de-
velopment. For instance, variation in colonial strategies seems to have an important
impact on institutional developments around the world, thus affecting comparative
economic development (e.g., Acemoglu et al., 2001). Similarly, initial relative factor en-
dowments, determined in large part by climate and soil quality, may well have affected
long-run development through inequality and human capital promoting institutions
(Engerman and Sokoloff, 2002; Galor et al., 2008). Thus, in many instances the initial
conditions that may have affected long-run developments are related to climate or ge-
ography. In the present context, therefore, it seems possible that the lightning-growth
correlationmay be picking up the influence from such long-run historical determinants
of prosperity. Naturally, the conventional understanding would be that "deep determi-
nants of productivity", e.g. determinants of political and economic institutions, should
have a fairly time invariant impact on growth. As a result, it would not be surprising if
such determinants do not exert a time varying impact on growth. But whether it is the
case or not is obviously an empirical matter.
To examine whether the lightning-growth nexus is attributable to such effects, we
obtained data on ten potential determinants of long-run performance for the US. The
source of the data is Mitchener and McLean (2003), who examine the determinants of
long-run productivity levels across US states. In addition, we collected state-level data
on three dimensions of global integration, related to international movements of goods
and capital. This leaves us with 13 different potential determinants of labor productiv-
ity growth, broadly capturing "institutions, geography and integration" (Rodrik et al.,
2004).20
As in Section 3.2 we ask whether these determinants, individually, exhibit a time
varying impact on growth, and whether their inclusion in the growth regression ren-
ders lightning insignificant.
20See the Data Appendix for details.
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Table 13. Growth regressions with trade & integration controls and lightning
INTEGRATION: (log) Agricultural Exports FDI per Agricultural Exports FDI per
exports per capita per capita exports per capita per capita
per capita per capita
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
(log) Real GSP per w., ini. -0.72 -1.02** -1.12** -0.41 -0.99** -1.10** -0.42
[0.45] [0.44] [0.43] [0.55] [0.44] [0.44] [0.56]
Lightning t78 87 0.07 0.15* 0.09 0.07
[0.10] [0.09] [0.11] [0.11]
Lightning t88 97 -0.07 -0.04 -0.05 -0.06
[0.08] [0.08] [0.09] [0.08]
Lightning t98 07 -0.22*** -0.23*** -0.20** -0.22***
[0.08] [0.08] [0.07] [0.07]
INTEGRATION t78 87 -0.18*** 0.25 -0.12 -0.20*** 0.28 -0.13
[0.05] [0.20] [0.16] [0.05] [0.20] [0.16]
INTEGRATION t88 97 -0.14** 0.2 -0.13 -0.14** 0.18 -0.11
[0.06] [0.22] [0.18] [0.06] [0.23] [0.19]
INTEGRATION t98 07 -0.01 0.37*** -0.42*** 0.01 0.31** -0.42***
[0.05] [0.12] [0.12] [0.05] [0.13] [0.13]
Observations 144 144 144 144 144 144 144
R-squared 0.15 0.22 0.16 0.13 0.28 0.19 0.18
Notes. Pooled OLS estimates. The dependent variable is the yearly growth rate of GSP per worker over
the periods 1977-1987, 1987-1997, and 1997-2007. All regressions include a constant and a full set of time-
dummies. Lightning is the (log) average number of flashes per year per square km, measured by flash-
detectors. Robust standard errors in brackets, adjusted for clustering at state level. Asterisks ***, **, and *
indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10%, respectively.
In Table 11 we examine the impact from various historical determinants of produc-
tivity one-by-one. Interestingly, in several cases the impact does seem to vary across
decades. Of particular note is column 11, which involves soldier mortality rates. Much
like lightning the partial correlation seems stronger at the end of the period, compared
to the beginning of the 1977-2007 period.
Table 12 includes both lightning and the individual controls. Since the soldier mor-
tality rates is the only variable we have found so far that exhibits a correlation with
growth that is qualitatively similar to that of lightning, the results reported in column
11 is of central importance. When both variables enter the growth regression only light-
ning retains explanatory power. The point estimate for the last period does decline a
bit, and the statistical significance of lightning is somewhat reduced. But soldier mor-
tality rates do not statistically dominate lightning in the specification. More broadly,
it is once again worth observing how stable the partial correlation between lightning
and growth seems to be. Comparing the results reported in column 1 (no historical
controls) for lightning to those reported in columns 2-11 it is clear that the coefficient
for lightning is quite robust.
Finally, Table 13 examines the potential influence from integration. Of particular
note is column 3, from which it is clear that the influence from exports seems to have
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increased over the period. This result may have a reasonable interpretation. The EU
common market (established in the early 1990s), and, perhaps more importantly, the
emergence of China and India in world markets may well have left an imprint on
growth. A likely path of influence would be trade. This can explain an intensification of
the impact from trade in the 1990s, on labor productivity growth, through greater divi-
sion of labor. While it thus seems that exports have become more important to growth
at the end of the 1977-2007 period, column 6 reveals that trade does not account for the
lightning-growth correlation.
4 Concluding Remarks
In theory, lightning should impact on IT diffusion. Higher lightning intensity leads
to more frequent power disruptions, which in turn reduces the longevity of IT equip-
ment. As a result, by inducing higher IT user cost, a higher lightning frequency should
hamper IT investments. By implications, high-tech societies may actually be quite vul-
nerable to climate shocks. Consistent with the temperate drift hypothesis, technolog-
ical change may therefore render societies more sensitive to climate phenomena that
previously were only of second order importance.
Empirically, we document that lightning activity is negatively correlated with mea-
sures of IT diffusion; computers and Internet hook-ups per household. Conditional on
standard controls, states with less lightning have adopted IT more rapidly than states
where lightning activity is more intensive.
Consistent with a detrimental impact on IT diffusion, we find that states with more
lightning have grown slower from about 1990 onwards. This pattern cannot be ac-
counted for by other climate phenomena, nor can it be explained by a time varying
influence from deep historical determinants of productivity.
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Appendix: Data description and Tables
Main variables:
1. Lightning. Our main measure of lightning density, originating from ground-
based flash sensors, is from the US National Lightning Detection Network Data-
base (NLDN). The NLDN consists of more than 100 remote, ground-based light-
ning sensors, which instantly detect the electromagnetic signals appearing when
lightning strikes Earth’s surface. The data is available as an average over the pe-
riod 1996-2005 for the 48 contiguous US states from Vaisala’s website:
http://www.vaisala.com. We find that lightning is not statistically different from
a constant plus white noise (see main text for analysis). Therefore, we extend
Vaisala’s data to the period 1977-2007. To investigate the time-series properties
of lightning, we use data on the number of thunder days (TD) per year by state,
available for the period 1901-1995. These data are collected as part of the Cli-
mate Change Detection and Attribution Program at the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). The raw data comes from 734 cooperative
observer stations and 121 first order stations (see Changnon, 2001 for a detailed
description). The data consists of monthly and yearly TD totals for 38 US states
over the period 1901-1995, 40 states over the period 1906-1995 and 42 states over
the period 1951-1995. It is available for purchase from the Midwestern Regional
Climate Center: http://mrcc.isws.illinois.edu/prod_serv/tstorm_cd/tstorm1.html.
From these data, we calculated the average yearly number of thunder days per
state. Ultimately, we are interested in average flash density (FD) by state rather
than thunder days per year. FDs are defined as the number of ground strikes per
sq km per year. We converted yearly TDs into FDs using the following formula
(Chisholm, 2000):
FD = 0.04 TD1.25.
2. Temperature and Precipitation. Data from the United States Historical Clima-
tology Network (USHCN) project, developed at NOAA’s National Climatic Data
Center (NCDC) to assist in the detection of regional climate change across the US.
The USHCN project has produced a dataset of daily and monthly records of basic
meteorological variables (maximum and minimum temperature, total precipita-
tion, snowfall, and snow depth) from over 1000 stations across the 48 contiguous
US states for the period 1900-2006. The precipitation data we use is corrected
by USHCN for the presence of outlier daily observations, time of data recording,
and time series discontinuities due to random station moves and other station
changes. The temperature data we use is additionally corrected for warming bi-
ases created by urbanization, and the replacement of liquid-in-glass thermome-
ters by electronic temperature measurement devices during the mid 1980s. We
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construct yearly average temperatures (expressed in degrees Celsius) and yearly
average precipitation totals (expressed in cm per year) for each state, as simple
averages of monthly data from 1221 stations across the country. The data is avail-
able at: http://cdiac.ornl.gov/epubs/ndp/ushcn/newushcn.html.
3. Latitude. Latitude at the center of the state, calculated from geographic coordi-
nates from the US Board on Geographic Names. The data is available at:
http://geonames.usgs.gov/domestic/download_data.htm.
4. Altitude. Approximate mean elevation by state. Data source: US Geological Sur-
vey, Elevations and Distances in the United States, 1983. Available from the US
Census Bureau at: http://www.census.gov/prod/2004pubs/04statab/geo.pdf.
5. Tornadoes, Wind, and Hail. The Storm Prediction Center of NOAA’s National
Weather Service Center provides data for tornadoes, wind, and hail for the pe-
riod 1950-2007. Data is available for the tornado occurrences and their damage
categories in the Enhanced Fujita (EF) scale (assigning 6 levels from 0 to 5). We
construct a measure of tornado intensity as the average damage category for all
tornado occurrences during a year. For all the estimations, we rescale the EF
categories from the original 0 to 5 scale to a 1 to 6 scale. Wind is measured
as the yearly average of wind speed, expressed in kilometers per hour. Hail
is measured as the average size of hail in centimeters. The data is available at
http://www.spc.noaa.gov/climo/historical.html.
6. Humidity, Sunshine and Cloudiness. Data from the "Comparative Climatic
Data for the United States through 2007", published by NOAA. (Relative) humid-
ity is the average percentage amount of moisture in the air, compared to the max-
imum amount of moisture that the air can hold at the same temperature and pres-
sure. Cloudiness is measured as the average number of days per year with 8/10
to 10/10 average sky cover (or with 7/8 to 8/8 average sky cover since July 1996).
Sunshine is the total time that sunshine reaches the Earth’s surface compared to
the maximum amount of possible sunshine from sunrise to sunset with clear sky
conditions. The data is available at http://www1.ncdc.noaa.gov/pub/data/ccd-
data/CCD-2007.pdf.
7. GSP per worker. Gross Domestic Product by state (GSP) per worker in chained
2000 US$. US Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) offers two series of real GSP.
The first is for the period 1977-1997, where industry classification is based on
the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) definitions. The second series cov-
ers the period 1997-2007 and relies on industrial classification based on the North
American industrial Classification System (NAICS). Both GSP series are available
at http://www.bea.gov/regional/gsp/. We build a single measure of real GSP,
extending levels of the series based on the SIC system with the yearly growth
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rates of the series based on the NAICS. This is equivalent to assuming that from
1997 onwards, the growth rate of GSP per worker calculated with the SIC sys-
tem equals the growth rate of real GSP calculated with the NAICS definitions.21
Based on this estimate for real GSP, we construct a yearly series of real GSP per
employed worker dividing real GSP by the number of employees per state. The
growth rate is measured in percentages. State-by-state data for the number of
employed workers is provided by the State Personal Income accounts at the US
BEA (available at: http://www.bea.gov/regional/spi).
8. Computers and Internet. Percentage of households with computer and per-
centage of households with Internet access at home in 2003. Data collected in
a supplement to the October 2003 US Current Population Survey, available at:
http://www.census.gov/population/socdemo/computer/2003/tab01B.xls.
Main variables for IT diffusion:
Human capital. This extended list of human capital variables is downloaded from
http://www.allcountries.org.
1. Enrollment rate: Public elementary and secondary school enrollment as a per-
centage of persons 5-17 years old. From “Digest of Education Statistics”, National
Center of Education Statistics (NCES), Institute of Education Sciences, US Depart-
ment of Education, http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/. Available at:
http://www.allcountries.org/uscensus/266publicelementaryandsecondaryschoolenrollment.html.
2. High school degree or higher: Persons with a high school degree or higher as a
percentage of persons 25 years and over. From “Digest of Education Statistics”,
National Center of Education Statistics (NCES), Institute of Education Sciences,
US Department of Education,
http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d03/tables/dt011.asp.
3. Bachelor’s degree or higher: Persons with a bachelor’s degree or higher as a
percentage of persons 25 years and over. Same source as high school degree or
higher.
4. College degree or higher: Persons with a college degree or higher as a percentage
of persons 25 years and over. Same source as high school degree or higher and
bachelor’s degree or higher.
21BEA warns against merging the level of the two series of real GSP directly, since the discontinuity
in the industrial classification system will obviously affect level and growth rate estimates. Our choice
of merging the growth rates of the two series can be justified recalling both the SIC and the NAICS aim
to classify production of all industries in each state, so that the growth rate of both GSP series in levels
is comparable. As a check, we computed the correlation between the growth rate of aggregate US GDP
and gross domestic income (GDI), since GDP corresponds to the NAICS-definition and GDI corresponds
to the SIC-definition (BEA, http://www.bea.gov/regional/gsp/). The correlation is higher than 0.99 for
different periods between 1929 and 2007.
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5. Graduate or professional degree: Persons with a graduate or professional degree
as a percentage of persons 25 years and over. Same source as high school degree
or higher, bachelor’s degree or higher, and college degree or higher.
Additional determinants of IT diffusion:
In addition to human capital, Caselli and Coleman (2001) suggest the following set
of determinants of computer technology diffusion across countries: real income, GDP
shares of different sectors, stock of human capital, amount of trade, and degree of inte-
gration to the world economy. We gathered similar data for US states, described below.
1. Shares of agriculture production, manufacturing production, and government
spending in GSP: Agriculture, forestry, fishing, and hunting production as % of
GSP; Manufacturing production as % of GSP, Total Government spending as %
of GSP.
2. Agricultural exports per capita: Agricultural exports per capita (US$). Total
value of Agricultural exports by state, from US Department of Agriculture, di-
vided by population. Available at:
http://www.ers.usda.gov/Data/StateExports/2006/SXHS.xls. Population data
from US Census Bureau.
3. Exports per capita: Exports per capita (US$). Total exports by state from US De-
partment of Commerce divided by population. Total exports data available for
purchase from US Census Bureau at
http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/reference/products/catalog/stateweb.html.
Population data from the US Census Bureau. Freely available for the period 1990-
1999 at: http://allcountries.org/uscensus/1326_u_s_exports_by_state_of.html.
4. FDI per capita: Gross value of Property, Plant, and Equipment (PPE) of Nonbank
US Affiliates, per capita (US$). Data on PPE available fromUS BEA for the period
1999-2006 available at: http://bea.doc.gov/international/xls/all_gross_ppe.xls.
For the year 1981 and the period 1990-1997 available at:
http://allcountries.org/uscensus/1314_foreign_direct_investment_in_the_u.html.
Population data from US Census Bureau.
5. Institutional and historical determinants of productivity: All variables are taken
from Mitchener and McClean (2003).
(a) % workforce in mining, 1880: Percentage of the workforce employed in
mining in 1880.
(b) Average no. cooling degree days: The average number of cooling degree
days is computed as the number of days in which the average air tempera-
ture rose above 65 degrees Fahrenheit (18 degrees Celsius) times the number
42
of degrees on those days which the average daily air temperature exceeded
65 over the year.
(c) % of 1860 population in slavery: The total number of slaves as a percentage
of the total population of each state in 1860.
(d) % of 1860 population on large slave plantations: The number of slaves
owned by slaveholders having more than 20 slaves as a percentage of the
total population of each state in 1860.
(e) Access to navigable water: An indicator variable that takes the value of one
if a state borders the ocean/Great Lake /river, and zero otherwise.
(f) Settler origin: A series of indicator variables which take on positive values
if a state, prior to statehood, had ties with that colonial power.
(g) Average annual soldier mortality in 1829-1838, 1839-1854, %: Soldier mor-
tality rates at the state level are derived using US soldier mortality data for
individual forts. Quarterly data were collected by the US Surgeon General
and Adjutant General’s Offices 1829-1838 and by the US Surgeon General’s
Office for 1839-1854. Mitchener and McClean obtained the yearly mortal-
ity rates by dividing the number of deaths each year by the average annual
"mean strength" of soldiers.
6. Socio-demographic indicators: Data on religiousness, race and ethnicity, urban-
ization and age structure of the population; from various sources.
(a) Church attendance, average 2004-06: Data from a Gallup Poll analysis, con-
ducted between January 2004 and March 2006, based on responses to the
question, "How often do you attend church or synagogue – at least once
a week, almost every week, about once a month, seldom, or never?" Data
available at: http://www.gallup.com/poll/22579/church-attendance-lowest-
new-england-highest-south.aspx#2
(b) % of white population, black population, and population of Hispanic ori-
gin: Data for race and Hispanic origin for the US, regions, divisions, and
states (100-Percent Data). Source: US Census Bureau. Data available at:
http://www.census.gov/population/www/documentation/twps0056/tabA-
03.xls (for 1980), and
http://www.census.gov/population/www/documentation/twps0056/tabA-
01.xls (for 1990).
(c) % of urban population: Rural and Urban population 1900-1990 (released
1995). Source: US Census Bureau. Available at:
http://www.census.gov/population/www/censusdata/files/urpop0090.txt
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(d) %of population 15 years or less, and% of population between 15-64 years:
Population by broad age group. “Demographic Trends in the 20th Cen-
tury”, Table 7, parts D and E. Source: US Census Bureau. Available at:
http://www.census.gov/prod/2002pubs/censr-4.pdf
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Table A1. Tests for whether lightning is a constant plus white noise
Breusch-Godfrey test Runs test
test-statistic p-value No. lags (a) test-statistic p-value
Aggregate US 0.02 0.88 1 0.46 0.65
Alabama 0.61 0.43 1 -0.22 0.82
Arizona 0.16 0.69 1 -0.13 0.90
Arkansas 0.16 0.69 1 1.67 0.09
California 0.48 0.49 1 -0.12 0.91
Colorado 0.12 0.73 1 0.25 0.80
Florida 0.02 0.90 1 -0.70 0.49
Georgia 0.00 0.95 1 0.25 0.80
Idaho 0.02 0.90 1 0.72 0.47
Illinois 0.20 0.65 1 -1.64 0.10
Indiana 1.67 0.20 1 -0.22 0.82
Iowa 0.20 0.66 1 -0.22 0.82
Kansas 0.58 0.44 1 0.84 0.40
Kentucky 0.24 0.62 1 0.25 0.80
Louisiana 0.06 0.81 1 -0.70 0.49
Maine 1.05 0.31 1 0.25 0.80
Maryland 0.01 0.94 1 0.25 0.80
Massachusetts 1.29 0.26 1 0.72 0.47
Michigan 0.33 0.56 1 -0.70 0.49
Minnesota 0.00 0.98 1 -1.64 0.10
Mississippi 0.98 0.32 1 -2.12 0.03
Missouri 0.19 0.66 1 0.36 0.72
Montana 0.71 0.40 1 -2.12 0.03
Nebraska 0.22 0.64 1 -0.70 0.49
Nevada 0.02 0.88 1 0.72 0.47
New Mexico 1.25 0.26 1 -0.22 0.82
New York 7.52 0.02 2 0.36 0.72
North Carolina 0.74 0.39 1 -1.45 0.15
North Dakota 5.30 0.07 2 -0.22 0.82
Ohio 0.03 0.85 1 -0.70 0.49
Oklahoma 2.97 0.09 1 -1.64 0.10
Oregon 0.64 0.42 1 -1.45 0.15
Pennsylvania 5.25 0.07 2 0.72 0.47
South Carolina 0.23 0.63 1 -0.22 0.82
South Dakota 2.93 0.09 1 1.33 0.18
Tennessee 0.22 0.64 1 -0.22 0.82
Texas 3.79 0.05 1 -0.22 0.82
Utah 4.54 0.03 1 -0.70 0.49
Virginia 4.68 0.03 1 -0.22 0.82
Washington 0.48 0.49 1 -0.61 0.54
West Virginia 4.56 0.03 1 0.72 0.47
Wisconsin 0.57 0.45 1 -1.17 0.24
Wyoming 0.09 0.77 1 -0.22 0.82
Notes. The residuals are obtained from regressing lightning on a constant for each of the 42 states over
the period 1977-1995. H0: Residuals are not serially correlated. Lightning is average number of flashes
per year per square km, measured at weather stations.
(a) Lags selected by Schwarz’s information criteria.
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On the Impact of Digital Technologies on Corruption:
Evidence from U.S. States and across Countries
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Abstract
Does increased Internet use reduce corruption? To examine the question we
develop a novel identification strategy for Internet diffusion. By instigating equip-
ment damage, power disruptions increase the user cost of IT capital, which in turn
lowers the speed of Internet diffusion. A natural phenomenon causing power dis-
ruptions is lightning activity. Using global satellite data and data from ground-
based lightning detection censors, we construct lightning density data for a large
cross section of countries and for the contiguous U.S. states. Empirically, lightning
density is a strong instrument for Internet diffusion. In conformity with OLS esti-
mates, IV estimates show that Internet diffusion has indeed reduced the extent of
corruption across countries and across U.S. states.
Keywords: Corruption, Internet, Instrumental variables estimation, Lightning.
JEL Classification codes: K4, O1, H0.
1 Introduction
Corruption is commonly perceived to be a major stumbling block on the road to pros-
perity. Aside from retarding growth (Mauro, 1995), corruption entails "fiscal leakage",
which reduces the ability of poor countries to supply public services like schooling and
health care (e.g. Reinikka and Svensson, 2004). Put simply, it is a government failure
one would like to dispose of.
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†All the authors are affiliated with the Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen.
Contact: Thomas Barnebeck Andersen (thomas.barnebeck.andersen@econ.ku.dk), Jeanet Bentzen
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The present paper provides evidence that the spread of the Internet has reduced
the extent of corruption during the 1990s and early years of the 21st century. Theoreti-
cally, there are two fundamental avenues through which the Internet has been able to
accomplish this feat. First, theWorldWideWeb (WWW) is a newmajor source of infor-
mation.1 By disseminating information of official wrong-doing the "risk of detection"
inevitably rises for politicians and civil servants. Second, the Internet is the chief vehi-
cle for the provision of E-government worldwide.2 By allowing citizens direct access
to government services online, E-government obviates bureaucrats’ role as intermedi-
aries between the government and the public, thus limiting the interaction between
potentially corrupt officials and the public. Moreover, online systems, by construc-
tion, require standardized rules and procedures. This reduces bureaucratic discretion
and increases transparency as compared to the "arbitrariness" available to civil servants
when dealing with the public on a case-by-case basis.
The Internet is a new technology, which greatly influences our estimation approach.
Figure 1 illustrates its remarkable growth from 1990; in roughly 15 years the number of
Web sites has grown by 100 million.
To examine the impact of the WWW we estimate the impact of changes in Internet
users on changes in corruption levels from 1990s to 2006. Using cross-country data as
well as data for the 48 contiguous U.S. states we find that increasing Internet penetra-
tion lowers corruption. The impact is both economically and statistically significant.
The correlation is robust to the inclusion of a large set of corruption determinants, both
across countries and states.
In order to establish causality we develop an identification strategy based on find-
ing exogenous variation in the costs of using IT equipment in general, and the Internet
in particular. As explained in detail below, computer equipment is highly sensitive to
power disruptions: power surges can lead to equipment failure and damage. A higher
frequency of power disruptions thereby leads to increasing costs of IT equipment, ei-
ther by elevating capital depreciation or as a result of additional costs that needs to
be borne in order to protect equipment from power disruptions. A natural phenom-
enon which produces power surges is lightning activity. In fact, one third of all power
disruptions in the U.S. are related to lightning activity. We therefore hypothesize that
higher lightning intensity increases the costs of using IT equipment and thus lowers
the speed of Internet diffusion.
Using global satellite data assembled by the U.S. National Aeronautics and Space
1Technically, there is a distinction between the Internet and the World Wide Web (WWW).
The latter was launched in 1991 by CERN (the European Organisation for Nuclear Research),
whereas the history of “the Internet” arguably is much older. See Hobbes’ Internet Timeline v8.2
<http://www.zakon.org/robert/internet/timeline/>. In this paper, we define the Internet/WWW as
the network of networks using the TCP/IP/HTTP protocols, which was spawned by the launch ofWWW.
2More than 80% of all E-government is Internet based (West, 2005). Moreover, in Britain, Direct-
gov, an official Web page launced in 2004, aims to contain the entire British government in one place,
<http://www.direct.gov.uk/en/index.htm>.
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Figure 1: The figure shows the total number of Web sites on the Internet, 1990-2006.
Generally, the numbers refer to December 1st in the individual year. Source: Hobbes’
Internet Timeline v8.2 <http://www.zakon.org/robert/internet/timeline/>.
Administration (NASA) we construct country and state level measures of lightning
density. In addition, for the U.S. we also employ lightning data from the U.S. Na-
tional Lightning Detection Network’s ground-based lightning detection censors. We
then document, using cross-country data, that greater lightning density is associated
with more frequent power disruptions per year, which in turn is associated with a
slower speed of Internet diffusion. In addition, using U.S. data, we show that the re-
duced form relationship between lightning density and corruption does not exist prior
to the inception of theWWW; it only exists from 1991 onwards. These falsification tests
make probable that the lightning instrument meets the appropriate exclusion restric-
tion: lightning affects corruption only through its impact on Internet penetration. If
our instrument were capturing other determinants of corruption, one would expect to
see a correlation between the two, both before and after the introduction of the WWW.
Moreover, the falsification tests support a causal link between lightning density and
the speed of Internet penetration, making the former a viable candidate instrument for
the latter. Indeed, lightning density turns out to be a strong instrument for the speed of
Internet diffusion across the U.S. states as well as across the world. Our 2SLS estimates
confirm the OLS results: rising Internet use over the 1990s reduced corruption.
The present paper is related to the literature which studies the determinants of the
level of corruption. Notable contributions include Ades and di Tella (1999), Treisman
(2000), Brunetti and Weder (2003), Persson et al. (2003), Glaeser and Saks (2006), and
Licht et al. (2007). Conceptually, Brunetti and Weder (2003) is perhaps the closest
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precursor to the present paper. The authors find a corruption-reducing impact of a
free press, and argues that this shows that an independent press works to increase
transparency. In the present case we expect the Internet to affect corruption for partly
the same reason.3
The political economy literature, which studies the impact of information on gov-
ernance more generally, is also related. This literature suggests that a better informed
public serves to discipline the political establishment, thus affecting governance (e.g.
Besley and Burgess, 2002; Strömberg, 2004; Reinikka and Svensson, 2004; Eisensee and
Strömberg, 2007; Ferraz and Finan, 2008).
Finally, the paper is related to the literature which studies the determinants of the
spread of the personal computer (e.g. Caselli and Coleman, 2001) and the Internet (e.g.
Chinn and Fairlie, 2007) across countries. This literature has documented a positive
impact of GDP per capita and the electricity infrastructure on Internet penetration,
and of human capital levels on the adoption of computers. Consequently, the level
of Internet penetration should a priori be viewed as endogenous.4
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we provide some anecdotal evi-
dence on the Internet’s merits as an anti-corruption technology. In Section 3, we present
our empirical specifications of choice. Section 4 outlines the identification strategy in
detail; in particular, we explain how lightning activity impacts on digital equipment,
and provides details on the data. Section 4 then provides an analysis of how the In-
ternet has affected corruption across the U.S. states, whereas Section 5 provides cross-
country evidence. Section 6 concludes. Extensive robustness testing has been relegated
to appendices.
2 Anecdotal Evidence
There is by now an abundance of anecdotal evidence supporting the two aforemen-
tioned fundamental avenues through which the Web has been able to reduce corrup-
tion. In this section we provide some illustrative examples.
Turning first to the Internet’s role as a major source of information, the New York
Times (May 24, 2005) reports on the self-appointed Chinese investigative journalist,
Li Xinde, who maintains an anti-corruption Web site targeting official corruption in
China.5 This journalist travels around China with a laptop and a digital camera inves-
3Evidence to the importance of mass media more broadly, but still in the context of combating corrup-
tion, is provided in the interesting study by McMillan and Zoido (2004).
4There is strong theoretical basis for believing that the initial adoption of new technologies is endoge-
nous to governance. New technologies may create political as well as economic “losers”, for which reason
incumbent entrepreneurs and politicians may try to block adoption (Mokyr, 1990; Parente and Prescott,
1999; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2001). It seems plausible that places with widespread corruption, for ex-
ample, may have adopted the Internet later, due to the influence of politicians, civil servants, or both. A
positive impact from governance indicators, or income per capita, on the level of Internet users can be
rationalized by this mechanism.
5“Death by a Thousand Blogs” by Nicholas D. Kristof. The Washington Post (May 2, 2007) also ran a
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tigating official wrongdoing. He then writes about it on his Web site, making sure to
leave town before local authorities can arrest him. The Web site has been instrumen-
tal in exposing a corruption case involving the deputy mayor of Jining, a large Chinese
city. The site featured an investigative report and a series of photos showing the deputy
mayor kneeling and crying, begging not to be reported to the police. The deputymayor
was subsequently arrested.6
In 2001 an Indian news Web site <www.Tehelka.com> nearly toppled the Indian
government after documenting high-level corruption. The reporters posed as arms
dealers and documented negotiations with top politicians and bureaucrats over the
size of required side payments to get the order; in some instances the reporters even
got the delivery of the bribe on camera. Consequently, numerous politicians and top
officials had to resign, chief among them the defence minister George Fernandes.7
In 2004 judge John Gomery headed a commission investigating a kickback program
in which the Canadian Liberal government had given millions to Montreal-based ad-
vertising firms. These funds were intended for publicizing certain government pro-
grams, but were instead funneled to political allies. While the hearings were public the
judge banned the official media from publishing reports on what was being uncovered
until a final rulingwasmade. The official media respected the ban but a Canadian blog-
ger bypassed it by collaboratingwith aU.S.Web site<http://www.captainsquartersblog.com>.8
The ensuing public resentment from what was disseminated through the Web site ar-
guably cost the Liberals their parliamentary majority in the June 2004 election.9
Undoubtedly, cases like these are now familiar to politicians and civil servants
across the world, which serves to lower the incentive to engage in shady dealings.
Turning next to the Internet’s role as the chief vehicle for the provision of E-government,
consider the OPEN (Online Procedures Enhancement for Civil Applications) system of
Seoul Municipality, South Korea, a Web portal which allows citizens online (real-time)
monitoring of applications for a variety of municipal licenses (Bhatnager, 2003). The
system was initiated based on a recognition that extensive regulations, resulting from
a large expansion of the municipal bureaucracy, had increased the scope for corrup-
tion. After declaring "war on corruption", OPEN was seen as one element of a broad
range of activities aimed at lowering corruption. Besides the abovementioned online
(different) story featuring Li Xinde exposing corruption in China.
6Another fascinating story from China concerns the village of Shengyou in Hebei Province, which saw
a clash between village peasants and numerous armed thugs sent by property developers to grab their
land. A video smuggled out by one of the villagers shows his fellow residents being beaten with staves
and shovels. Six villagers were killed and around 50 were wounded. With copies of the video circulating
the Internet, the authorities reacted promptly: A mayor and a Communist Party chief of the municipality
to which the village belongs were sacked. The official media reported that 22 people had been arrested,
including the bosses of a firm contracted by a local state-owned power plant to build a waste-processing
plant on the village fields. See “Turning ploughshares into staves”, The Economist (June 23, 2005).
7See “The Sting That Has India Writhing” by Celia W. Dugger, The New York Times (March 16, 2001).
8See “Shivering Mr Martin’s timbers”, The Economist (April 7, 2004).
9See also “Did blogosphere influence vote? Corruption inquiry covered only on Web might have
tipped Canadian election” by David Kopel, The Rocky Mountain News (January 28, 2006).
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monitoring service, the portal explains the various elements of the anticorruption fight;
it displays an anticorruption index; and it informs citizens on rules, regulations, and
procedures.
In India, the celebrated "Bhoomi" program from the state of Karnataka represents
an illustrative example of how E-government serves to limit the interface between civil
servants and the public. Starting in 1998 the programme aimed to computerize land
records; by now more than 20 million landholdings belonging to the state’s 6.7 million
landowners has been registered. Before online registrationwas available citizens had to
seek out village accountants to register, a process which involved considerable delays
and the need for bribes to be paid. With the online system there is no longer a need for
the official "middlemen" (Bhatnager, 2003).
Practitioners such as Transparency International has argued in its 2003 Global Cor-
ruption Report that E-government offers a partial solution to the problem of corruption.
It is widely seen as a tool for public sector system transformation, with the potential to
transform governmental efficiency, transparency, citizen trust, and even political par-
ticipation (West, 2008). While this potential has yet to be realized in full, governments
do seem to undertake significant investments in setting up E-government systems. In-
deed, and despite a dearth of hard data, West (2008) argues (based on an analysis of
1,667 national governmentWeb sites in 198 countries) that 50% of all governments offer
Web sites with services that are fully executable online, 96% offer access to publications,
and 75% offer access to databases.
3 Specification
Since governance indicators, like the prevalence of corruption, tend to be persistent
over time, empirical work on the determinants of corruption usually seeks to explain
differences in corruption levels across U.S. states or across countries. In the present
case, however, the inevitable choice of focus is on changes in corruption. The Internet
is a recent phenomenon, and, as such, cannot have affected corruption levels prior to
its inception, adoption and widespread use. Consequently, we study whether changes
in Internet penetration can explain changes in corruption over the time-period during
which the Internet has been in operation.
We will mainly rely on the following parsimonious specification:
DCi = α0 + α1DINTERNETi + α2Cinitial,i + εi, (1)
whereDCi is the change in corruption levels between an initial and a final year, C f inal,i 
Cinitial,i and DINTERNETi is the change in Internet penetration, INTERNETf inal,i  
INTERNETinitial,i. The inclusion of Cinitial,i makes explicit that changes in corruption
almost inevitably is a function of the initial level. For example, a country with no cor-
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ruption obviously cannot experience reductions in corruption levels. Notice that this
also has the virtue of automatically controlling for (a potentially large set of) variables
which may affect the level of corruption.
To see the latter point more clearly, observe that (1) is equivalent to the following
levels regression with a lagged dependent variable:
C f inal,i = α0 + α1DINTERNETi + (α2 + 1)Cinitial,i + εi. (2)
Accordingly, all time invariant structural characteristics affecting the level of corruption
will be picked up by Cinitial,i. This reduces the scope for omitted variable bias signifi-
cantly.
Of course, while specification (1) reduces the likelihood of omitted variable bias,
which translates into Cov(DINTERNETi, εi) 6= 0, it does not rule it out. Time-varying
characteristics may be omitted, causing Cov(DINTERNETi, εi) = 0 to fail. Hence, to
check the robustness of the link between changes in Internet penetration and changes
in levels of corruption we also invoke specifications of the form:
DCi = α0 + α1DINTERNETi + α2Cinitial,i + X0initial,iα3 + ei, (3)
where X contains additional controls. Standard control variables will include the level
of income per capita (or GDP per capita in the cross-country context) as well as the
growth rate of the same; the latter in an effort to check for time-varying corruption de-
terminants. When we study the U.S. sample, where we use an outcome based measure
of corruption (total convictions), we will also include a measure of state size (i.e, state
population) in the set of basic controls to ensure that all "scale effects" are pruned from
the data. These controls are employed in both the OLS and 2SLS setting.
In addition to these controls we also examine the robustness of the partial corre-
lation between DINTERNETi and changes in corruption to the inclusion of a much
larger set of corruption determinants. It is worth stressing that adding regressors
comes at a cost in terms of an increased risk of measurement error, which may bias
all estimates. For this reason, we only use the expanded set of controls to study partial
correlations; our robustness analysis documents that the partial correlation between
DINTERNET and DC is robust across countries and U.S. states.
In spite of these checks one may worry that the magnitude of the obtained esti-
mate for α1 could be misleading on account of Cov(DINTERNETi, ei) 6= 0. To address
this concern we employ an IV approach. The next section describes our identification
strategy in detail.
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4 Identification
4.1 Theory
In order to explain changes in Internet use from the time of the Web’s inception to
present-day, one needs to explain IT investments. In this regard the user cost of IT cap-
ital plays a central role. A higher level of user cost implies a lower desired (long-run) IT
capital stock, which ceteris paribus will imply lower IT investments during adjustment.
By implication, the spread of the Internet will occur at a slower pace.
The identification strategy employed in the present paper is therefore to find exoge-
nous determinants of the user costs associated with digital equipment in general, and
therefore the Internet in particular. As is well known, the user cost of capital depends,
among other things, on the rate of capital depreciation (Hall and Jorgenson, 1967). IT
capital depreciation is one important avenue through which our instrument affects the
Internet diffusion process.
Digital equipment, such as the computer, is highly sensitive to power disruptions.
Such disruptions are likely to cause down-time, though sudden power surges may also
damage the equipment and randomly destroy or alter data. In other words, power dis-
ruptions tend to increase the user cost of IT capital. A natural phenomenonwhich dam-
ages digital equipment, by producing power failures, is lightning activity (e.g., Shim et
al., 2000 Ch. 2; Chisholm, 2000).
Perhaps surprisingly, the influence from lightning activity is far from trivial. The
National Lightning Safety Institute, a nonprofit organization, reports that lightning in
the United States alone accounted for more than 100,000 laptop and desktop computer
losses in 1997.10 NASA (2007) points out that the main impetus to lightning research
in the late 1960s was the danger of lightning to aerospace vehicles and solid-state elec-
tronics used in computers and other electronic devices.11 In order to understand why
lightning is so problematic some remarks on the physics of power supply and distrib-
ution are required.
Power plants create commercial electric power with alternating voltage. Alternat-
ing voltage, V(t), as a function of time, t, takes the form of a sinusoidal wave, i.e.
V(t) = V0  sin(2pi  f  t), where f is the number of oscillations per second ( f is usually
expressed in hertz (Hz), where f Hz means f cycles per second). The time required
for the pattern to be repeated is the period T = 1/ f . Whenever this sinusoidal wave
changes size, shape, frequency, develops notches, etc., technically, there is a power dis-
turbance.
10<http://www.lightningsafety.com/nlsi_lls/nlsi_annual_usa_losses.htm>
11Solid-state electronics refers to an electronic device in which electricity flows through solid semicon-
ductor crystals rather than through vacuum tubes. Transistors, made of one or more semiconductors, are
at the heart of modern solid-state devices. In the case of integrated circuits, millions of transistors can be
involved. Microprocessors are the most complicated integrated circuits. They are composed of millions of
transistors that have been configured as thousands of individual digital circuits, each of which performs
some specific logic function (see Kressel 2007 for an enjoyable discussion with a historical perspective).
54
It is important to appreciate that computers to this day remain extremely sensitive
to such disturbances. For more than a century the reliability of the electricity grid has
rested at 99.9%, or so-called "three nines" reliability. Three-nines reliability permits
roughly 9 hours of outages per year. This was sufficient when the economy was built
around light bulbs and electric motors. But microprocessor-based controls and com-
puter networks demand at least 99.9999% reliability (or "six nines" reliability).12 This
amounts to only seconds of allowable outages per year.
The reason why such high reliability is required is that equipment based on solid-
state electronics, such as computer chips, is constructed to work under conditions of
a "clean" sinusoidal wave form. The power supply of a digital device converts the
alternating current to direct current with a much reduced voltage. Digital processing of
information works by having transistors "turn" this small voltage on and off at several
gigahertz (Kressel, 2007). If the wave becomes disturbed or distorted, the conversion
process can become corrupted. This may result in equipment failure. In fact, sensitivity
to small distortions increases with the miniaturization of transistors, which is the key
to increasing speed in microprocessors (Kressel, 2007). Voltage disturbances measuring
less than one cycle are sufficient to crash servers, computers, and other microprocessor-
based devices (Yeager and Stalhkopf, 2000; Electricity Power Research Institute, 2003).
To put it differently, at a 60 Hz frequency (the standard in the U.S.) this means that
a power disturbance of a duration less than 1/60th of a second is enough to crash a
computer!
By some estimates, lightning is the direct cause of one third of all power quality
disturbances in the United States (Chisholm and Cummins, 2006). Moreover, the prob-
ability of lightning-caused power interruptions or equipment damage scales linearly
with lightning density (Chisholm, 2000; Chisholm and Cummins, 2006).13 As a result,
lightning-caused computer failure is a quite pervasive phenomenon.
Some of the most noted instances of lightning triggered computer failures relate to
airports. For example, according to Germany’s Federal Office for Information Security
(Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, BSI), a major German airport
experienced a lightning strike very close to the air traffic control tower. Despite the ex-
ternal lightning protection system that had been installed (a lightning conductor), the
computerized fire extinguishing system in the IT area was triggered by the incidence,
and, as a result, all airport operations were paralyzed for two hours (BSI, 2004). The
New York Times (July 3, 1999) reports how air traffic across the northeastern United
States was disrupted after lightning hit New England’s main air traffic control center
12See for example National Energy Technology Laboratory (2003). Yeager and Stalhkopf (2000) actually
argue that “nine nines” reliability is needed. See also “The power industry’s quest for the high nines”,
The Economist (March 22, 2001).
13This linear scaling can be expressed precisely. Let NS denote the number of strikes to a conducter per
100 km of power line length, h the average height (in meters) of the conducter above ground level, and
GFD the ground flash density, then NS = 3.8  GFD  h0.45 (see Chisholm, 2000).
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in Nashua, N.H.14 After the lightning strike the mainframe computer began report-
ing error messages to technicians, apparently because devices attached to it were not
running properly.
In general, lightning discharges can enter electronic equipment inside a residence
in four principal ways (IEEE, 2005). First, lightning can strike the network of power,
phone, and cable television wiring. This network, particularly when elevated, acts
as an effective collector of lightning surges. The wiring conducts the surges directly
into the residence, and then to the connected equipment. In fact, the initial lightning
impulse is so strong that equipment connected to cables up to 2 km away from the site
of the strike can be damaged.15 Second, when lightning strikes directly to or nearby air
conditioners, satellite dishes, exterior lights, etc., the wiring of these devices can carry
surges into the residence. Third, lightning may strike nearby objects such as trees,
flagpoles, road signs, etc., which are not directly connected to the residence. When
this happens, the lightning strike radiates a strong electromagnetic field, which can be
picked up by the wiring in the building, producing large voltages that can damage
equipment. Finally, lightning can strike directly into the structure of the building. This
latter type of strike is extremely rare, even in areas with a high lightning density.
Accordingly, if computer equipment is left unprotected, high lightning intensity
will work so as to increase the user cost of digital capital by elevating the rate of capital
depreciation. Of course, steps may be taken to protect the equipment. A high-quality
surge protector provides protection against voltage spikes, for example. High-tech
companies install generators to supplement their power needs, thereby insuring them-
selves against power failure. They also add "uninterruptedly power sources" relying on
batteries to power computers until generators kick in. These initiatives, however, will
in any case increase the costs of acquiring digital equipment, and thereby the user cost
of IT capital. The crux of the matter is that if one lives in an environment with a high
annual lightning density, this adds to the costs of using modern electronics, including
a computer.16
In the discussion abovewe have focused on the impact of power quality on themar-
ginal costs of IT capital. But this is not the only way in which lightning may matter for
Internet diffusion. In areas with frequent and prolonged power disruptions and out-
ages, the marginal benefit of owning a computer is surely diminished. This mechanism
14“Lightning Hits Control Center And Grounds Many Planes” by Matthew L. Wald.
15According to BSI (2004, p. 258), with discharges of several hundred thousand volts, lightning strikes
can achieve currents of up to 200,000 amperes. This enormous electrical energy is released and dies away
within a period of 50-100 microseconds. A lightning strike of this order of magnitude originating from
a distance of about 2 km will still cause voltage peaks that are capable of destroying sensitive electronic
devices in the power lines of a building.
16Besides, the abovementioned protective devises are not necessarily enough to ensure against damage.
According to the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), a typical surge protector
will not protect equipment from a nearby lightning strike (see <http://www.lightningsafety.noaa.gov/
indoors.htm>). Generators, in turn, do not react fast enough and can deliver dirty power; batteries are
expensive to maintain and may also not react fast enough. See e.g., “The power industry’s quest for the
high nines”, The Economist (March 22, 2001).
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will also work to lower the speed of Internet diffusion.
Consequently, lightning matters to Internet diffusion in two ways: by inducing
power disturbances, it increases the marginal costs as well as lowers the marginal ben-
efits of IT capital. This is not to say that these two complementary channels necessar-
ily are equally relevant everywhere. In the U.S. sample we would conjecture that the
benefit channel is of secondary relevance; power outages and disruptions are likely
of too short a duration to seriously impact on the perceived benefits from IT. In the
cross-country sample, however, both the cost channel and the benefit channel may be
relevant, especially so in poor countries. For this reason we would expect a stronger
impact of lightning on Internet penetration in the cross-country context, compared to
the U.S. sample.17
Against this background we propose lightning density as an instrument for the
speed at which Internet use per capita changed over the period in question. Schemati-
cally we can express the theory in the following way
LIGHTNING DENSITY  ! POWER DISTURBANCES  ! INTERNET USE, (4)
where the second arrow implicitly subsumes the impact of power disturbances on the
costs and benefits of IT capital.
Lightning is certainly exogenous in a deep sense. However, this does not ensure
validity of the exclusion restriction. Consider the following example: Climate-related
circumstances may map into levels of corruption (indirectly capturing e.g. the resource
curse mechanism), and lightning may be more pronounced in some climate zones com-
pared to others. As mentioned in Section 3, however, the inclusion of Cinitial ensures
that time invariant determinants of corruption are (implicitly) controlled for; the re-
source curse mechanism is therefore unlikely to pose a problem vis-à-vis the exclusion
restriction. Rather, validity of the exclusion restriction requires that lightning has no
direct impact on changes in corruption over the period under study, conditional on the
initial level of corruption, Cinitial , and the (initial) level of income per capita. Formally,
let z denote the lightning density; validity requires Cov(e, z) = 0, where e is the error
term in (3).
Naturally, with only one instrument a formal test of the exclusion restriction is not
feasible. However, informal tests are possible. Hence, in the analysis below we con-
struct various falsification tests designed to shed light on the plausibility of the exclu-
sion restriction.
17Some may instinctively believe that the marginal cost of protecting the computer (completely) from
lightning also is negligible in the U.S. context. In this regard William A. Chisholm has suggested to us
in personal correspondence that a laptop computer with battery and wireless Internet access may indeed
be completely protected from lightning at a cost of about $200 extra. This is hardly a trivial expense.
However, and more importantly, these measures will not protect the nearby cell-phone tower providing
wireless infrastructure. The point being that the cost of wireless service will reflect the local providers’
costs in replacing equipment when the tall tower is struck repeatedly by lightning. Hence, either way,
lightning density will elevate the costs of being online.
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4.2 Data on the Instrument: Lightning density
The raw data for flash densities (flashes per km2 per year) comes from NASA. The
Global Hydrology and Climate Center (GHCC) has designed, constructed, and de-
ployed numerous types of groundbased, airborne, and spacebased sensors to detect
lightning activity and to characterize the electrical behavior of thunderstorms as part of
their research on atmospheric science. The GHCC’s spacebased sensors detect all forms
of lightning activity over land and sea 24 hours a day. Thus, such sensors allowed the
development of the first global database of lightning activity, which has been used so
far for severe storm detection and analysis, and for lightning-atmosphere interaction
studies.
In this paper we rely on the data from the Optical Transient Detector (OTD), a space
based sensor launched on April 3, 1995. For a period of roughly 5 years the satellite
orbited Earth once every 100 minutes at an altitude of 740 km. At any given instant it
viewed a 1300 km 1300 km region of Earth. "Flashes" were determined by comparing
the luminance of adjoining frames of OTD optical data. When the difference was larger
than a specified threshold value, an "event" was recorded.18 These satellite-based data
are archived and cataloged by the GHCC, where they are also made available, free of
charge.19
We apply the data from a high-resolution (0.5 degree latitude  0.5 degree longi-
tude) grid of total lightning bulk production across the planet, expressed as a flash
density, from the completed 5 year OTD mission.20 Figure 2 provides a world map of
the average flash density over the 5 years period.
We construct average flash densities for each country and U.S. state by first map-
ping the corresponding geographic areas into the lightning data grid and then taking
the average of flash densities within each of these areas. The coordinates describing the
areas are taken from the GEOnet Names Server (GNS) at the U.S. National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency’s (NGA),21 and the U.S. Board on Geographic Names’ (U.S. BGN)
database of foreign geographic names and features.22 We used the GNS database re-
leased on October 7, 2008.23 The GNS data covers the entire planet with the exception
of the U.S. and the Antarctica. The area for the U.S. was estimated using geographic
features for the 48 contiguous U.S. states, contained in the database released on August
15, 2008 by the Geographic Names Information System at the U.S. BGN.24
18Basically, these optical sensors use high-speed cameras designed to look for changes in the tops of
clouds. By analyzing a narrow wavelength band (near-infrared region of the spectrum) they can spot
brief lightning flashes even under daytime conditions.
19<http://thunder.msfc.nasa.gov/data/#OTD_DATA>
20Available at
<ftp://microwave.nsstc.nasa.gov/pub/data/lightning-satellite/lis-otd-climatology/HRFC/LISOTD_HRFC_V2.2.hdf>
21<http://earth-info.nga.mil/gns/html/namefiles.htm>
22<http://geonames.usgs.gov/domestic/download_data.htm>
23Available at <ftp://ftp.nga.mil/pub2/gns_data/geonames_dd_dms_date_20081007.zip>
24Available at <http://geonames.usgs.gov/docs/stategaz/NationalFile_20080815.zip>
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Figure 2: Average flash density (flashes per year per km2). The figure is constructed us-
ing the OTD Global Lightning Distributions for the period April 12, 1995 to December
31, 1999.
More specifically, we follow four steps in order to calculate the average lightning
density for each geographic entity: (i) we collect coordinates for geographic features
that describe the complete land territory of each country; (ii) we use these coordinates
to establish each feature’s reference point on the lightning data grid; (iii) we select from
these reference points the ones which identify uniquely the area covering each country
on the grid; and (iv) we compute the simple average of lightning densities over each
country’s final selection of grid references.
A potential problem with the OTD data is that it only provides observations on to-
tal lightning events; i.e., intra-cloud, cloud-to-cloud, cloud-to-sky and cloud-to-ground
lightning. In other words, OTD data does not separate out cloud-to-ground lightning in-
cidences. The pertinent characteristic of lightning in the evaluation of risk to electronic
equipment and electric power systems is the cloud-to-ground flash density. Fortu-
nately, since the mid-1980’s, it has been possible to measure ground flash density more
directly using networks of electromagnetic sensors. Such Lightning Location Systems
(LLS) are able to detect individual ground strikes with high spatial and temporal ac-
curacy. However, many parts of the world, particularly the developing world, are not
covered by the LLS data.25 But accurate cloud-to-ground data does exist for the 48
contiguous U.S. states. These cloud-to-ground lightning flashes, which are measured
by the U.S. National Lightning Detection Network (NLDN), are provided by Vaisala
for the period 1996-2005.26 NLDN consists of more than 100 remote, ground-based
lightning sensors, which instantly detect the electromagnetic signals given off when
25In addition, data is not freely available for the parts of the world actually covered.
26See <http://www.vaisala.com/thunderstorm>
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lightning strikes Earth’s surface. Comparing the NLDN ground-based measures with
the NASA satelite-based measures for the U.S. provides an indication of the extent to
which the total amount of lightning is a reliable indicator of cloud-to-ground lightning.
Figure 3 provides a scatter plot of total lightning against cloud-to-ground lightning
for the U.S. sample. Note that by definition total lightning should be at least as large as
cloud-to-ground lightning, which is confirmed by the figure; all observations are below
the 45 degree line.27
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Figure 3: The figure shows a scatter plot of total lightning flash rate density (flashes per
km2 per year) based on the Optical Transient Detector high resolution data (horizontal
axis) versus cloud-to-ground flash rate density (flashes per km2 per year) based on the
U.S. National Lightning Detection Network (vertical axis). The full line is the 45-degree
line. Number of observations is 48.
Figure 3 shows that there is agreement between the twomeasures of lightning. With
a correlation above 0.95, total lightning is a reasonable proxy for cloud-to-ground light-
ning in the contiguous U.S. states sample. This can also be expected to be the case in
the cross-country data (Chisholm and Cummins, 2006).
5 Cross-State Evidence
The cross-state analysis proceeds as follows. In the next section we provide details on
the remaining data used for the analysis. Then, in Section 5.2, we provide evidence
27NASA’s flash densities of total lightning are calculated for the 1995-1999 period, while Vaisala’s cloud-
to-ground measures are calculated for the 1996-2005 period. In addition, Vaisala uses mile2 as the area
unit; these where converted into km2 by dividing by the mile2 numbers by 1.6092.
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on the partial correlation between changes in Internet usage and changes in corruption
levels. Before we proceed to our 2SLS estimates in Section 5.4 we provide an indepen-
dent check of the validity of our identification strategy in Section 5.3.28
5.1 Data
The corruption data derives from the Justice Department’s "Report to Congress on the
Activities and Operations of the Public Integrity Section". This publication provides
the number of federal, state, and local public officials convicted of a corruption-related
crime by state. As argued by Glaeser and Saks (2006), conviction levels capture the ex-
tent to which federal prosecutors have charged and convicted public officials for mis-
conduct in each of the U.S. states. There are potential problems with using conviction
rates to measure corruption: in corrupt places, the judicial system is itself likely to be
corrupt, meaning that fewer people will be charged with corrupt practices. This prob-
lem, however, is diminished when focusing on federal convictions, the reason being
that the federal judicial system is somewhat isolated from local corruption. Conse-
quently, it should treat people similarly across states (Glaeser and Saks, 2006).
More specifically, the change in corruption convictions, DCC, is calculated as the
difference between corruption convictions (CC) in 2006 and 1991:
DCCi = log(1+ CC2006,i)  log(1+ CC1991,i). (5)
The initial year follows from the fact that the Internet (in the sense of the World Wide
Web) was invented (at CERN) in 1990. Positive values for DCC are interpreted as re-
flecting increasing corruption.29
The second key variable is Internet users, which we measure as the percentage of
households with Internet access. It is based on data collected in a supplement to the
October 2003 Current Population Survey (CPS), which included questions about com-
puter and Internet use.30 The CPS is a multi-stage probability sample with coverage in
all states and the District of Columbia. The sample was selected from the 1990 Decen-
nial Census files and is continually updated to account for new residential construc-
tion. To obtain the sample the United States is divided into 2,007 geographic areas, and
about 60,000 occupied households are eligible for interviews.
Since U.S. corruption data goes back to 1991, the launch date of the WWW, we
28With the satellite-based lightning data we are able to include all 50 U.S. states, i.e. add Alaska and
Hawaii. Results are very similar. Yet we stick to the 48 state sample because cloud-to-ground lightning
data is only available for these 48 states.
29Note that an increased use of digital technology will both increase the risk of detection for a corrupt
official (the detection technology is improved) as well as lower the incentive to commit corrupt acts.
Hence, in theory, increased use of digital technology could increase the number of convictions if the former
effect dominates. It might thus seem as if the Internet increases corruption. However, empirically the net
effect is negative, implying that the “incentive effect” dominates, as documented below.
30Released October 27, 2005, by the U.S. Census Bureau. It is available at
<http://www.census.gov/population/socdemo/computer/2003/tab01B.xls>.
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define the change in Internet use by state population as
DINTERNETi = INTERNETi,2003   INTERNETi,1991 = INTERNETi,2003,
since INTERNETi,1991 = 0 for all i (i.e., for all states).
Finally, in some specificationswe control for the initial level of income or the growth
rate of (real) income per capita between 1991 and 2006. In these instances we employ
data on "personal income per capita", which is taken from the State Personal Income
Database from U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). Nominal income per capita is
deflated using the implicit price deflator for personal consumption expenditures, index
year 2000 (also from BEA). The natural log of income per capita in 1991 is denoted as
log(YCAP1991); the growth rate is denoted GYCAP. Finally, we also control for initial
state population, which also derives from BEA. The natural log of initial state popula-
tion is denoted log (POP1991). Summary statistics are reported in Appendix A.
5.2 Partial Correlations
Table 1 documents the partial correlation between changes in Internet use and changes
in corruption for the 48 contiguous U.S. states. The dependent variable is defined by
equation (5).
Column 2 estimates equation (1). As is clear, DINTERNET is estimated with high
precision in the U.S. sample. With a t-value of 2.37 in column 2 significance holds
at roughly the 2% level. The specification (1) accounts for almost 30% of the varia-
tion in DCC in the U.S. sample. Adding the growth rate of real income per capita,
GYCAP, does not overturn the significance of changes in Internet use; neither does
adding log(POP1991) and log(YCAP1991), cf. Column 4. Indeed, while significant at
conventional levels, the inclusion of log(POP1991) and log(YCAP1991) does not (statis-
tically) change the DINTERNET point estimate. Hence, the remaining variation in
DINTERNET, once we have partialled out the effect of initial corruption, is roughly
orthogonal to the variation in income per capita and the variation in population size.
This finding provides some assurance that a parsimonious specification such as (1) is
appropriate for the U.S. sample. Overall, the results reported in Table 1 document a
noteworthy partial association between Internet diffusion and changes in corruption
convictions from 1991 onwards.
In order to check the robustness of the partial correlation between Internet diffu-
sion and changes in corruption levels more thoroughly we have explored the entire
list of determinants of corruption discussed in Maxwell and Winters (2005). They fo-
cus on four fundamental traits of U.S. states that should have predictable effects on
corruption: (i) number of corruptible government bodies, (ii) the size of the state, (iii)
socio-ethnic homogeneity, and, (iv) civic-minded and well-informed political cultures.
In addition to proxies for these traits the authors consider seven additional control vari-
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ables, which, besides real income growth, consists of metropolitan population, general
tax revenue, direct initiatives, direct initiatives threshold, campaign expenditure re-
strictions, and finally, open party primaries.31
Table 1: Ordinary Least Squares on U.S. states
Dependent variable: DCC (1) (2) (3) (4)
DINTERNET -0.058** -0.058** -0.089***
(0.024) (0.024) (0.023)
log(1+CC1991) -0.387*** -0.386*** -0.418*** -0.904***
(0.096) (0.096) (0.099) (0.139)
GYCAP -1.976
(2.218)
log(POP1991) 0.753***
(0.143)
log(YCAP1991) 2.322**
(0.887)
CONSTANT 1.254*** 4.392*** 5.167*** -27.450***
(0.276) (1.312) (1.597) (7.964)
Observations 48 48 48 48
R-squared 0.20 0.29 0.30 0.59
F-test [H0: DINTERNET = -0.058, p-value] 1.000 0.99 0.168
Notes: Dependent variable is the change in log(1+number of corruption convictions), DCC,
over the period 1991 to 2006. The explanatory variables are described in the main text. Robust
standard errors are reported in parentheses. Asterisks ***,**,* indicate significance at the 1, 5,
and 10% level, respectively.
In Appendix B, Table A.2 we report the results from introducing all of these 13 vari-
ables (i.e., the ones we have not already controlled for in Table 1) as ancillary controls
in the basic specification, one at the time. Overall, the association between changes
in Internet use and changes in corruption convictions is robust to the inclusion of the
"Maxwell-Winters controls", with one exception: When the percentage of population
with high school diploma is introduced into the regression, DINTERNET, as well as
the high school variable itself, are found to be insignificant. Still, both variables are
individually significant when the other variable is excluded, and they are jointly sig-
nificant when they both enter the regression.
There are several ways to think about the latter result. A proximate explanation
is of course multicollinearity. At a deeper level, however, one may speculate as to
31We refer to Maxwell and Winters (2005) for a detailed description of the data.
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the interpretation of the collinearity of human capital and DINTERNET. The most
obvious explanation is that technology diffusion occurs more rapidly within skilled
populations. Consequently, human capital should be correlated with DINTERNET. If
the level of human capital does not affect changes in corruption directly, the correla-
tion between the former and the latter is spurious, reflecting the intervening influence
from DINTERNET. However, it is not possible a priori to rule out a direct effect from
skills on changes in corruption, which then taints the OLS estimate of DINTERNET
on changes in corruption levels. To make further progress we need to move beyond
the OLS analysis.
5.3 Falsification Test
According to our identification strategy lightning only affects corruption through Inter-
net penetration. This observation paves the way for a simple falsification test: If indeed
lightning density affects changes in corruption levels due to its impact on power sup-
ply, IT investments, and thus Internet use, lightning density should be uncorrelated
with changes in corruption prior to the inception and spread of the Internet. If light-
ning density is correlated with past changes in corruption levels the variable is likely
capturing some other (omitted) determinant of corruption. If so, the validity of the
lightning instrument should be questioned.
To examine whether this is the case we run the following regression:
DCCi = α0 + α1 log(LIGHTNING)i + α2CCinitial,i + X0initial,iα3 + εi, (6)
on two separate periods of time. First, we examine the sign and significance of α1 on the
period 1991-2006. We expect a positive and statistically significant estimate for α1, cap-
turing a slower spread of the Internet and thus smaller reductions in corruption, ceteris
paribus. Second, we examine the sign and significance of α1 on the period 1976-1990,
where the initial year is a consequence of data availability on corruption convictions.
Here we expect a numerically small and statistically insignificant estimate for α1.
Table 2 reports results on the falsification test. As shown in columns 1-6 lightning
does not influence changes in corruption prior to the inception of theWWW. This holds
both for the period 1976-1990, where we have missing observations on corruption con-
victions for three states, and for the 1978-1990, where there are nomissing observations.
It is worth observing that the numerical size of the point estimate is close to zero; the
non-rejection of α1 = 0 is not simply a matter of a more imprecisely estimated parame-
ter.
Columns 7-9 show that lightning exerts a statistically significant influence on cor-
ruption after the inception of the WWW. Figures 4 and 5 provide a visual impression
of these findings.
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Figure 4: The figure shows the association between lightning and changes in corruption
convictions over the 1978-1990 period, with the influence of income per capita and
population partialled out.
Alabama
Arizona Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Florida
Georgia
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North DakotaOhio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
T nessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming
-2
-1
0
1
2
e(
 C
ha
ng
es
 in
 lo
g(
1+
C
C
) |
 X
)
-3 -2 -1 0 1
e( log(LIGHTNING)| X)
Figure 5: The figure shows the association between lightning and changes in corruption
convictions over the 1991-2006 period, with the influence of income per capita and
population partialled out.
These results suggests that lightning is not picking up omitted (time varying) de-
terminants of corruption. If lightning were picking up time varying determinants of
corruption (like human capital) it would be correlated with changes in corruption lev-
els both before and after the inception of the WWW.
5.4 IV Estimates
The 2SLS results are reported in Table 3. Inspecting panel A we see that lightning den-
sity is negatively related to the diffusion of the Internet across U.S. states, in keeping
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with the theory underlying our identification strategy. This holds whether we rely
on the accurate cloud-to-ground lightning density or, alternatively, the total lightning
proxy. In column 3 we include log(POP1991) and log(YCAP1991). Importantly, as seen
from panel A, lightning remains a strong instrument despite the inclusion of these ad-
ditional controls.32
Since we are unable to reject homoscedasticity the usual rule-of-thumb for strength
of instruments is informative. As the F-values are always above 30, our instruments of
choice are strong (Staiger and Stock, 1997).
2SLS yield results that are broadly consistent with OLS. Indeed, testing the equality
of OLS and 2SLS via the Hausman test does not allow rejection of the null that DIN-
TERNET is exogenous. We are thus led to conclude that valid inferences can be drawn
from OLS in the U.S. sample. Observe, however, that OLS tends to produce numer-
ically smaller point estimates compared with 2SLS. In this sense the OLS results can
be viewed as conservative estimates of the impact from the spread of the Internet on
changes in corruption.
So what is the economic significance of Internet use in combating corruption? To
answer this question we begin with the levels specification associated with (2):
log(1+ CC2006) = α0 + α1DINTERNET + (α2 + 1) log(1+ CC1991).
If we linearize, treatingCC1991 as a constant, the following simple approximation emerges:
∆CC2006 ' α1 (1+ CC2006) INTERNET2003, (7)
where we have used that DINTERNET = INTERNET2003, cf. Section 5.1.
Next, consider the impact of changes in Internet use on corruption for the "typi-
cal" U.S. state. The typical U.S. state in terms of median level Internet use is Arizona
(CC2006 = 16 and INTERNET2003 = 55.3). Suppose that Arizona is moved up to the
third quartile in the distribution of Internet users in 2003; this is equivalent to an in-
crease of 2.8 Internet users per 100 people. Using the OLS results reported in column
2 of Table 1 in equation (7) we find ∆CC2006 ' ( 0.058)  (1+ 16)  (2.8) =  2.76.
That is, this increase in Internet penetration would reduce the number of corruption
convictions by roughly 3 yearly convictions. Put differently, moving up 11 places in
the ranking of Internet users (i.e. from the median to the third quartile) would move
Arizona down two places in the U.S. state corruption convictions ranking (i.e. from the
58th percentile to the 55th percentile of the corruption convictions distribution in 2006).
32Using the total lightning proxy in column 3 provides similar results.
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Table 3: Two-Stage Least Squares on U.S. sample
(1) (2) (4)
Dependent variable: DINTERNET Panel A: First-stage regression
log(1+CC1991) 0.721 0.371 0.102
(0.526) (0.505) (0.650)
log(LIGHTNING) (cloud-to-ground) -3.801*** -2.384***
(0.651) (0.416)
log(LIGHTNING) (total) -4.338***
(0.743)
log(POP1991) -0.968
(0.695)
log(YCAP1991) 24.418***
(4.276)
CONSTANT 59.554*** 62.628*** -171.670***
(1.378) (1.684) (39.576)
F (first-stage) value [H0: log(LIGHTNING) = 0] 34.11 34.10 32.85
Dependent variable: DCC Panel B: Second-stage regression
DINTERNET -0.090** -0.067* -0.127**
(0.036) (0.037) (0.051)
log(1+CC1991) -0.386*** -0.386*** -0.914***
(0.097) (0.094) (0.145)
log(POP1991) 0.692***
(0.154)
log(YCAP1991) 3.518**
(1.677)
CONSTANT 6.171*** 4.918** -36.459***
(1.949) (1.990) (13.439)
Observations 48 48 48
R-squared 0.26 0.29 0.57
Hausman exogeneity test [H0: α2SLS αOLS= 0, p-value] 0.452 0.797 0.953
Notes: Dependent variable is the change in log(1+number of corruption convictions), DCC,
over the period 1996 to 2006. The explanatory variables are described in the main text. Cloud-
to-ground lightning is measured using ground-based censors, whereas total lightning is mea-
sured via satellites. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Asterisks ***,**,* indi-
cate significance at the 1, 5, and 10% level, respectively.
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6 Cross-Country Evidence
In this Section we examine whether the results obtained above appear to generalize to
a cross-country sample. After providing details on the data used in the cross-country
setting (beyond lightning density), we discuss the partial correlation between changes
in corruption and changes in Internet users in Section 6.2. Section 6.3 examines the
validity of our instrument, and Section 6.4 contains the 2SLS estimate of the impact of
the Internet on corruption.
6.1 Data
Global corruption is measured using the well-known Control of Corruption Index
(CCI) compiled by Kaufmann et al. (2007). The CCI measure, which ranges from  2.5
(worst) to 2.5 (best), is available biannually from 1996 to 2002 and annually from 2002
onwards.33 The CCI indicator attempts to measure "the extent to which public power
is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption as
well as capture by elites and private interests" (Kaufmann et al., 2007, p. 4).34 The indi-
cator is based on a large number of individual data sources, which are then aggregated
into one measure by an unobserved components model. This means that the aggregate
measure is a weighted average of the underlying individual data sources, with weights
reflecting the precision of each of these underlying data sources; this makes the CCI the
most comprehensive measure of corruption around.35 Moreover, by virtue of being a
solution to a statistical signal extraction problem, the aggregate CCI indicator is pre-
sumably more informative than any individual data source.36
The change in corruption levels is calculated as the difference between CCI in 2006
and 1996, i.e.
DCCIi = CCI2006,i   CCI1996,i. (8)
Observe that, by definition, positive values for DCCIi means less corruption.
33These boundaries correspond to the 0.005 and 0.995 percentiles of the standard normal distribu-
tion. For a few countries, country ratings can exceed these boundaries when scores from individual data
sources are particularly high or low (Kaufmann et al., 2007).
34Some are sceptical concerning the use of perception-based corruption data (Svensson, 2005). Interest-
ingly, however, Olken (2006) has provided novel evidence on the relation between corruption perceptions
and a direct measure of corruption in the context of villages across Indonesia. The empirical results show
that villagers’ perceptions of corruption do appear to be positively (albeit weakly) correlated with a direct
“missing expenditure” measure.
35The widely reported Corruption Perception Index (CPI) compiled by Transparency International
forms part of the CCI measure (see Kaufmann et al., 2007, Table A13). Reasuringly, the simple corre-
lation between CCI and CPI is 0.97. A high correlation is not unexpected since corruption reflects the
underlying institutional framework (Svensson, 2005).
36Svensson (2005), however, notes that the aggregation procedures used by Kaufmann et al. presumes
that subindicator measurement errors are independent across sources. In reality, errors may be correlated
since producers of different indices read the same reports and most likely each other’s evaluations. If the
assumption of independence is relaxed, the gain from aggregating a number of different reports is less
clear.
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Ideally, we would like to go back to 1991, the launch date of the WWW. Unfortu-
nately, with the preferred CCI measure this is not feasible as 1996 is the earliest year for
which the variable is available. However, to check robustness we also run regressions
using the ICRG corruption indicator (from the International Country Risk Guide); the
ICRG indicator allows us to go back to 1991.
Our key explanatory variable is the number of Internet users per 100 people. In-
creasingly, the number of Internet users is based on regular surveys. In situations
where surveys are not available, an estimate can be derived based on the number of
subscribers. Data is compiled by the International Telecommunication Union (ITU),
and made available in the World Development Indicators (WDI) 2007. Since global
corruption data goes back to 1996, we calculate the change in Internet users over this
period:
DINTERNETi = INTERNETi,2005   INTERNETi,1996,
where 2005 is the most recent year available for Internet users in theWDI (2007). When
we examine the period 1991-2006, using the ICRG indicator, we use the approximation
that INTERNETi,1991 = 0, as in analysis of the U.S. states.
Real PPP-adjusted GDP per capita, YCAP, for the global sample is taken fromWDI
(2007). The growth rate of real GDP per capita, GYCAP, is calculated over the period
1996-2005 (respectively, 1991-2005), as 2005 is the most recent year with observations
on PPP GDP per capita in the WDI (2007). The natural log of real GDP per capita in
1996 is denoted as log(YCAP1996).
Finally, for our cross-country falsification tests of our instrument, we examine each
step of the theory underlying our identification strategy. That is, we test whether in-
deed lightning is associated with more frequent power disruptions, which in turn af-
fects the speed of Internet diffusion within countries. In order to do so, we need data
on the frequency of power failures.37
The cross-country measure of the frequency of power disruptions is collected by the
World Bank, and it is available in WDI (2007) for the years 2002-2006. Specifically, the
variable measures the average number of days per year that establishments experience
power outages or surges from the public grid. We will use this variable as a proxy for
the intensity of power disturbances. This variable, whichwewill refer to asOUTAGES,
form part of theWorld Bank Group’s Enterprise Surveys.38 These surveys cover almost
58,000 firms in 97 countries for the period 2002–2006. For most countries electrical
outages are measured only at one point in time during the period 2002-2006. However,
for 26 countries there are two observations, one in 2002 and one in 2005. In these cases
we use the 2005 values. Summary statistics are provided in Appendix A, Table A.1.
37Admittedly, we would have liked to perform these tests on the U.S. sampel as well. However, in spite
of our best efforts, we have only been able to obtain data on power failures for a cross section of countries.
At the same time, the falsification test employed on U.S. data is not possible in the cross-country setting
due to a lack of data on corruption.
38<http://www.enterprisesurveys.org/>
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6.2 Partial Correlations
Table 4 explores the partial correlation between changes in Internet use and changes
in corruption for the cross-country data; the dependent variable is DCCI, defined by
equation (8).
Table 4: Ordinary Least Squares on cross-country sample
Dependent variable: DCCI (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
DINTERNET 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.008** 0.018*** 0.011***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
CCI1996 -0.070** -0.287*** -0.290*** -0.415*** -0.295*** -0.436***
(0.028) (0.065) (0.066) (0.065) (0.061) (0.066)
GYCAP 0.199
(0.148)
log(YCAP1996) 0.279*** 0.312***
(0.062) (0.071)
CONSTANT 0.001 -0.307*** -0.367*** -2.538*** -0.299*** -2.924***
(0.043) (0.087) (0.091) (0.509) (0.096) (0.593)
Regional dummies NO NO NO NO YES YES
Observations 113 113 105 108 113 108
R-squared 0.03 0.22 0.29 0.38 0.33 0.42
F-test (p-value):
H0: DINTERNET = 0.016 1.000 0.980 0.0654 0.597 0.210
Notes: Dependent variable is the change in Control of Corruption, DCCI, over the period
1996 to 2006. The explanatory variables are described in the main text. Latin America & the
Caribbean is the excluded regional category; the remaing regions are East Asia & Pacific (EAP),
Europe & Central Asia (ECA), Latin America & the Caribbean (LAC), Middle East & North
Africa (MENA), North America (NA), South Asia (SOA), Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA).Robust
standard errors are reported in parentheses. Asterisks ***,**,* indicate significance at the 1,
5, and 10% level, respectively.
Column 2 estimates the parsimonious specification (1), described in Section 3. The
sign of DINTERNET is positive, indicating more "control of corruption" (i.e., less cor-
ruption). Moreover, DINTERNET is estimated with high precision. With a t-value
above 4 significance is well below the 1% level. Including the growth rate of real GDP
per capita has no impact on the slope estimate associated with DINTERNET, cf. col-
umn 3. In fact, the growth rate of real GDP per capita holds no explanatory power
once we control for initial corruption and changes in Internet use. When we include
the log of GDP per capita, DINTERNET remains significant albeit numerically some-
what smaller. Regional dummies does not change the results appreciably either. In
fact, the null that the DINTERNET slope estimates in all columns equal 0.016 cannot
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be rejected at the five percent level. Hence, statistically speaking, adding the log of
GDP per capita in 1996 and/or regional dummies makes no difference to the results.
This means that the remaining variation in DINTERNET, once we have partialled
out the effects of initial corruption, is roughly orthogonal to the variation in GDP per
capita and/or regional fixed effects. In other words, the positive (partial) association
between changes in Internet use and changes in corruption is not driven by omitted
factors such as the level of economic development.39 Consequently, a parsimonious
specification such as (1) appears to be appropriate in the cross-country sample. These
results are very similar to what we found for the U.S. sample.
Table 5: Ordinary Least Squares on cross-country subsamples
Dep. variable: DCCI (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
DINTERNET 0.013*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.015*** 0.019*** 0.016*** 0.016**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006)
CCI1996 -0.235*** -0.285*** -0.286*** -0.275*** -0.339*** -0.301*** -0.291***
(0.064) (0.066) (0.065) (0.065) (0.063) (0.069) (0.106)
CONSTANT -0.221** -0.305*** -0.306*** -0.334*** -0.334*** -0.325*** -0.317**
(0.085) (0.088) (0.090) (0.090) (0.090) (0.099) (0.122)
Observations 91 112 110 100 100 90 75
Excluded region SSA NA SOA MENA EAP LAC ECA
R-squared 0.17 0.22 0.22 0.24 0.28 0.26 0.16
F-test (p-value):
H0: DINTERNET = 0.016 0.389 0.995 0.990 0.877 0.385 0.895 0.984
Notes: Dependent variable is the change in Control of Corruption, DCCI, over the period 1996
to 2006. The regions are: East Asia & Pacific (EAP), Europe & Central Asia (ECA), Latin Amer-
ica & the Caribbean (LAC), Middle East & North Africa (MENA), North America (NA), South
Asia (SOA), Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. As-
terisks ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10% level, respectively. The F-test tests
the null that the slope estimate of DINTERNET associated with each subsample is equal to the
slope estimate associated with the full sample, i.e. column 2 in Table 4.
Naturally, onemay still worry about the robustness of the partial correlation. Hence,
as a first check we re-estimate the basic regression model omitting each region of the
world, one by one. The results are found in Table 5.
As can be inferred from the table the point estimate for DINTERNET is remark-
ably robust. The last row in Table 5 performs an F-test, where the null is that the slope
estimate of DINTERNET associated with each sub-sample is equal to the slope esti-
mate associated with the full sample, i.e. 0.016. The null cannot be rejected at any
conventional level of significance.
As another robustness check we have examined the partial correlation between
39This is perhaps not surprising as the correlation between CCI1996 and YCAP1996 is as high as 0.8.
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DCCI and DINTERNET while controlling for the set of corruption predictors dis-
cussed in a recent survey by Treisman (2007). Specifically, we check robustness to the
inclusion of 28 additional corruption determinants, covering (in the terminology of
Treisman) three broad categories of determinants: "historical and cultural controls";
"political controls"; and "rents and competition controls". Overall we find that the esti-
mate of DINTERNET is unchanged, once again suggesting the parsimonious specifi-
cation (1) is appropriate. The details can be found in Appendix C.
Finally, we have examined an alternative corruption indicator, the ICRG index,
which also allows us to consider the entire period 1991-2006. The results once again
support a strong partial correlation between changes in Internet penetration and changes
in corruption levels. The results are found in Appedix D, Table A.6, columns 1-2.
6.3 Falsification Test
The type of falsification test adopted in the U.S. sample is infeasible for the cross-
country sample. The reason is that corruption indicators are not available sufficiently
far back in time. Hence, in this section we provide an alternative falsification test,
which entails checking each element in the causal chain, cf. (4), underlying our identifi-
cation strategy.40 While we argue these links are highly plausible on physical grounds,
it does not follow that they are quantitatively relevant in an economic context. More-
over, if lightning is uncorrelated with power failures but nevertheless seem to correlate
with changes in Internet use, one may question the identification strategy; lightning
may then be picking up the influence from other (omitted) corruption determinants.
To proceed, we express the underlying logic of the identification strategy as a sys-
tem of equations:
log (OUTAGESi) = β0 + β1 log(LIGHTNINGi) + X
0
OγO + υi, (9)
DINTERNETi = α0 + α1 log (OUTAGESi) + X0IγI + ui (10)
where XO and XI contain additional controls. The basic question is whether β1 > 0 and
α1 < 0.
We will run regressions (9) and (10) with and without controls. In the former case
XO and XI equal CCI1996 and log(YCAP1996). In principle, a variety of variables could
be included in XO and XI . The choice of including initial corruption and initial income
per capita as additional controls is made for two reasons. First, governance indicators
have previously been shown to affect energy efficiency (Frederikson et al., 2004) as
well as Internet use (e.g., Chinn and Fairlie, 2006). Second, and more important in the
present context, by controlling for both initial corruption and initial income per capita,
these specifications will have direct bearing on the validity of the 2SLS regressions
40As noted above, this type of test cannot be performed on U.S. data since the required data on power
failures is not available.
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in the next section: The identification strategy (implicitly) requires lightning to affect
outages, and outages to affect Internet use conditional on CCI1996 and log(YCAP1996).
Consequently, this is the setting where confidence in the validity of the identification
strategy, involving lightning as an instrument for changes in Internet use, is required.
Mauritius
Egypt, Arab Rep.Ireland
TajikistanRussian Federation
Latvia
Chile
Kazakhstan
Algeria
Uzbekistan
Syrian Arab Republic
MongoliaAzerbaijan
Estonia
Oman
Lithuania
Belarus
Kenya
Kyrgyz Republic
Niger
Morocco
Ukraine
Lebanon
Korea, Rep.
Georgia
Portugal
Senegal
Belgium
Tanzania
Macedonia, FYR
Czech Republic
Poland
Moldova
Mali
Ecuador
PakistanBulgaria
Guinea-Bissau
Croatia
Armenia
Guyana
TurkeyRomaniaSp in
Malawi
Bolivia
India
Honduras
Slovak Republic
Greece
Hungary
Germany
ZambiaPhilippines
Indonesia
Jamaica
Albania
Peru
Angola
Nicaragua
Burkina Faso
Vietnam
N mibia
Mexico
Guatemala
Argentina
Congo, Dem. Rep.Botswana
Bangladesh
Slovenia
Uganda
Cambodia
Cameroon
Madagascar
Panama
Brazil
Costa Rica
Colombia
Switzerland
Thailand
El Salvador
South Africa
Paraguay
Uruguay
-4
-2
0
2
4
e(
lo
g(
O
U
TA
G
ES
) |
 X
)
-4 -2 0 2
e(log(LIGHTNING | X)
Figure 6: The figure shows the relationship between average lightning density and
electrical outages, with the influence of initial corruption and initial income per capita
partialled out.
Table 6 reports the results from estimating equations (9) (columns 1-3) and (10)
(columns 4-6). In column 1 we report the bivariate association between lightning den-
sity and electrical outages and surges. The correlation is both highly significant and
positive as required. Moreover, lightning can account for some 12% of the global
variation in electrical outages. In column 2 we add CCI1996. The magnitude of the
point estimate for lightning declines but remains significant at the 5% level. Adding
log(YCAP1996) changes nothing substantially; in particular, lightning now has a p-
value of 0.053, i.e. is significant at the 10% level.
Figure 6 provides a visual impression of the partial association between log(LIGHTNING)
and log(OUTAGES), cf. column 3, Table 6. Taking the point estimate at face value, the
results imply that an increase in lightning density of one percent increases the number
of days where power outages take place by about 0.2-0.3%.
Turning to column 4 of Table 6, we find that a higher intensity of electric power
failures hampers the spread of the Internet within countries. Indeed, electrical outages
and surges can account for nearly 60% of the total variation in the Internet variable.
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Adding CCI1996 (column 5) does not change the impression of a first-order impact
from outages to the spread of the Internet. In fact, outages appear to have a quan-
titatively stronger effect on the spread of the Internet than corruption. Specifically,
increasing log(OUTAGES) by one standard-deviation is associated with a reduction in
DINTERNET of  0.61 standard-deviation units; in contrast, a similar exercise using
CCI1996 would increase DINTERNET by 0.29 standard-deviation units.
Adding log(YCAP1996) in column 6 does not change anything qualitatively. Figure
7 provides a visual impression of the strength of the partial association between power
failures and changes in Internet use.
Finally, in columns 7 and 8 we add log(LIGHTNING) as an explanatory variable
in equation (10). If lightning density affects the spread of the Internet in ways unrelated
to electrical outages, we would expect it to be significant conditional on the inclusion of
log(OUTAGES). If so, one may worry that lightning density is proxying for other vari-
ables affecting Internet diffusion, which would raise doubts concerning the validity of
the exclusion restriction maintained in the next section. Indeed, this amounts to a fal-
sification test of the identification strategy. Fortunately, the instrument passes the test:
lightning is not a significant determinant of changes in Internet use over the period in
question, conditional on the inclusion of power failures. This finding renders probable
that the statistical correlation between log(LIGHTNING) and DINTERNET, which
we document in the next section, arises due to lightning’s influence on the frequency
of power failures, which in turn affects the spread of the Internet within countries.
6.4 IV Estimates
Turning now to instrumental variables methods, Table 7 reports 2SLS-based results
for the cross-country sample. Panel A of Table 7 provides results from the first-stage
regressions in the 2SLS procedure. In accordance with the logic of the identification
strategy, the lightning density is negatively related to the diffusion of the Internet in
column 1. In column 2, where we have also included the logarithm of real GDP per
capita, the lightning instrument turns insignificant; or, more appropriately, the instru-
ment is weak.
The association between average lightning density and the change in Internet use
in column 1, once the influence of initial corruption is partialled out, is close to the
"rule-of-thumb" value suggested by Staiger and Stock (1997). Specifically, if the F-value
associated with the null of zero explanatory power of the instrument is above ten we
need not concern ourselves with issues of weak identification: inference based on 2SLS
estimates will not be plagued with size distortions. This rule-of-thumb, however, re-
quires that the error variance is homoskedastic (see assumption M, part (c) in Staiger
and Stock, 1997). While this assumption is fulfilled in the second-stage regression (cf.
Pagan-Hall test), it fails in the first-stage regression (cf. Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg
test). Consequently, while inspection of panel A reveals the F-value is "close" to ten in
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Figure 7: The figure shows the relationship between electrical outages and changes
in Internet use, with the influence of initial corruption and initial income per capita
partialled out.
column 1, with non-constant error variance it is not entirely clear what this means for
the actual size of significance tests.
Turning to panel B, we see that 2SLS yields results that are broadly consistent with
OLS, cf. Table 4 and 5. DINTERNET remains significant at 5% in column 1; the slope
estimate is roughly twice the size of the corresponding OLS estimates but standard
errors also more than double. A formal test of the equality of OLS and 2SLS is the
Hausman test. This test, which is reported in panel B in the table, does not allow
rejection of the null that DINTERNET is exogenous. Put differently, we do not detect
any systematic difference between OLS and 2SLS coefficient estimates. However, if our
2SLS estimates are weakly identified the overall properties of the test are somewhat
unclear.
We address the problem of potential size distortions by invoking a method pro-
posed by Chernozhukov and Hansen (2008), which allows us to construct confidence
intervals with the correct size regardless of the strength of instruments.41 Moreover,
Chernozhukov and Hansen show how these size-adjusted confidence intervals can
easily be made robust to non-spherical disturbances. Finally, the procedure has good
41These confidence intervals are weak-identification robust since information about the (partial) corre-
lation between instruments and the endogenous variable is not used.
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power properties.
Table 7: Two-Stage Least Squares on cross-country sample
(1) (2)
Dependent variable: DINTERNET Panel A: First-stage regression
CCI1996 11.21*** 4.983***
(1.428) (1.629)
log(YCAP1996) 9.507***
(1.127)
log(LIGHTNING) -3.602*** -2.086
(1.290) (1.333)
CONSTANT 25.59*** -58.27***
(2.634) (9.889)
F (first-stage) value [H0: log(LIGHTNING) = 0] 7.800 2.450
Dependent variable: DCCI Panel B: Second-stage regression
DINTERNET 0.032*** 0.042*
(0.012) (0.022)
CCI1996 -0.515*** -0.622***
(0.172) (0.161)
log(YCAP1996) -0.053
(0.224)
CONSTANT -0.682*** -0.346
(0.227) (1.499)
Observations 113 108
95%Weak-identification robust confidence intervals for DINTERNET [0.013, 0.087]
90% Weak-identification robust confidence intervals for DINTERNET [0.005,∞]
Hausman exogeneity test [H0: α2SLS αOLS= 0, p-value] 0.201 0.215
Notes: Dependent variable is the change in Control of Corruption, DCCI, over the period 1996
to 2006. The explanatory variables are described in the main text. Robust standard errors
are reported in parentheses. Asterisks ***,**,* indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10% level,
respectively.
Panel B reports these size-adjusted confidence intervals. As is evident from the ta-
ble, 95% size-adjusted confidence interval deems DINTERNET above zero in column
1. The midpoint of the confidence interval is 0.05, which is above both OLS (0.016) and
2SLS (0.032) estimates. In column 2, where log(YCAP1996) is included and where we
face a severe identification problem, the 90% size-adjusted confidence interval provides
a sharp lower bound, which is strictly larger than zero; but the confidence interval is
upwardly unbounded, i.e. data are not informative about the upper bound.
In Appendix C, Table A6, columns 3 and 4 we perform the above analysis using the
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ICRG measure of corruption, which allows us to examine the entire period 1991-2006.
The results are statistically stronger than those reported in Table 7, but the basic mes-
sage is the same. Using OLS to address the economic impact of Internet use on changes
in corruption levels is not overly misleading in the cross-country sample. However,
OLS will likely provide conservative estimates, as both 2SLS and one midpoint of size-
adjusted confidence interval is numerically larger than the OLS estimate.
A final issue concerns economic significance. In the cross-country sample we rely
on the levels specification (2), i.e.
CCI2006 = α0 + α1DINTERNET + (α2 + 1)CCI1996.
Using the results from OLS reported in column 2 of Table 4, the effect of an increase
in INTERNET2005 holding the initial level of Internet users constant will be considered. In
this case, we have that
∆CCI2006 ' α1∆INTERNET2005. (11)
The "typical" country in the cross-country sample is Morocco (CCI2006 =  0.060 and
INTERNET2005 = 15.25). How would Morocco’s corruption ranking change if we
increase the number of Internet users in 2005 from the median to the third quartile
of the world distribution? This amounts to increasing INTERNET from 15 in one
hundred to 35 in one hundred (i.e. to the level of Spain). Inserting in (11) gives
∆CCI2006 ' (0.016)  20 = 0.32. That is, it would increase the CCI2006 score for Mo-
rocco from 0.060 to 0.26. Put differently, moving from the median to the third quartile
in terms of Internet users would move the corruption score from the median to roughly
the 62nd percentile, which happens to be the level of Italy. While being economically
important, the effect does not seem implausible large.
Overall, the results from the cross-section analysis are very similar to the results
obtained for the U.S. sample. Internet diffusion is robustly correlated with reductions
in the level of corruption and the 2SLS estimates of the impact of the Internet on cor-
ruption suggest the association is causal. Moreover, both samples support a simple
parsimonious specification; statistically, the 2SLS estimates are equivalent to those ob-
tained by OLS. In sum, these results lend support to the proposition that the Internet
has worked so as to lower corruption from 1991 onwards.
7 Concluding remarks
The present analysis renders probable that the Internet is a powerful anti-corruption
technology. Indeed, the Internet facilitates the dissemination of information about cor-
rupt behavior, making it more risky for bureaucrats and politicians to take bribes; it
also obviates the need for potentially corrupt officials to serve as middlemen between
the government and the public; and it has allowed for more transparency in the context
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of public procurement.
The correlation between changes in Internet penetration and changes in corruption,
conditional on the initial level of corruption, is persistent: It holds across the world at
large, and across different sub-samples of the world, using best available corruption
perception indices as dependent variables; it also holds across U.S. states, using cor-
ruption convictions.
In order to examine whether Internet penetration has had a causal impact on cor-
ruption, the paper develops a new instrument for the user cost of digital equipment
such as computers, and thereby for Internet diffusion. Digital equipment is highly
sensitive to power disruptions; and, to a considerable extent, lightning activity causes
power disruption around the world. Indeed, according to some calculations, light-
ning causes some 17,000 computers around the world to crash each second (Yeager
and Stahlkopf, 2000).
Using data based on ground-based censors and global satellite data, we construct
state and country level measures of average lightning density. Using cross-country
data, we document that lightning is highly correlated with electrical outages, and that
the latter is associated with a slower pace of Internet penetration. Across the U.S. we
show that lightning is correlated with changes in corruption after the emergence of
the WWW, but uncorrelated with changes in corruption prior to its invention. These
findings support the use of lightning density as an instrument for Internet diffusion.
Empirically, lightning density turns out to be a strong instrument for Internet diffusion,
especially in the U.S. sample. Our 2SLS estimates document that the spread of the
Internet has lowered corruption, both in the U.S. and worldwide.
We are unable to reject that the spread of the Internet is exogenous in our specifica-
tions, though OLS estimates are considerably lower than the 2SLS counterparts. How-
ever, despite remaining conservative, by using OLS estimates in our subsequent calcu-
lations, we find the impact of the Internet on corruption to be economically substantial.
Accordingly, to the extent that corruption affects economic growth, these findings pro-
vide one mechanism by which the Internet may work to spur growth. In this way, our
findings also provide a new perspective on the importance of the well-documented
global "digital divide".
The identification strategy developed in this paper may prove useful in future re-
search. By providing a strong instrument for Internet use, researchers may be able to
make new progress on the impact of computers and the Internet on other outcomes,
like the return to education or productivity growth more broadly.
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A Summary Statistics
The summary statistics for the cross-country sample is found in panel A, whereas the
similar data for the U.S. is found in panel B.
Table A1: Summary statistics
Obs. Mean Median Std. dev. Min Max
Panel A: Cross-country sample
CCI2006 113 0.105 -0.251 1.080 -1.767 2.573
CCI1996 113 0.112 -0.169 1.057 -2.084 2.297
INTERNET2005 113 22.56 15.24 21.66 0.208 86.94
INTERNET1996 113 1.541 0.196 3.216 0 18.26
GYCAP 105 0.264 0.189 0.287 -0.351 1.416
YCAP1996,1000 $ 108 9.454 5.980 8.855 0.070 37.76
Average lightning density 113 8.999 6.590 8.617 0.018 44.38
Outages 93 27.50 9.600 46.60 0.040 248.96
Panel B: U.S. sample
CC2006 48 20.15 9.50 21.48 0.00 83.00
CC1991 48 13.44 6.00 21.14 0.00 108.00
INTERNET2003 48 54.39 55.00 5.88 39.50 65.50
GYCAP 48 0.363 0.357 0.056 0.265 0.580
YCAP1991, 1000 $ 48 22.53 22.10 3.32 16.43 31.78
POP1991 48 52.22 36.46 56.16 4.59 305.00
Average lightning density 48 10.54 8.58 7.31 0.89 27.34
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C Robustness: Additional controls, Cross-Country sample
In this appendix we conduct a "kitchen sink" type robustness check of all OLS results
in the cross-country sample relying on the control variables used in Treisman (2007).
Specifically, we include these variables in the specification (3), one at a time, in order to
check whether the partial association between changes in Internet use and changes in
corruption is influenced by any of these "popular" predictors of corruption.
Treisman (2007) relies on three sets of variables: a set of "historical and cultural con-
trols"; a set of "political controls"; and finally a set of "rents and competition controls".
The set of historical and cultural controls include: percentage Protestants, percent-
age Catholics, percentage Muslims, British legal origin, French legal origin, German le-
gal origin, Scandinavian legal origin, former British colony, former French colony, and
finally former colony of other power except Spain or Portugal.42 As is evident from
Table A.3, the association between changes in Internet use and changes in corruption
is robust to the inclusion of these controls in the sense of never turning insignificant.
In fact, the point estimate of DINTERNET remains statistically unaffected, cf. F-test in
Table A.3.
Treisman’s political controls43 include: political rights, democratic since 1950, press
freedom, newspaper circulation, presidential democracy, pure plurality system, open-
list system, district magnitude, and fiscal decentralization. As is evident from Table
A.4, with the exception of newspaper circulation, the association between changes in
Internet use and changes in corruption remains is robust to the inclusion of these con-
trols, in the sense of never turning insignificant. Once again, the point estimate of DIN-
TERNET remains statistically unaffected. When newspapers circulation is included,
however, both this variable and DINTERNET are insignificant. Yet both variables are
significant in this 95-country sample when the other variable is excluded, and they are
jointly significant. Put differently, the insignificance of DINTERNET is due to multi-
collinearity.
Finally, the set of rents and competition controls include: fuel exports, imports, year
opened to trade, time required to open a firm, women in government, and the log of
the standard deviation of inflation. Inspection of Table A.5 reveals that, with the excep-
tion of time required to open firm and the log of the standard deviation of inflation, the
association between changes in Internet use and changes in corruption is robust to the
inclusion of these controls. When time required to open firm is included, DINTERNET
turns insignificant. This is not due to multicollinearity; it is due to the large reduction
in sample size, from 108 (with time required to open firm excluded) to 69 (with time
required to open firm included). DINTERNET is insignificant in the 69-country sample
42For more information on exact definitions of the variables used in Appendix A.1, we refer to Treisman
(2007).
43Treisman appears to do a double-counting by treating the percentage of Protestants both as a political
and a historical-cultural control. We include it only as a historical-cultural control.
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even with time required to open firm excluded, i.e. when estimating column 1 in the
reduced sample (point est. 0.006, std. error 0.004). More importantly, time required
to open firm is surely affected by corruption (corruption causes longer time required
to open firm); but it is in no way clear why it should affect corruption (longer time
required to open firm is not likely to cause corruption), in which case it should not be
included as a control. These two factors in conjunction, i.e. reduced sample size and
endogenous right-hand side variable, implies that we should not attach too much im-
portance to the results in column 5, Table A.5. Finally, DINTERNET is also insignificant
in column 8, where the log of the standard deviation of inflation is included. However,
Treisman does not use all available information on inflation variability. Once we up-
date his variable using the log of the standard deviation of CPI (log of the standard
deviation of the GDP deflator), we can expand our country coverage from 79 to 105
(108). In both cases, DINTERNET turns significant, cf. columns 9-10.
Overall, the results from Tables A.3-A.5 confirm the robustness and stability of the
partial association between changes in Internet use and changes in corruption in the
cross-country sample.
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D Robustness: Alternative corruptionmeasure, Cross-Country
sample
Table A.6. Alternative corruption indicator (ICRG)
Dependent variable: DICRG (1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS 2SLS
INTERNET2005 0.036*** 0.031*** 0.043*** 0.054**
(0.006) (0.007) (0.009) (0.021)
ICRG1991 -0.747*** -0.748*** -0.820*** -0.835***
(0.088) (0.096) (0.114) (0.125)
log(YCAP1991) 0.108 -0.196
(0.123) (0.284)
CONSTANT 0.981*** 0.179 1.079*** 2.576
(0.231) (0.881) (0.244) (2.238)
Observations 102 97 102 97
F (first-stage) value [H0: log(LIGHTNING) = 0] 25.08 6.466
Hausman exogeneity test [H0: α2SLS αOLS= 0, p-value] 0.620 0.582
Notes: The dependent variable is the change in the ICRG’s index over the period 1991 to 2005,
DICRG. The explanatory variables are described in the main text. Asterisks ***, **, * indicate
significance at the 1, 5, and 10% level, respectively.
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The Impact of Aid on Bureaucratic Quality:
Does the Mode of Delivery Matter?
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Abstract
We show that the impact of foreign aid on bureaucratic quality in recipient
countries varies with the mode of delivery. Specifically, grants are found to impair
the functioning of the bureaucracy, whereas loans are not. The negative impact of
grants is larger when they are given as budget support rather than as assistance for
specific projects or for programs in general.
Keywords: Foreign aid, bureaucratic quality.
JEL classification: F35.
1 Introduction
Donors try to contribute to better institutions in developing countries through substan-
tial technical support, putting a particular emphasis on enabling local bureaucracies to
improve their performance and standards. In theory, aid has the potential to raise
bureaucratic quality, as it can release governments of binding revenue constraints, en-
abling them for instance to pay higher salaries to civil servants. Yet, a variety of fac-
tors created by the aid process itself, such as the provision of technical assistance that
inhibits the recipient government’s own capacity and initiative, or the donor fragmen-
tation caused by the presence of multiple agencies and development agendas (Knack
and Rahman, 2007), can become serious obstacles to the development of better local
bureaucracies.
Surprisingly, only a limited number of studies have analyzed empirically devel-
opment aid’s capacity to promote better bureaucracies. For a sample of 34 African
countries, Bräutigam and Knack (2004) find that high levels of aid are associated with
declines in the overall quality of governance. Covering a broader cross-section of aid
recipients, Knack and Rahman (2007) identify a negative effect of donor fragmentation
on bureaucratic quality.
We thank PEGNet for funding Pablo Selaya’s stay in Kiel during which most of the research underly-
ing this paper was undertaken.
†Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen. E-mail: pablo.selaya@econ.ku.dk.
‡Kiel Institute for the World Economy, Germany. E-mail: rainer.thiele@ifw-kiel.de.
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In this paper we present an empirical assessment of the effects of aid on bureau-
cratic quality across countries, aiming to contribute to the literature in two respects.
First, we focus on an important characteristic of development aid in recent years, namely,
the increasing degree in discretion in the use of funds with which donors disburse aid.1
Second, we focus on disaggregated flows of aid rather than on a single aid aggregate,
and thus take explicitly into account the fact that some forms of aid are more likely to
affect governance than others.
Our main findings suggest that the impact of foreign aid on bureaucratic quality in
recipient countries varies with the mode of delivery. Specifically, grants are found to
impair the functioning of the bureaucracy, whereas loans are not. We also find that the
negative impact of grants is larger when they are given as budget support rather than
as assistance for specific projects or for programs in general.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The data and the method of
estimation are discussed in Section 2. Section 3 presents the results, and Section 4 some
concluding remarks.
2 Data and Method
Our dependent variable is the average level of bureaucratic quality. We take as a proxy
the respective index from the PRS Group’s International Country Risk Guide (ICRG).2
This index is intended to measure institutional strength and the extent to which the
bureaucracy tends to minimize revisions of policy when governments change. It gives
countries a score ranging from 0 to 4 according to the overall level of bureaucratic
quality, as perceived by the population, and measured by a number of independent
surveys.3
Aid data are taken from the OECD’s Creditor Reporting System (CRS).4 The data
refer to actual aid disbursements. Disbursements are to be preferred over aid com-
mitments as the behavior of recipients is more likely to respond to actual transfers
of resources rather than to donors’ promises. We distinguish between program and
project aid, based on the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC) sector
codes for aid allocation. Program aid consists of funds for "general budget support",
"developmental food aid", "other commodity assistance", and "action related to debt".
Project aid comprises investments in social and economic infrastructure, as well as aid
1This is many times justified on grounds of giving more substance to the idea of aid ownership in
recipient countries (see e.g. DFID, 2005
2Available at , https://www.prsgroup.com/ICRG.aspx.
3Governance indicators are in general imperfect measures; see for example Kaufman and Kray (2008),
for a survey and discussion of the challenges remaining in relation to their construction; but also of the
characteristics that make them informative and useful for empirical research.
4See Appendix A1 for precise definitions and sources of the variables used in the regressions, and
Appendix A2 for summary statistics.
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to production sectors such as agriculture.5
Our analysis covers the years 1995-2005, which coincides with the period in which
donors started to increasingly emphasize the crucial importance of aid ownership and
the quality of governance for development, and the period for which we have access
to data on disaggregated aid disbursements from the OECD.
Our basic econometric specification is
∆bureaui,95 05 = α+ β0bureaui,95 + β1aid
t,p
i,95 05 + εi, (1)
where ∆bureaui,95 05 is the change in the level of bureaucratic quality in country i over
the period 1995–2005, bureaui,95 is the initial level of bureaucratic quality, aid
t,p
i,95 05 is
the average level of type t aid received for purpose p, where t 2 fgrants, loansg, and
p 2 fproject aid, program aid, budget supportg; and εi is a zero-mean error term.
This specification reduces to an important extent problems related to omitted vari-
ables. Including bureaui,95 as a regressor in equation (1) helps to control for a poten-
tially large set of historical slow moving factors explaining differences in the level of
bureaucratic quality (like ethnic fractionalization or natural resource endowments, for
example); and factors such as unobservable dimensions of culture which might be dif-
ficult to account for directly.6 Controlling for bureaui,95 also helps to account for the fact
that the variation in average levels of bureaucratic quality across countries depends to
a large extent on idiosyncratic initial conditions. Indeed, as shown in Table 1 for the
case of total aid, various proxies for institutions, resource endowments, religion, ethno-
linguistic fractionalization and geographical location turn out to be insignificant when
introduced jointly with bureaui,95. 7
We extend equation (1) to include Xi,95 05, a vector of time varying covariates of
bureaucratic quality to reduce the number of potentially confounding factors in the
identification of β1:
∆bureaui,95 05 = α+ β0bureaui,95 + β1aid
t,p
i,95 05 + β2Xi,95 05 + εi. (2)
In our preferred specification, the vector Xi,95 05 is represented by the initial level of
real GDP per capita. Other regressors suggested in the literature, such as the number
5For details concerning the sector codes, see the Appendix.
6Notice that we could also rewrite equation (1) as bureaui,05 = α+ (β  1)bureaui,95 + β1aid
t,p
i,95 05 + εi,
which highlights that all predetermined characteristics of the average level of bureaucratic quality during
the period of analysis are controlled for. An alternative strategy to try to account for the effect of individual
predetermined confounders (especially time invariant and slow moving unobservable characteristics) is
to run the regression with yearly data in first differences or with the variables transformed to deviations
from their means. However, this type of strategy would lead to heavily downward-biased estimates,
given the high persistence of the level of bureaucratic quality during the period of analysis.
7By focusing on changes in bureaucratic quality, regression (1) basically explains variationwithin coun-
tries. Running a regression in averages, bureaui,95 05 = α+ β1aid
t,p
i,95 05 + εi, would help to explain vari-
ation between countries. Estimates based on this approach confirm our results (not shown here, but avail-
able on request).
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of conflicts the government is involved in (Bräutigam and Knack 2004) and the initial
level of human capital (here proxied by enrolment in tertiary education), are not found
to have an independent impact on bureaucratic quality. Table 1 shows that the basic
negative correlation between bureaucratic quality and total aid, is robust to this type
of controls; and also to controlling for of a number of other possible covariates of bu-
reaucratic quality, like socio-demographic conditions (proxied by population size, and
measures of the religious landscape); and general geographic conditions (proxied by
the percentage of tropical area, latitude of the country; and the initial endowment of
natural resources).
The first option to estimate equation (2) is OLS. However, an OLS regression may
not allow us to identify β1 as a causal effect of aid on bureaucratic quality, since causal-
ity between aid and bureaucratic quality can run in both directions (see, e.g., Alesina
and Weder, 2002, who argue that more corrupt countries receive more aid). To account
for this, we estimate equation (2) in a 2SLS framework, using the initial level of pop-
ulation and the mortality rate for children under 5 years as instruments for our aid
variables.
Population size is a promising instrument for aid, as Easterly (2009) notes, based on
the observation that "there is an exogenous small country bias in aid such that smaller
countries get higher aid per capita and higher aid as a ratio to their income" (Easterly,
2009, p. 388). Such a relationship clearly exists, but population size as a regressor
does not satisfy the exclusion restriction immediately, since it is possible that it affects
directly the dynamics of bureaucratic quality.8 However, in a recent study, Knack and
Azfar (2003) show that the theoretical relationship between country size and the quality
of governance is ambiguous, and that the empirical relationship between population
and corruption (key feature of bureaucratic quality) is feeble, and highly sensitive to
sample selection bias.9 Therefore, conditional on the initial level of bureaucratic quality
and income per capita, our choice of population size as an instrument for aid appears
to satisfy the conceptual requirements of relevance and validity.
We supplement population size in the set of instruments, with the rate of mortality
for children under 5 years. We make this choice for various reasons. First, population
size itself might not capture entirely the idea of allocating aid according to recipients’
current needs (which is the approach to aid delivery that the international develop-
ment community has emphatically been pursuing during the period we study); and
8There are a number of studies arguing, for example, that small and more homogeneous populations
make good governance easier, see for example Alesina and Spolaore (1998).
9Knack and Azfar (2003) argue, in particular, that historical indexes trying to measure corruption cover
mostly large nations (corrupt or not), and some of the small nations which are probably less corrupt. (They
refer to Transparency International’s indexes for the years in the mid-1990s, where about 50 countries,
with a median population between 27 and 31 million, were surveyed, cf Knack and Azfar, 2003, Table 1.)
As coverage of countries increased and corruption and governance indicators started to include several
sources of data and information, smaller and more corrupt countries started to appear in the overall sam-
ple. This basically explains why the correlation we tend to find now between corruption and population
size is much weaker than the positive correlation it is possible to find using old governance indicators.
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infant mortality is a clear indicator of need of aid. This supports the relevance of infant
mortality as an instrument for aid. Second, in a study on the link between institu-
tions of governance and development performance, Campos and Nugent (1999) show
that bureaucratic quality has no direct effect on infant mortality rates across countries
(see Campos and Nugent, 1999, Table 4). This supports infant mortality’s validity as
instrument. Third, if population size and infant mortality are valid instruments, and
uncorrelated among themselves,10 then any linear combination of them is valid as well,
and in general more efficient than using any of them separately.11
As shown in the next section, this pair of instruments passes comfortably the stan-
dard tests of strength and relevance in all cases, except when the aid variable refers to
loans, where we cannot reject with a high probability that the instruments are weak. We
find that infant mortality is a particularly weak instrument for loans. This is perhaps
not very surprising though, as loans tend to be given to richer developing countries,
where infant mortality arguably is no longer among the most pressing concerns.12 As
an alternative instrument we include the (lagged) level of loan commitments. Loan
commitments are highly correlated with loan disbursements (see e.g. Clemens et al.,
2004), and should not affect the level of bureaucratic quality directly if sufficient time
has passed since commitments were made.
Finally, since the 2SLS estimates do not allow for correct inference on the coefficients
when the instruments are weak, we additionally rely on Moreira’s (2003) test for the
significance of weakly identified coefficients.
3 Results
Table 2 presents the OLS regression results for the preferred specification, which in-
cludes aid as the explanatory variable of interest, and the levels of initial bureaucratic
quality and initial GDP per capita as controls. Both controls are positively and signif-
icantly associated with average bureaucratic quality over the period under considera-
tion. As concerns aid, a clear pattern emerges. First, while project aid does not seem
to affect bureaucratic quality, program aid (in general) and aid for budget support (in
particular) turn out to exhibit a negative correlation with the level of bureaucratic qual-
ity. Second, the effects are statistically significant for total levels of aid and for the part
of them being only grants, but not for loans. Third, the impacts of total aid and grants
are larger (more negative) when the funds are meant to support the fiscal budget rather
than to finance specific projects or more general programs. If we associate grants and
aid for general programs with potentially higher degrees of flexibility in the use of
10The correlation between them in the sample is 1.5%.
11Using both instruments also allows us to test one overidentifting restriction, which is naturally addi-
tional useful information to assess the instrumentation strategy’s overall validity.
12Other indicators of need, such as the share of paved roads equally fail to produce strong and valid
instruments.
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Table 4: Loans and Bureaucratic Quality, 2SLS
Dependent variable:
∆ Bureaucratic Quality, 1995-2005 (1) (2) (3) (4)
Bureaucratic Quality, 1995 -0.724*** -0.62*** -0.67*** -0.59***
[0.130] [0.10] [0.10] [0.09]
Real GDP per capita, 1995 0.0399** 0.04* 0.04* 0.04***
[0.0190] [0.02] [0.02] [0.01]
All Aid Loans/GDP, av. 1995-2005 -0.38
[0.313]
Project aid loans/GDP, v. 1995-2005 -0.45
[0.82]
Program aid loans/GDP, av. 1995-2005 -1.29
[1.03]
Budget Support loans/GDP, av. 1995-2005 -2.59
[2.02]
Constant 1.248*** 0.93*** 1.17*** 0.86***
[0.425] [0.29] [0.35] [0.16]
Observations 101 101 101 101
R-squared 0.13 0.14 0.07 0.10
First-stage F statistic 14.44 11.85 10.96 32.80
p-value for Moreira (2003) CLR test 0.10 0.56 0.15 0.22
Confidence interval for
Moreira (2003) CLR test [-2.51, 0.00] [-3.24, 1.00] [-9.19, 0.20] [-6.90, 1.04]
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets. ***, ** and * denote significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent
level. Aid disbursements instrumented by initial aid commitments for each loan category.
funds, our results suggest that the probability of adverse effects from aid varies posi-
tively with the degree of discretion that recipients have over the incoming resources.
Table 3 shows the results when we estimate the model by 2SLS, instrumenting aid
with initial infant mortality and initial population. The first stage regression in this case
reflects well the main findings of the aid allocation literature (e.g. Berthélemy, 2006).
That is, given equation (2), the first stage regression explains the level of aid received by
a country with the initial level of population (reflecting the fact that smaller countries
receive more aid in relative terms), the initial level of infant mortality (representing an
important specific need of the recipient country), and the initial level of GDP per capita
(which captures, both, initial development conditions, and the idea that donors prefer
to give more resources to poorer countries).13
13None of the standard indicators of donor interest, such as former colonial status or religious affinity,
qualified as a potential instrument as none is found to be a significant determinant of aid allocation. This
may reflect the fact that we include aid given bymultilateral agencies, which according to previous studies
is unaffected by conventional donor interest variables (e.g., Nunnenkamp and Thiele 2006).
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The most notable result in Table 3 is that the sign of project aid turns significantly
negative. This can be rationalized along the line of Knack and Rahman’s (2007) finding
that project proliferation deteriorates bureaucratic quality, by putting a strain on the
absorptive capacity of recipient governments. The instruments we rely on in Table 3
appear as valid (we get high p-values of the Hansen’s J-test for overidentification) and
fairly strong (F-statistics exceeding the rule-of-thumb threshold of 10), except for the
case of loans. The impact of loans on bureaucratic quality continues to be insignificant
or weakly significant except for budget support, but inference about this estimate is
limited by the presence of weak instruments.
In Table 4 we introduce lagged commitments as an instrument for disbursed loans.
This instrument appears to be markedly stronger than those used before. The corre-
sponding 2SLS regression yields an estimate statistically not different from zero, which
is corroborated by Moreira’s (2003) test. In all cases the confidence interval for the
coefficient contains the value zero.
4 Concluding Remarks
This paper analyzes the impact of different forms of aid on bureaucratic quality in re-
cipient countries. The main finding is that grants impair the functioning of the local
bureaucracy whereas loans do not. In a similar vein, when investigating tax effort, an-
other important dimension of governance, Gupta et al. (2004) find that grants have a
significant negative effect on government revenue while loans have a significant pos-
itive effect. Taken together, these results qualify the predominant view that loans are
superior to grants as a mode of delivering aid to poor countries.
Grants are found to exhibit the strongest negative effect on bureaucratic quality
when they take the form of budget support. Our analysis thus suggests a note of cau-
tion about routinely providing aid for budget support.
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A Variable definitions and sources
1. Aid. Total ODA disbursements. Source: OECD CRS.
2. Project aid. ODA disbursements for (DAC codes):
(110) education,
(120) health,
(130) population policies/programmes and reproductive health,
(140) water supply and sanitation,
(150) government and civil society,
(160) other social infrastructure and services,
(210) transport and storage,
(230) energy generation and supply,
(240) banking and financial services,
(250) business and other services,
(311) agriculture,
(312) forestry,
(313) fishing,
(321) industry,
(322) mineral resources and mining,
(323) construction,
(331) trade policy and regulations and trade-related adjustment,
(332) tourism,
(400) multisector/cross-cutting,
(430) other multisector,
(910) administrative costs of donors.
Source: OECD CRS.
3. Program aid. ODA disbursements for (DAC codes):
(510) general budget support,
(520) developmental food aid/food security assistance,
(600) action relating to debt.
Source: OECD CRS.
4. Budget support. ODA disbursements for Budget support. Part of Program aid.
Source: OECD CRS.
5. Bureaucratic quality. Bureaucratic Quality Index 0 to 4 points. Measures in-
stitutional strength and the extent to which the bureaucracy tends to minimize
revisions of policy when governments change. High points (up to 4) are given to
countries where the bureaucracy governing without drastic changes in policy or
interruptions in government services. These low-risk countries have bureaucra-
cies somewhat autonomous from political pressure and with established mech-
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anisms for recruitment and training. To produce this index, the ICRG collects
political information and makes political risk assessments on the basis of subjec-
tive analysis of the available information.
Source: ICRG.
6. Corruption. Index 0 to 6 Points. Assessment of corruption within the political
system. The most common form of corruption met directly by business is in the
form of demands for special payments and bribes connected with import and
export licenses, exchange controls, tax assessments, police protection, loans, etc.
Although this measure takes such corruption into account, it is more concerned
with actual or potential corruption in the form of excessive patronage, nepotism,
job reservations, ’favor-for-favors’, secret party funding, and suspiciously close
ties between politics and business. Similar to the measure of bureaucratic quality,
to produce this index, the ICRGmakes a risk assessment on the basis of subjective
analysis of the available information.
Source: ICRG.
7. Real GDP per capita. Real GDP per capita. Based on Penn World Table’s (PWT)
6.2 chain index, obtained by first applying the component growth rates between
each pair of consecutive years t  1 and t (t = 1951 to 2000), to the current price
component shares in year to obtain a growth rate for each year. This growth rate
for each year t is applied backwards and forwards from 1996, and summed to the
constant price net foreign balance to obtain the Chain GDP series.
Source: PWT 6.2.
8. Population. Population size (in millions).
Source: WDI 2007.
9. Land area. Square km (in 000s).
Source: WDI 2007.
10. Under 5 mortality rate. Under-5 mortality rate is the probability that a newborn
baby will die before reaching age five, if subject to current age-specific mortality
rates. The probability is expressed as a rate per 1,000.
Source: WDI 2007.
11. Human capital. Ratio of total enrolment, regardless of age, to the population of
the age group that officially corresponds to the level of tertiary education. Ter-
tiary education, whether or not to an advanced research qualification, normally
requires, as a minimum condition of admission, the successful completion of ed-
ucation at the secondary level.
Source: WDI 2007.
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12. Ethno-linguistic fractionalization. Easterly and Levine’s (1997) average of eth-
nolinguistic fractionalization, reflecting the share of the population for whom the
language spoken at home is not the official or the most widely used language in
the country, and the degree of ethnic fractionalization.
Source: Toerell et al. (2008).
13. Share of catholics. La Porta et al (1999). Catholics as percentage of population in
1980.
Source: Toerell et al. (2008).
14. Share of muslims. La Porta et al (1999). Muslims as percentage of population in
1980.
Source: Toerell et al. (2008).
15. Share of protestants. La Porta et al (1999). Protestants as percentage of popula-
tion in 1980.
Source: Toerell et al. (2008).
16. Absolute latitude (index 0-1). La Porta et al (1999). The absolute value of the
latitude of the capital city, divided by 90 (to take values between 0 and 1).
Source: Toerell et al. (2008).
17. Number of conflicts the gov’t is involved. UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset
(version 3-2005). Number of conflicts in which the government of the country is
involved.
Source: Toerell et al. (2008).
18. Share of land area in the tropics. From Sachs and Gallup (1995). Percentage of
tropical area in the country.
Source: CID, Harvard.
19. Natural resources abundance. From Sachs and Warner (1997). Share of mineral
production in GNP in 1971.
Source: CID, Harvard.
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B Tables and Figure 1
Table A1. Summary statistics
No. obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Bureaucratic Quality index, 1995 101 1.91 0.94 0 3.58
Bureaucratic Quality index, av. 1995-2005 101 1.85 0.85 0 3.93
∆ Bureaucratic Quality index, 1995-2005 101 -0.11 0.88 -3 2
Aid / GDP, av. 1995-2005 101 3.61 5.32 0.002 24.34
Loans 101 0.59 1.53 0 14.49223
Grants 101 3.25 5.12 0.001 24.04
Budget support aid/GDP, av. 1995-2005 101 0.38 0.70 0 3.18
Loans 101 0.04 0.12 0 0.72
Grants 101 0.34 0.65 0 2.90
Project aid/GDP, av. 1995-2005 101 1.77 2.30 0 11.45
Loans 101 0.25 0.43 0 2.83
Grants 101 1.58 2.21 0 11.40
Program aid/GDP, av. 1995-2005 101 1.61 3.23 0 20.35
Loans 101 0.17 0.43 0 3.18
Grants 101 1.70 3.81 0 26.77
Real GDP per capita (000s), 1995 101 6.25 6.85 0.17 30.56
School enrolment, 1995 95 16.81 14.80 0.29 65.95
Corruption index, 1985 93 2.76 1.24 0 6
Population, 1995 101 42.75 151.55 0.28 1204.86
Under-5 mortality rate per thousand,1995 100 83.21 72.60 6 295
Land area (000s sq km) 101 732.61 1364.45 0.32 9327.48
Ethnolinguistic fractionalization 84 0.42 0.32 0 0.89
% of catholics, 1980 100 29.63 36.08 0 97.3
% of protestants, 1980 100 7.97 13.67 0 64.2
% of muslims, 1980 100 31.42 38.65 0 99.5
N. of conflicts, av. 1985-1995 100 0.38 0.63 0 4.8
(Absolute) Latitutde index 100 0.22 0.15 0 0.59
% of tropical area 93 0.64 0.45 0 1
Share of natural resources, 1971 83 0.14 0.26 0 1.51
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Table A2. Countries in the sample (WB country codes)
Latin America Middle East
Argentina (ARG) United Arab Emirates (ARE)
Bahamas, The (BHS) Bahrain (BHR)
Bolivia (BOL) Algeria (DZA)
Brazil (BRA) Egypt, Arab Rep. (EGY)
Chile (CHL) Iran, Islamic Rep. (IRN)
Colombia (COL) Iraq (IRQ)
Costa Rica (CRI) Israel (ISR)
Dominican Republic (DOM) Jordan (JOR)
Ecuador (ECU) Kuwait (KWT)
Guatemala (GTM) Lebanon (LBN)
Guyana (GUY) Libya (LBY)
Honduras (HND) Morocco (MAR)
Haiti (HTI) Malta (MLT)
Jamaica (JAM) Oman (OMN)
Mexico (MEX) Qatar (QAT)
Nicaragua (NIC) Saudi Arabia (SAU)
Panama (PAN) Syrian Arab Republic (SYR)
Peru (PER) Tunisia (TUN)
Paraguay (PRY) Yemen, Rep. (YEM)
El Salvador (SLV)
Suriname (SUR) Africa
Trinidad and Tobago (TTO) Angola (AGO)
Uruguay (URY) Burkina Faso (BFA)
Venezuela, RB (VEN) Botswana (BWA)
Côte d’Ivoire (CIV)
Asia Cameroon (CMR)
Bangladesh (BGD) Congo, Rep. (COG)
Brunei Darussalam (BRN) Ethiopia (ETH)
China (CHN) Gabon (GAB)
Hong Kong, China (HKG) Ghana (GHA)
Indonesia (IDN) Guinea (GIN)
India (IND) Gambia, The (GMB)
Korea, Rep. (KOR) Guinea-Bissau (GNB)
Sri Lanka (LKA) Kenya (KEN)
Mongolia (MNG) Liberia (LBR)
Malaysia (MYS) Madagascar (MDG)
Pakistan (PAK) Mali (MLI)
Philippines (PHL) Mozambique (MOZ)
Papua New Guinea (PNG) Malawi (MWI)
Singapore (SGP) Namibia (NAM)
Thailand (THA) Niger (NER)
Vietnam (VNM) Nigeria (NGA)
Sudan (SDN)
Eastern Europe Senegal (SEN)
Albania (ALB) Sierra Leone (SLE)
Armenia (ARM) Togo (TGO)
Azerbaijan (AZE) Tanzania (TZA)
Belarus (BLR) Uganda (UGA)
Cyprus (CYP) South Africa (ZAF)
Croatia (HRV) Congo, Dem. Rep. (ZAR)
Kazakhstan (KAZ) Zambia (ZMB)
Moldova (MDA) Zimbabwe (ZWE)
Slovenia (SVN)
Turkey (TUR)
Ukraine (UKR)
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Figure 1: The relationship between average aid receipts and change in Bureaucratic
Quality over 1995-2005, controlling for initial levels of Bureaucratic Quality and income
per capita. (The slope corresponds to the coefficient of aid/GDP in regression 2 in Table
1).
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Does Foreign Aid increase Foreign Direct Investment?
Pablo Selaya† Eva Rytter Sunesen‡
5 July 2009
Abstract
The notion that foreign aid and foreign direct investment (FDI) are comple-
mentary sources of capital is conventional among governments and international
cooperation agencies. This paper argues that the notion is incomplete. Within
the framework of an open economy Solow model we show that the theoretical
relationship between foreign aid and FDI is indeterminate. Aid may raise the
marginal productivity of capital by financing complementary inputs, such as pub-
lic infrastructure projects and human capital investment. However, aid may also
crowd out productive private investments if it comes in the shape of physical capi-
tal transfers. We therefore turn to an empirical analysis of the relationship between
FDI and disaggregated aid flows. Our results strongly support the hypotheses that
aid invested in complementary inputs draws in foreign capital while aid invested
in physical capital crowds out FDI. The combined effect of these two types of aid
is small but on average positive.
Keywords: Aid, foreign direct investment (FDI), open economy Solow model.
JEL classifications: F21, F35, H40, O19.
1 Introduction
The notion that foreign aid and foreign direct investment (FDI) are complementary
sources of capital is conventional among governments and international cooperation
agencies. For example, a salient point in the UN’s 2002 Monterrey Report of the In-
ternational Conference on Financing for Development is that official development as-
sistance (ODA), trade and foreign direct investment (FDI) are three essential tools for
development financing:
"ODA plays an essential role as a complement to other sources of financing
for development, especially in those countries with the least capacity to at-
tract private direct investment. A central challenge, therefore, is to create
We are grateful for comments from Carl-Johan Dalgaard, Heino Bohn Nielsen, Finn Tarp, Thomas
Rønde, and Thomas Barnebeck Andersen, as well as from participants at the Nordic Conference in Devel-
opment Economics 2007, the Spring Meetings of Young Economists (SMYE) 2008 at Université Lille 2, the
Quantitative Economics Doctorte (QED) 2008 workshop at Université Paris 1, and the 7th Development
Dialogue 2009 at the Institute of Social Sciences (ISS), The Hague.
†Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen. E-mail: pablo.selaya@econ.ku.dk.
‡Copenhagen Economics A/S, Sankt Annæ Plads 13, 1250 Copenhagen, Denmark. E-mail:
ers@copenhageneconomics.com.
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the necessary domestic and international conditions to facilitate direct in-
vestment flows, conducive to achieving national development priorities, to
developing countries, particularly Africa, least developed countries, small
island developing States, and landlocked developing countries, and also to
countries with economies in transition." (UN, 2002, p. 9).
However, the implicit presumption that ODA has a "catalysing" effect on FDI, i.e.,
that aid and FDI are complements, is by no means evident. For example, Kosack and
Tobin (2006) argue that aid and FDI are unrelated, because aid is mainly oriented to
support the government budget and finance investments in human capital, while FDI
is a private sector decision and relatively more connected to physical capital. In a more
general study, Caselli and Feyrer (2007) find that themarginal product of capital (MPK)
is roughly the same across countries, and one of the implications is that increasing aid
inflows to developing countries will lower the MPK in these economies and will tend
to be fully offset by outflows of other types of capital investments (p. 540). If this is the
case, aid and FDI are clearly closer to being substitutes rather than being complements.
This paper provides a unified framework for assessing the relative merit of these
different claims. We set up an open-economy Solow model with perfect capital mo-
bility that distinguishes between aid directed towards complementary factors of pro-
duction and aid invested in physical capital. The distinction serves to illustrate, on the
one hand, that aid invested in complementary factors increases MPK in the recipient
country, which tends to draw in additional foreign resources, and thus helps to sustain
a higher level of capital over time. For example, aid can ease important bottlenecks in
poor countries by financing public infrastructure and human capital investments that
would not have been undertaken by private actors (due to the free-riding problem in fi-
nancing public goods), nor by public agents (because of the budgetary constraints that
prevent aid-recipient governments from undertaking this type of investments). On the
other hand, the model also shows that foreign aid invested in physical capital directly
competes with other types of capital, and thus replaces investments that private ac-
tors would have undertaken anyway. In this case, capital mobility and rate-of-return
equalisation across countries will give rise to a flight of other types of capital after an
aid flow has been received.
The theoretical model provides a number of results and testable predictions. First,
for a given level of domestic saving, aid invested in physical capital crowds out other
types of foreign investments in physical capital, one for one. Second, aid invested in
complementary factors of production has an ambiguous effect on FDI. The logic of
the ambiguity is that, while an increase in complementary factors increases MPK, the
productivity increase also raises income, domestic savings and domestic investments,
which tends to lower MPK and thus to crowd out foreign investments. These two
findings suggest that the overall impact of aid on FDI is ambiguous and that the com-
position of aidmatters. Finally, the relationship between complementary aid and FDI is
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unlikely to be linear, so scale effects from this type of aid should be taken into account.
We take the implications of our theoretical model to the data utilising a panel of 84
countries over the period 1970-2001. We find a large and positive effect of aid invested
in complementary factors, while aid invested in physical capital has a negative impact
on FDI. Although the combined impact of these two types of aid on FDI remains posi-
tive, our results imply that more aid should be directed towards inputs complementary
to physical capital to optimise the return on aid. The results are robust to (1) a broader
definition of complementary aid than that adopted in our benchmark estimations, (2)
to allowing for imperfect capital mobility, and (3) to including other traditional FDI
determinants.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the scarce empirical literature
on FDI and aid. Section 3 introduces the theoretical model of FDI and aid building
on an open economy Solow model with perfect capital mobility. Section 4 discusses
relevant econometric issues and presents the data. Section 5 shows the results, and
Section 6 tests their robustness. Section 7 sums up and discusses policy implications.
2 Literature Review
The relationship between aid and FDI is controversial and empirical results remain
inconclusive. To our knowledge, only four papers explicitly analyse the relationship
between aid and FDI. Harms and Lutz (2006) and Karakaplan et al. (2005) analyse the
question for a broad sample of developing countries. Karakaplan et al. (2005) find that
aid has a negative direct effect on FDI and that both good governance and financial
market development significantly improve the impact of aid on subsequent flows of
FDI. Harms and Lutz (2006), on the other hand, find that once they control for the reg-
ulatory burden in the host country, aidworks as a complement to FDI and, surprisingly,
that the catalysing effect of foreign aid is stronger in countries that are characterised by
an unfavourable institutional environment.
The two case studies based on Japanese FDI and aid flows in Kimura and Todo
(2007) and Blaise (2005) also find incongruent results. While Blaise (2005) finds pos-
itive effects of aid to infrastructure projects, Kimura and Todo (2007) find no positive
infrastructure effect, no negative rent-seeking effect but a positive vanguard effect (aris-
ing when foreign aid from a particular donor country promotes FDI from the same
country but not from other countries).
This paper argues that the mixed results can be explained by the high level of ag-
gregation of the aid variable. While Karakaplan et al. (2005) include only overall ODA,
Harms and Lutz (2006) also distinguish between grants, technical cooperation grants,
as well as bilateral and multilateral aid. However, it remains unclear why one would
expect foreign investors to react differently to these sources of aid. Kimura and Todo
(2007) apply the idea of different types of aid, but construct their proxies relying only
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on data for aid commitments and they only separate out aid to physical infrastructure.
3 A Theoretical Model of FDI and Aid
A general shortcoming in the empirical literature is the lack of consensus on the spec-
ification of the FDI relation, and none of the existing empirical papers on aid and FDI
are supported by a theoretical model. This paper closes this gap by proposing a Solow
model for a small open economy to model the main characteristics of the relationship
between aid and FDI.1
We assume a Cobb-Douglas production function where GDP per capita, y, is given
by
y = Akα, (1)
where k is the stock of physical capital per capita, KL , α is a constant and A denotes total
factor productivity.
We assume that the total flow of foreign aid, AID, can be split into aid invested
in complementary factors, AIDA, and aid invested in physical capital, AIDK, where
AID = AIDA+ AIDK. AIDA by nature raises the marginal productivity of all produc-
tion factors that are complementary to physical capital.2 For example, infrastructure
investments lead to the interconnection of markets (Easterly and Levine, 1999), while
investments in human capital improve technology adoption. AIDK, on the other hand,
enters the production function only through its effect on physical capital accumulation,
and has no (augmenting) effect on total factor productivity.3
Tomodel this explicitly, we first assume that complementary aid has an augmenting
effect on all production factors that are complementary to physical capital, and we thus
allow the flow of AIDA to increase the existing stock (A0) of A in the economy:
A = A0 + AIDA. (2)
Allowing complementary aid to have a direct impact on A is a shorthand for the idea
that AIDA has an augmenting effect on any production factor other than k (e.g. human
capital, public investments, new technology, etc.) and, thus, it is able to increase –
ultimately– the MPK.
Second, we assume an open economy.4 Accordingly, in per capita terms, capital
1One exception is Beladi and Oladi (2007) who analyse the question in a general equilibrium setting
where all foreign aid is used to finance public goods.
2The argument of complementarity between public and private investment is generalised by Clarida
(1993) and Chatterjee et al. (2003). Reinikka and Svensson (2002) find empirical support for the importance
of complementary public capital for foreign investors.
3We thus allow part of foreign aid to be productivity enhancing while FDI brings no spillovers. In
reality, all capital transfers might contain some knowledge transfer but the assumption is made to keep
the model simple and tractable.
4In line with Sørensen and Witta-Jacobsen (2006, Ch. 4) and Turnovsky (2000).
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equipment can be financed by (i) domestic savings (S = sy, where s is a given savings
rate), (ii) foreign direct investments ( f di) and (iii) the inflow of aid invested in physical
capital (aidK). Then capital accumulation per capita is given by
k˙ = sy+ f di+ aidK   (n+ δ)k, (3)
where n is the population growth rate and δ is a fixed depreciation rate.
With perfect capital mobility, the world real rate of return, rw, pins down at any
point in time the net return to capital (MPK   δ), and thus
rw = MPK  δ = Aαkα 1   δ. (4)
According to (4), the steady state level of k at any point in time is given by
k =

Aα
r
 1
1 α
, (5)
where r is defined as a gross world real rate of return, rw + δ.
Rewriting (3) taking (5) as given, the flow of FDI per capita is determined as the
residual
f di =  aidK   sy + (n+ δ)k, (6)
where y = Akα.
At a first glance, (6) seems to support the Caselli and Feyrer (2007) conjecture that
aid and FDI are substitutes: for a given level of domestic savings, equalisation between
MPK and r requires an increase in foreign aid to be accommodated by a proportional
reduction in FDI:
∂ f di
∂aidK
=  1. (7)
However, this finding only holds for aid invested in physical capital. The effect of
complementary aid, on the other hand, has two components:
∂ f di
∂aidA
=  s ∂y

∂aidA
+ (n+ δ)
∂k
∂aidA
. (8)
First, since
s
∂y
∂aidA
= s
∂ (Akα)
∂aidA
= s

Lkα + Aαkα 1
∂k
∂aidA

> 0, (9)
complementary aid has a positive effect on domestic savings and thus on domesti-
cally financed capital investments. This result comes from the fact that aidA shifts the
production function thereby raising the steady state levels of income and domestic sav-
ings. Given the assumption of MPK equalisation in (4), the corresponding increase in
domestically financed investments causes a proportional reduction in the need for FDI
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of the size  s ∂y∂aidA .
Also, since
∂k
∂aidA
=
∂
∂aidA
 
Aα
r
 1
1 α
!
=
1
1  α

Aα
r
 α
1 α Lα
r
> 0, (10)
we see that complementary aid has a positive effect on the steady state capital stock.
This finding is based on the augmenting effect of aidA, which raises MPK and thus
allows the recipient country to increase its capital stock without experiencing a coun-
terbalancing capital flight. That is, for a fixed s, aid-financed investments in comple-
mentary factors allow a sustainable increase in FDI equal to (n+ δ) ∂k

∂aidA
.
This model holds then several implications that should be taken into account when
assessing the empirical relationship between aid and FDI. First, the effect of total aid
on FDI is ambiguous:
∂ f di
∂aid
=
∂ f di
∂aidK
+
∂ f di
∂aidA
=  1  s ∂y

∂aidA
+ (n+ δ)
∂k
∂aidA
? 0, (11)
because we expect aid to production sectors to have a negative effect on FDI, but the ef-
fect of complementary aid is indeterminate. Second, from equations (9) and (10), since
themarginal effect of complementary aid on FDI includes the level of aid itself, the rela-
tionship between complementary aid and FDI is not linear. In particular, there are scale
effects from complementary aid that should be taken into account. Since  s ∂y∂aidA and
(n+ δ) ∂k

∂aidA
work in opposite directions, the sign of the second order effects will also be
indeterminate and will need to be assessed empirically. Third, the model stresses the
need to take all sources of capital into account, and it is therefore essential to include
domestic savings as an additional explanatory variable in the empirical FDI analysis.
To our knowledge, this has not been done before.
4 Econometric Issues
In a panel setting, the econometric interpretation of the aid-FDI relationship is
f diit = β0 + β1A
0
it + β2nit + β3Sit + β4aid
K
it + β5aid
A
it + β6

aidAit
2
+ uit, (12)
where f diit is FDI per capita in country i during period t, A0it is the overall productivity
level at the beginning of period t, nit is population growth, Sit is domestic savings per
capita, aidKit is aid invested in physical capital, and aid
A
it is aid invested in complemen-
tary factors. The square of aidAit is included in (12) to control for the scale effects of
complementary aid.
We expect β1 to be positive since a high productivity level gives a high steady state
level of capital, β2 should be positive since a fast growing population lowers the per
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capita capital stock and thus allows for an increase in FDI per capita, and β3 should be
negative since high domestic saving lowers the need for foreign capital. From equation
(7) we know that aidK crowds out foreign investments one-to-one, β4 =  1, whereas
the effect of aidA (β5 and β6) is indeterminate. Since data on total productivity is un-
available, the next section will discuss the strategy used to identify A0it empirically.
4.1 Productivity
Since data on the initial productivity level (A0it) is unavailable, we need to find valid
proxies. In the first case, we use pooled OLS (POLS) and estimate
f diit = αt + β0 + β1nit + β2Sit + β3aid
K
it + β4aid
A
it + β5

aidAit
2
+ uit, (13)
where αt is a time-specific constant that captures common productivity shocks at time
t. However, not all countries start out with the same initial conditions and we thus
allow also for cross sectional differences in productivity by including time-invariant
country-specific fixed effects, αi,
f diit = αt + αi + β0 + β1nit + β2Sit + β3aid
K
it + β4aid
A
it + β5

aidAit
2
+ uit. (14)
This equation can be estimated consistently and efficiently with a fixed effects model
(FE). However, if productivity evolves unequally across countries over time, regres-
sion (14) leaves out important information. We therefore extend the list of variables
to include a lagged dependent variable, which captures time-moving country-specific
factors as well as agglomeration effects,
f diit = αt + αi + β0 + β1 f diit 1 + β2nit + β3Sit + β4aid
K
it + β5aid
A
it + β6

aidAit
2
+ uit.
(15)
Equation (15) can be estimated consistently and efficiently using the Arellano and
Bond (1991) Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) estimator. It is important to no-
tice that including a lagged dependent variable also reduces the need to control for
other FDI determinants. All estimators use standard errors that are robust to arbitrary
heteroskedasticity as well as intra-group correlation (clustering).
4.2 Endogeneity
We need to consider the possible endogeneity of aid in estimating the above equa-
tions, since all estimators are consistent only if all explanatory variables are exogenous.
Aid would be endogenous, for example, if donors systematically disburse more re-
sources to those countries that are neglected by private foreign investors (Harms and
Lutz, 2006). We therefore estimate (13)–(15) following the instrumentation strategy in
Hansen and Tarp (2000, 2001), Dalgaard and Hansen (2001) and Dalgaard et al. (2004).
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The first set of instruments accounts for donors’ overall preference for granting
more aid to countries with smaller populations and lower levels of income per capita
and thus includes (lagged) interactions between levels of aid and (i) the size of popula-
tion and (ii) the initial level of GDP per capita in the recipient country. We also include
the lagged level of aid to account for persistency in other determinants of aid as well
as a dummy variable for African countries in the CFA franc zone to capture particular
donors’ strategic interests.
Tests confirm the validity of our instruments, and the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test
finds that the aid variables should be treated as endogenous in the FDI relation. All the
results reported in the next section are therefore based on Instrumental Variables (IV)
methods.
4.3 Data
The dependent variable, f diit, is net FDI inflows in constant US dollars from the UNC-
TAD Foreign Direct Investment database, divided by the population to control for
country size. The main explanatory variables are the population growth rate and sav-
ings per capita from the WDI (2005).
The aid variables are based on total net flows of official aid disbursements reported
in the OECD/DAC database. Since data on sectoral disbursements are available only
after 1990, the measure of per capita aid flows to sector s, aidsit, is constructed using
sectoral commitments as a proxy for sectoral disbursements. In particular, we follow
Clemens et al. (2004) and Thiele et al. (2006) and assume that the proportion of aid
actually disbursed to sector s is equal to the proportion of aid committed to sector s,
and hence that
aidsit 
commitsit
∑s commitsit
∑s aid
s
it, (16)
where commitsit is the amount of ODA commitments to sector s. Approximating sectoral
disbursements with sectoral commitments may cause some concerns due to differences
in definitions and statistical record (see Clemens et al., 2004, for more details). How-
ever, according to Odedokun (2003) and Clemens et al. (2004) this problem is likely
to be small since disbursements and commitments (both on the aggregate and sectoral
levels) are highly correlated. Also, annual discrepancies are likely to be larger than
averages, and we thus average the data over five-year intervals.
Aid is decomposed into two broad categories according to its purpose of invest-
ment:
 Aid invested in complementary inputs: aid oriented to social infrastructure (such
as education, health, and water supply projects) and economic infrastructure
(such as energy, transportation and communications projects).
 Aid invested in physical capital: contributions to directly productive sectors (such
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as agriculture, manufacturing, trade, banking and tourism projects).
These two aid categories capture the main characteristics of aidA and aidK: aid in-
vested in complementary factors is intended to generate positive spillover effects (pub-
lic goods, inputs complementary to physical capital) whereas aid invested in physical
capital has a more narrow purpose and could more easily have been undertaken by
private investors. Other sectoral aid categories (like multisector support, programme
assistance, debt reorganisation, emergency assistance and unallocated types of aid) are
excluded from the analysis since they are primarily oriented to provide fiscal budget
support in the recipient country.5
5 Results
Figure 1 in the Appendix shows the partial correlation between FDI and aid invested
in physical capital. While there seems to be a negative relationship between the two
variables, it is difficult to assess if there is full crowding out from the downwards slop-
ing line (that is, to assess if the slope is  1). Figure 2 depicts the partial correlation
between FDI and aid invested in complementary goods. The figure clearly indicates
that the two variables are positively correlated and that the relationship might not be
linear. However, the exact predictions from the theoretical model can only be tested in
a more comprehensive framework where country-specific characteristics capture the
cross-sectional heteroskedasticity clearly prevalent in the figures.
Results from estimating equations (13)–(15) for a sample of 84 countries using five-
year intervals are reported in Table 1. Independently of the chosen estimator, our
results strongly support the notion that aid invested in complementary factors has a
catalysing effect on FDI. This means that the short-run replacement effect of aidA on
FDI is outweighed by the positive effect that complementary aid has on the long-run
levels of income and capital per capita. A Hausman test confirms the significance of
fixed effects, and the highly significant lagged dependent variable suggests that we
should rely on the consistent and efficient Arellano and Bond (1991) GMM estimator
in our further analysis. When the time series are persistent, the first-difference GMM
(GMM-DIF) estimator is poorly behaved since under such conditions lagged levels of
the variables are only weak instruments for subsequent first-differences. We there-
fore rely on the system GMM (GMM-SYS) estimator suggested by Arellano and Bover
(1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998). All variables are treated as endogenous, which
means that instruments should be lagged two periods or more to be valid.
The results in column (4) in Table 1 show that, for a given domestic savings rate, one
aid dollar invested in complementary factors draws in 1.24 dollars of FDI, both in per
5Section 6 includes a test for robusteness of the results with respect to the definition of complementary
aid, and a note about the changes in the results when variables possibly correlated with aidA are included
in the regressions.
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Table 1: FDI and Foreign Aid
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
POLS FE GMM-DIF GMM-SYS GMM-SYS
aidK  0.59  1.56  0.77  0.94  0.88
[0.8] [0.3] [0.2] [0.2] [0.2]
aidA 1.67 1.71 1.34 1.24 1.07
[0.5] [0.2] [0.2] [0.2] [0.2]
aidA, squared  0.0028  0.0012  0.0015  0.0015  0.0013
[0.0006] [0.0007] [0.0002] [0.0002] [0.0002]
Savings, sy 29.7  32.3 1.11 20.5  20.2
[16] [24] [23] [7.8] [17]
Pop. growth, n  7.26  0.97 1.05  3.7  2.19
[3.5] [1.4] [1.6] [2.5] [1.8]
f dit 1 0.045 0.40 0.38
[0.1] [0.09] [0.1]
GDP per capita 13.7
[4.1]
Constant 12.9 . . 5.04 1.14
[14] . . [8.5] [6.0]
Observations 289 277 217 289 289
R2 0.11 0.08 . . .
N. countries 84 72 76 84 84
Model specification tests:
Hansen-Sargan overid. (0.21) (0.88) (0.15) (0.34) (0.79)
Underid. (0.0028) (0.0) . . .
Cragg-Donald F (0.0021) (0.0) . . .
Anderson F joint sig F (0.0) (0.0) . . .
DWH p (0.071) (0.0026) . . .
AR(1) . . (0.00) (0.21) (0.75)
AR(2) . . (0.77) . .
Hypothesis tests on marginal effects evaluated at the median:
ME of aidK =  1 0.41  0.56 0.23 0.06 0.12
[0.83] [0.30] [0.19] [0.25] [0.21]
ME of aid > 0 0.96 0.10 0.50 0.24 0.13
[0.52] [0.37] [0.13] [0.09] [0.07]
ME of aidA > 0 1.55 1.66 1.27 1.18 1.02
[0.51] [0.18] [0.16] [0.22] [0.22]
Notes. ***, **, and * denote significance at 1, 5, and 10% levels. Robust standard errors in brackets, p-
values in parentheses. The dependent variable is FDI per capita. All regressions include time dummies.
Aid variables are instrumented with own lags, interactions with GDP per capita, log(pop) and a FRZ
dummy.
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capita terms. The square of complementary aid is negative and significant, suggesting
that the "savings" effect described in equation (9) dominates for sufficiently high levels
of aidA. Evaluated at the median of the sample, our results indicate that the marginal
effect of aidA on f di is 1.18, and a Wald test confirms it to be significantly positive.
Having specified a dynamic model, we can calculate the long run effect of aidA by
assuming a that the level of FDI per capita is the same in every period. Evaluating at the
median, we find that one additional aid dollar per capita invested in complementary
factors draws in 1.97 (1.18/0.6) dollars of FDI per capita in the long run. We conclude
from this that aidA generates important short run as well as long run benefits for foreign
investors. The results also confirm the crowding out effect of aid invested in physical
capital, since one aid dollar per capita invested in physical capital replaces 0.94 dollars
of f di, which accumulate to 1.57 dollars in the long run (0.94/0.6).
The effect of population growth is insignificant throughout the analysis. But, con-
trary to the prediction from our model, we find a positive rather than a negative ef-
fect of domestic savings on f di. A plausible explanation is that foreign investors look
explicitly at data on national savings when making their investment decisions and in-
terpret a high s as a signal of sustained growth history and good economic prospects.6
To adjust for this positive externality we include GDP per capita in column (5). Ad-
justing for the purchasing power of the population leaves savings insignificant and
negative, which suggest that once we correct for the positive signalling effect of a high
saving rate, domestic and foreign capital are substitutes as suggested by the theoretical
model.
Finally, we perform some tests of hypothesis and present the results at the bottom
of the Table. We test the Caselli and Feyrer (2007) conjecture that aid invested in phys-
ical capital replaces FDI one for one. The Wald tests show that we cannot reject its
validity in most of the cases. We also find that the combined effect of aidA and aidK is
significantly positive and between 0.21 and 0.24 (evaluated at the median of the sam-
ple), which implies that the substitution effect of aidK is more than outweighed by the
positive effects of aidA on f di in a typical country. If the marginal effects are evaluated
at the mean instead of the median, our conclusions remain the same.
6 Robustness
In light of the important policy implications arising from our results, it is necessary
to ensure that these results are robust to correcting for possible misspecifications in
the empirical relationship between FDI and aid. We carry out three basic checks for
robustness of our empirical findings.
6This is in line with evidence showing that the households with the highest lifetime incomes are the
ones with highest lifetime saving rates (Carroll, 2000), and that higher growth rates lead to higher savings
rates (Carroll, Overland and Weil, 2000; Loayza, Schmidt-Hebbel and Servén, 2000).
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6.1 Technical Assistance
The grouping of aid variables could be questioned. In particular, aid in this paper does
not include Technical Cooperation Grants (TCGs), which contribute to development
primarily through education and training. Since TCGs consist of activities involving
the supply of human resources or actions targeted on human resources (education,
training, and advice) one could easily argue that TCGs would have the same impact as
aid invested in complementary factors. In the Appendix (Table A1) we therefore repli-
cate the specifications from Table 1 using an extended definition of aidA that includes
also TCGs from the OECD database. Although there is a slight drop in the size of the
coefficients, the results from Table 1 carry over.
6.2 Imperfect Capital Mobility
If mobility of capital is imperfect, MPK should be allowed to deviate from the gross
world interest rate by a risk-premium, ρ, that reflects idiosyncratic country character-
istics. In this case, the first-order condition in (4) should read
r+ ρ = MPK, (17)
and the capital stock in (5) should be redefined accordingly:
k =

Aα
r+ ρ
 1
1 α
. (18)
While this renders the effect of aid invested in physical capital unchanged, the ef-
fect of complementary aid becomes somewhat more complicated. The risk premium
impact FDI directly through (18) but, given that
∂k
∂aidA
=
∂
∂aidA
 
Aα
r+ ρ
 1
1 α
!
=
1
1  α

Aα
r+ ρ
 α
1 α Lα
r+ ρ
, (19)
the marginal effect of aidA will also depend on the risk premium and thus on country-
specific characteristics. To capture this econometrically, we include the risk premium
level and its interaction with aidA, and estimate
f diit = αt + αi + β0 + β1nit + β2Sit + β3aid
K
it + β4aid
A
it + β5

aidAit
2
(20)
+β6ρit + β7

aidAit  ρit

+ uit.
β6 and β7 are expected to be negative because higher risk reduces country i’s attrac-
tiveness as an investment location.
To capture the risk premium we include the overall International Country Risk
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Guide rating as well as its three subcategories of risk: political, financial and economic.7
All risk variables are treated as endogenous. In general, lower political risk is associ-
ated with higher levels of overall accountability, stability and institutional quality in
the political process. In particular, from the ICRG rankings, political risk is lower (1)
the higher the government stability, (2) the better the socioeconomic conditions and the
investment profile, (3) the lower the number of internal conflicts, external conflicts and
political corruption, (4) the lower the military is involved in politics, (5) the lower the
religious and the ethnic tensions, (6) the higher the prevalence of law and order, and
(7) the larger the degrees of democratic accountability and bureaucratic quality. Results
from estimating (20) including these political risk measures are reported in Table 2.8
The political risk variable enters only significantly in four cases. Relative absence of
external conflict, low level of religious tensions and a high level of democratic account-
ability suggest all a lower risk premium and tend to attract foreign investors. However,
the prevalence of law and order shows a negative impact on FDI inflows (significant
only at the 10% level, though). This counter intuitive result might be due to the fact that
we have already accounted for domestic savings, which will be highly correlated with
this risk variable: countries characterised by high prevalence of law and order tend to
have higher domestic saving.
The interactions between complementary aid and the political risk indicator are
more often significant, and the results suggest that government stability, favourable
socioeconomic conditions, an attractive investment profile, low military interference in
politics and better bureaucratic quality are all supportive of a high steady-state level
of capital. Although the results show a negative impact of the interaction between
aidA and the index for low degree of religious tensions, the net marginal effect on FDI
remains positive.
Table 3 presents similar estimations taking into account different economic and fi-
nancial risk measures. The economic risk variables reflect the macroeconomic situa-
tion and the economic advancement of the host country: GDP per capita, real GDP
growth, inflation, the budget balance as a share of GDP and the current account as a
share of GDP. The financial risk variables assess a country’s ability to finance its official,
commercial and trade debt obligations: external debt as a share of GDP, debt service
as a share of exports, the current account as a share of export, international liquidity
as months of import cover and exchange rate stability (calculated here as the annual
change in the real exchange rate).9 Results in Table 3 keep our overall conclusions un-
7In order to detect significant effects of aid on FDI, Karakaplan et al. (2005) and Harms and Lutz
(2006) use aid interacted with the Kaufmann et al. (2005) governance indicators to capture differences in
government effectiveness.
8For the results in Table 2, a high value of the different political-risk measures is associated with a low
overall political risk, and hence, a high value of the different risk measures should have a positive effect
on f di.
9Similar to the case of the political risk indexes, all these different measures reflect lower overall levels
of economic and financial risk.
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changed. It is interesting to note, however, that the political risk variables seem to be
more important to foreign investors than the economic and financial risk variables.
6.3 Omitted Variables
Tables 2 and 3 show a positive impact from the savings rate on f di. We adjust for this
in Tables 4 and 5 including the level of GDP per capita in the regressions. As in Table 1,
the effect of savings disappears and it is captured by the level of GDP per capita, which
supports our results previously suggesting the existence of positive externalities from
s to f di.
However, it is important to notice that once we adjust for the risk of investing
abroad by including various proxies for the risk premium, population growth turns
out to have a significantly negative impact on f di in both Tables 2 and 3. One expla-
nation might be that a fast growing population is attractive for the efficiency-seeking
investor but that the quality of the abundant labour in some countries might be too
poor to attract foreign investors. In this case, a fast growing population might instead
cause social tensions and excessive burdens on the public system, which will tend to
scare away foreign investors rather than draw in more investments.10 We therefore
add the primary school enrolment rate from the World Development Indicators (2005)
in Tables 4 and 5, to take the quality of the labour force and the level of development
into account.11 In many cases, the adjustment for the quality of the labour force means
that population growth no longer enters significant and in the remaining cases it re-
duces the size of the initially negative effect on f di. It is interesting noticing that the
adjustment for the level of human capital reduces the size of the effect of aidA on f di.
This means that the aidA variable is picking up the information that we intend, and
thus substantiates our choice and definition of different types of aid.
Finally, while our empirical specification includes both variables predicted by our
theoretical model as well as a rich specification of idiosyncratic country characteristics,
there might be additional variables that play a role in the allocation choice of foreign in-
vestors. To test for this, further regressions included measures of market potential (re-
gional dummies, urban population and rural population), factor market characteristics
(size of the labour force, average years of schooling) andmarket access (openness, num-
ber of vehicles, transportation network density, telephone lines and rail lines). None of
them turned out significant or to have a qualitative impact on our results. These results
are available upon request.
10This is in line with Mankiw, Romer and Weil’s (1992) point that a higher population growth rate
implies lower per capita human capital levels and thus lower MPK levels. This will have a negative
impact on FDI.
11The data on school enrolment is highly unbalanced, so we interpolated within countries to fill in
gaps, and extended the series with the first and the last values to complete the extremes. The correlation
between the original and the transformed series is above 0.98 in both cases.
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7 Conclusion
Due to its potential to transfer knowledge and technology, create jobs, boost overall
productivity, and enhance competitiveness and entrepreneurship, attracting FDI to de-
veloping countries is essential to contribute to economic growth, development and
poverty reduction. Given the emphasis on using ODA as a vehicle for creating a private
sector enabling environment, the question of whether or not aid flows induce signifi-
cantly more FDI inflows becomes an important and relevant question not only on its
own right but also as an essential element in the aid effectiveness debate.
The results strongly support the hypotheses that aid invested in inputs complemen-
tary to physical capital draws in foreign capital, while aid directly invested in physical
capital crowds out private foreign investments. While the impact of the two types of
aid together is positive, an important policy implication is that the composition of for-
eign aid matters and that more aid should be directed towards complementary inputs.
Such investments improve the absorption capacity of the recipient country and increase
MPK in the host country, which allows it to accumulate more foreign capital without
experiencing a drop in domestic investments or a flight of foreign capital.
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Appendix: Figures and Tables
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Figure 1: FDI and Aid to Physical Capital (aidK)
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Figure 2: FDI and Aid to Complementary Factors (aidA)
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Table A1: FDI and Foreign Aid - Alternative Definition of aidA
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
POLS FE GMM-DIF GMM-SYS GMM-SYS
aidK  0.29  1.47  0.71  0.75  0.74
[0.8] [0.2] [0.2] [0.3] [0.2]
aid †A 1.09
 1.65 1.33 0.97 0.87
[0.4] [0.2] [0.2] [0.2] [0.2]
aid †A, squared  0.0020  0.0012  0.0015  0.0012  0.0011
[0.0004] [0.0006] [0.0002] [0.0002] [0.0002]
Savings, sy 38.5  25.8 6.62 26.5  20.3
[17] [22] [20] [10] [18]
Pop. growth, n  8.91  1.7 0.52  5.50  3.18
[4.1] [1.4] [1.4] [3.2] [2.3]
f dit 1 0.018 0.37 0.36
[0.1] [0.1] [0.1]
GDP per capita 15.4
[4.3]
Constant 18.8 . . 5.73  0.99
[13] . . [10] [6.7]
Observations 289 277 217 289 289
R2 0.11 0.08 . . .
N. countries 84 72 76 84 84
Model specification tests:
Hansen-Sargan overid. (0.12) (0.53) (0.11) (0.30) (0.86)
Underid. (0.0017) (0.0) . . .
Cragg-Donald F (0.0013) (0.0) . . .
Anderson F joint sig F (0.0) (0.0) . . .
DWH p (0.17) (0.0018) . . .
AR(1) . . (0.00) (0.12) (0.54)
AR(2) . . (0.69) . .
Hypothesis tests on marginal effects evaluated at the median:
ME of aidK =  1 0.71  0.47 0.29 0.25 0.26
[0.80] [0.24] [0.19] [0.28] [0.22]
ME of aid > 0 0.71 0.13 0.56 0.17 0.07
[0.57] [0.33] [0.15] [0.11] [0.08]
ME of aid †A > 0 1.00
 1.60 1.26 0.92 0.82
[0.35] [0.14] [0.16] [0.23] [0.21]
Notes. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors in brackets, p-values in parentheses. The
dependent variable is FDI per capita. All regressions include time dummies. Aid variables are instru-
mented with own lags, interactions with GDP per capita, log(pop) and a FRZ dummy. aid †A is defined as
aidA + technical cooperation grants.
138
Table A2: Partial Correlations - Main Variables
f di aidK aidA aid †A n sy
f di 1
aidK  0.24 1
aidA  0.16 0.79 1
aid †A  0.15 0.78 0.99 1
n  0.24 0.03  0.05  0.02 1
sy 0.35 0.12 0.19 0.17  0.18 1
Table A3: Partial Correlations - Economic Risk Measures
GDP per GDP Inflation Budget Curr. Acc.
capita growth rate balance balance
GDP per capita 1
GDP growth  0.08 1
Inflation rate 0.14  0.23 1
Budget balance 0.12 0.18  0.20 1
Curr. Acc. balance 0.22 0.19  0.24 0.25 1
Table A4: Partial Correlations - Financial Risk Measures
Foreign For. debt Curr. Acc. Reserves to Exch. R.
debt service to exports imp. months stab.
Foreign debt 1
For. debt service 0.14 1
Curr. Acc. to exports  0.56  0.17 1
Reserves to imp. months  0.24  0.05 0.22 1
Exch. R. stab. 0.30 0.28  0.26  0.01 1
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Table A6: Summary statistics
Obs Median Mean Std. dev. Min. Max
Main variables:
f di 289 9.8 27.2 64.1  384.9 547.0
aidK 289 6.8 15.9 41.9  18.7 442.1
aidA 289 21.6 40.1 79.6  12.2 914.4
aid †A 287 32.5 50.3 82.2  7.0 926.0
n 289 2.3 2.2 1.0  5.1 7.0
sy 289 0.1 0.3 0.5  0.4 3.2
Political risk measures:
ICRG index 233 60.3 60.1 10.3 27.6 80.6
Govt. stab. 232 8.0 7.6 2.2 2.3 12.0
Socio-ec. condit. 232 5.0 4.9 1.5 1 9
Investm. profile 232 6.1 6.3 1.8 1.2 11
Internal conflict 232 8.2 7.8 2.4 0.4 12.0
External conflict 232 9.8 9.4 2.0 2.3 12.0
Political corrup. 232 3.0 2.8 0.9 0 5
Military in politics 232 3.0 3.1 1.5 0 6
Religious tensions 232 5.0 4.3 1.4 0 6
Law and Order 232 3.0 3.2 1.1 1 6
Ethnic tensions 232 4.0 3.9 1.4 0 6
Democ. account. 232 3.3 3.3 1.2 0 6
Bureauc. quality 232 2.0 1.7 0.9 0 3.5
Economic risk measures:
GDP per capita 289 1.1 1.5 1.7 0.1 9.1
GDP growth 289 3.7 3.7 3.1  11.5 15.7
Inflation rate 280 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.0 2.8
Budget balance 242 0.0 0.0 0.0  0.4 0.2
Curr. Acc. balance 274  3.1  3.2 5.9  31.2 20.1
Financial risk measures:
Foreign debt 285 0.6 0.7 0.6 0.1 7.0
For. debt service 270 18.8 19.7 13.5 1.3 84.5
Curr. Acc. to exports 274  0.1  0.2 0.3  1.6 0.4
Reserves to imp. months 268 3.3 3.8 3.1 0.1 26.0
Exch. R. stab. 289 0.1 0.2 0.4  1.7 2.8
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Aid and Sectoral Labor Productivity
Pablo Selaya† Rainer Thiele‡
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Abstract
The paper examines empirically the proposition that aid to poor countries is
detrimental for external competitiveness, giving rise to Dutch disease type effects.
At the aggregate level, aid is found to have a positive effect on growth of labour
productivity. A sectoral decomposition shows that the effect is significant and pos-
itive both in the tradables and the nontradables sectors. The paper thus finds no
empirical support for the hypothesis that aid reduces external competitiveness in
developing countries. Possible reasons are the existence of large idle labour capac-
ity and high levels of dollarization in financial liabilities at the firm level.
Keywords: Foreign aid, sectoral growth, Dutch disease.
JEL classifications: F35, O47.
1 Introduction
The empirical literature on the macroeconomic effects of aid has produced contrasting
results. Among the recent studies, some authors claim that the effects of aid on growth
and development have been historically very close to zero (Rajan and Subramanian,
2008), or even negative (Easterly, 2007); while others (like Clemens, Radelet and Bhav-
nani, 2004; Roodman, 2007) conclude that on average aid has had a positive effect on
growth. Given the actual size of aid transfers, these mixed findings are to some extent
disappointing. But, as Bourguignon and Sundberg (2007) indicate, the mixed evidence
is probably not surprising "[...] given the heterogeneity of aid motives, the limitations
of the tools of analysis, and the complex causality chain linking external aid to final
outcomes." (Bourguignon and Sundberg, 2007, p. 316).
One way in which most of the recent empirical studies reflect the fact that the
causality chain linking aid to outcomes is complex, is the common conclusion that
An earlier version greatly benefited from comments and suggestions from Carl-Johann Dalgaard,
Priscilla Mothoora, Thomas Rønde, and Finn Tarp, and from participants at the LACEA 2006 conference
at ITAM and the GTZ-PEGNet 2007 conference in Berlin. We are indebted to David Roodman, who gen-
erously provided access to his database. We thank PEGNet for funding Pablo Selaya’s stay in Kiel during
which the paper was finished. All remaining errors are ours.
†Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen. E-mail: pablo.selaya@econ.ku.dk.
‡Kiel Institute for the World Economy, 24100 Kiel, Germany. E-mail: rainer.thiele@ifw-kiel.de.
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the effects of aid are highly dependent on idiosyncratic characteristics of the recipi-
ent countries. This is also the starting point of this paper, where we reformulate the
fundamental question on aid’s effectiveness in a way that helps to identify specific
mechanisms at work, and the individual country characteristics that matter.
Some papers already go along this line by trying to identify factors directly un-
dermining aid’s capacity to increase growth. The arguments advanced in these papers
basically belong to one of two different strands. The first is concentrated on the nega-
tive incentives and effects that aid may have on the institutional quality of the recipient
countries (see for example Rajan and Subramanian, 2007; Bräutigam and Knack, 2004).
The basic idea is that foreign aid may reduce the pressure to embark on necessary insti-
tutional reforms in the recipient countries. Some of the reasons are that aid appears as
a windfall of resources alleviating structural deficits for irresponsible fiscal authorities,
or that aid tends to spur corruption and competition for the rents it might create among
special-interest groups. 1
The second strand is related to possible detrimental macroeconomic effects of aid
(see for example Adam and Bevan, 2006; Gupta, Powell and Yang, 2006; de Renzio,
2007). The main argument in these studies is that the capacity to "absorb" the aid influx
in an effective manner can be severely restricted. The combination of a lack of absorp-
tion capacity and a relatively large size of aid receipts can translate into inflationary
pressures and a tendency of the domestic currency to appreciate. This hurts exportable
sectors directly, and may affect aggregate output growth and employment if the effects
are sustained over a certain period.2
This paper belongs to the second strand. The main question we pose is to which
extent foreign aid to poor countries has effectively limited the growth of exportable
sectors. In particular, the paper presents an empirical assessment of the effects of aid
on growth rates of average labor productivity at the aggregate level, and a disaggrega-
tion of this effect between the impact on the tradable (exportable) sector and the non-
tradable sector. A comprehensive empirical analysis of this issue at the cross-country
level is absent in the existing literature on foreign aid. The currently available esti-
mates of the impact of aid on sectoral competitiveness and labor productivity rely on
highly stylized simulations (Adam and Bevan, 2006), have been concentrated only on
the manufacturing sector (Rajan and Subramanian, 2005), or on the agricultural and
industrial sector (Feeny and Ouattara, 2009).
Our contribution with this paper is intended to be twofold. First, we provide esti-
mates of the effects of aid on growth of average labor productivity in sectors producing
most of the tradable (exportable) goods and in those producingmost of the nontradable
goods. The main results show significant positive effects of aid on labor productivity
growth in both sectors. They are robust to different econometric specifications, con-
1See for example Svensson (2000) and Djankov, Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2006).
2The prospect of effects like these may rise even further, as donors have promised a substantial scaling-
up of financial aid to the poorest countries.
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ditioning factors, and the endogenous nature of the relationship between donors’ aid
disbursements and recipients’ economic growth.
In general, our results contrast with those of similar previous studies. Thus, in a
second step, we explore mechanisms that provide a plausible explanation for the main
findings. More precisely, the paper shows that a large inflow of aid might be beneficial
for growth of average labor productivity when the recipient country has high levels of
dollarization of financial liabilities. A possible reason is that firms indebted mostly in
foreign currency benefit from an overvalued domestic currency, because that reduces
their financial costs and burdens. This type of positive effects on firms’ balance-sheets
might be substantial in highly dollarized economies and, therefore, might allow firms,
and the economy, to grow faster.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the link
between aid and external competitiveness and explains how we analyze it. Section 3
discusses methodological issues. Section 4 presents the empirical results, and Section 5
concludes.
2 Aid, real appreciation and external competitiveness
Rajan and Subramanian (2005) ask why is it so difficult to find a robust effect of aid
on growth, and argue that the potential benefits of aid are reduced by adverse effects
on competitiveness. They present evidence indicating that aid inflows cause overval-
uation of the real exchange rate (RER) in the recipient country, and that this reduces
competitiveness in the exporting sectors, as reflected by "systematic adverse effects on
growth, wages, and employment in labor intensive and export sectors" (Rajan and Sub-
ramanian, 2005, p. 22).
The overall idea resembles closely the mechanics of the Dutch disease problem af-
ter an influx of any type of foreign resources. The basic Dutch disease model is set up
on an economy producing two types of goods, the traded and the nontraded. Quan-
tity and price of the nontraded good are set by the intersection of a downward sloping
demand curve and an upward sloping supply curve; while the quantity of the traded
good is set by its demand, at the price given exogenously by the world market.3 In this
simple model, a large inflow of foreign resources (aid for instance) has two important
effects. First, it tends to make the value of the domestic currency stronger vis-a-vis
the foreign currency (that is, the domestic nominal exchange rate gets appreciated).
Second, it tends to expand the demand for both goods; which raises the price of non-
traded vs the traded goods (given that the latter is given by the world market), and
consequently tends to increase the domestic rate of inflation. When both of these ef-
fects (the nominal appreciation and the increase in domestic inflation) are combined,
the price of nontraded goods increases in real terms compared to the price of traded
3The model is fully described in Elbadawi et al (2007) and Nkusu (2004), for example.
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goods (or, equivalently, the RER gets appreciated, or overvalued).
RER appreciation is detrimental for growth in the traded sector if wages and other
production costs do not adjust downwards. If the slowdown in the traded sector is
long-lasting, it may also retard growth in the whole economy, especially if the produc-
tion of tradable goods exhibits has side effects for the whole economy –such as the
adoption of new technologies and the opening of new markets.
Among the papers that have analyzed the case of Dutch disease and RER overval-
uation after an influx of foreign aid, some show that the Dutch disease effects of aid
are small (for example Prati, Sahay and Tressel, 2003), while others suggest that they
are potentially larger (for example Elbadawi et al., 2007). However, there is a certain
consensus among these studies on two specific points. The first is that a windfall of for-
eign aid does cause RER overvaluation. The reason is that the negative effects of aid on
the RER are difficult to avoid completely, given that recipient countries tend to be lim-
ited in their ability to contain the RER overvaluation (for example, with contractionary
monetary policies), or to expand domestic supply (for example, due to problems of
absorptive capacity).4
The second point of consensus is that this aid-induced RER overvaluation tends to
be present mainly during the short run. This happens because, after the aid inflow has
been received, the economy has the possibility of effectively expanding the domestic
supply over the medium and longer run. An expansion in domestic supply can hap-
pen, for example, when aid is used to build infrastructure such as new rural roads
that tend to benefit relatively more the nontradables sector. This helps to contain the
tendency of the domestic price level to increase, and the tendency of the RER to get
overvalued over the long run.
With this background, this paper presents an econometric assessment of the effects
of aid on growth rates of average labor productivity at the aggregate level, and a sec-
toral disaggregation of this effect, distinguishing the effect of aid on the tradable from
the nontradable sectors. Our hypothesis is that, if aid causes real appreciation and a re-
duction in external competitiveness, that is Dutch disease type of problems, an inflow
of aid should have a negative effect on growth of sectors producingmost of the tradable
goods, and a positive effect on sectors producing most of the nontradable goods.
Contrary to previous papers in the literature, our results show no evidence of Dutch
disease type effects. Hence, we explore some mechanisms that might account for this
finding. The exploration is based on the theoretical work from Nkusu (2004), who ar-
gues that developing countries may exhibit some particular characteristics that reduce
the probability of having RER overvaluation and Dutch disease type of problems after
an influx of aid, or characteristics that might even allow them to benefit when the RER
gets overvalued. One of these characteristics is the existence of idle capacity. When a
4Killick and Foster (2007) argue that the increasing aid to Africa, for example, will be difficult to man-
age for the recipient countries in ways that "do not disadvantage producers of tradeable goods, and the
private sector generally".
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developing country with idle capacities receives foreign aid resources, the associated
expansion in aggregate demand can be met relatively fast by an expansion of aggre-
gate supply. This reduces the upward pressures on the level of inflation and, thus, also
reduces the pressure for RER overvaluation.
A second characteristic reducing risks related to Dutch disease is that production in
developing countries is typically highly dependent on imported inputs. This implies
that, with input costs largely denominated in foreign currency, a RER overvaluation
unambiguously lowers total costs of production. We explore this idea by testing the hy-
pothesis that high levels of dollarization of financial liabilities may offset the negative
effects of real appreciation induced by aid, supporting positive, rather than negative,
effects of aid on growth.
In our empirical analysis we proceed in four steps. First we seek to identify the
marginal effect of aid on growth in aggregate average labor productivity, defined as the
average growth rate of output (GDP or Total Value Added) per worker, and denoted
by g. This is made along the lines of the empirical aid-growth literature. That is, the
basic model we estimate is
g = f (a, p, d, Γ, Z), (1)
which is a regression of growth in output per worker on the size of aid effectively dis-
bursed, a, the direct effects of macro policies’ quality, p, geographical country-specific
determinants, d, conditional effects of a, p and d on g (captured by a vector Γ contain-
ing interaction terms between a, p and d, with the level of aid disbursed),5 and a set of
control for other covariates of aggregate average labor productivity growth, Z.
The second step in the empirical analysis involves a sectoral decomposition of the
aggregate effect. We estimate the same type of model, but using measures of growth of
productivity in the tradable (exportable) and the nontradable sectors, gs:
gs = f (a, p, d, Γ, Zs), (2)
where s 2 ftradables, nontradablesg and Zs is a vector of covariates of sectoral growth
of labor productivity.
These first two steps are aimed to give an answer to the question of whether foreign
aid causes a relative loss of external competitiveness (Dutch disease) or not.6
5In terms of traditional aid-growth models (as in Dalgaard et al., 2004, for example), these in-
teraction effects correspond to Burnside and Dollar’s (2000) claim that aid works with reasonable
policies (∂2g/∂a∂p > 0); Hansen and Tarp’s (2000) suggestion that aid exhibits diminishing returns
(∂2g/∂a2 < 0); and Dalgaard, Hansen and Tarp’s (2004) finding of higher aid effectiveness with better
geographic/climatic conditions (∂2g/∂a∂d > 0).
6A reviewer commented that it is not possible to learn if aid causes Dutch disease by focusing on dif-
ferences in labor productivity across sectors; and that it would be more appropriate in this case to analyze
differences in sectoral shares. The main argument is that aid may affect not only the level of sectoral output,
but also the level of sectoral employment (as an example, if aid causes agricultural labor productivity
to increase, it would be difficult to say if it was because aid had a positive effect on agricultural output,
or a negative effect on agricultural employment). To check this, we run our main regressions in terms
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The following steps are aimed to explore possible reasons. In particular, we analyze
if financial conditions and the composition of debt are a relevant part of the explana-
tion. The next steps require then (a) extending the aggregate models in (1) and (2) to
control for the characteristics of debt in the aid-recipient countries, and (b) decompos-
ing again this effect into its sectoral components. Accordingly, we estimate
g = f (a, p, d, Γ, Z, Z f ) (3)
and
gs = f (a, p, d, Γ, Zs, Z f ), (4)
where Z f is a vector including financial characteristics in the country, in particular char-
acteristics of debt in the country, and and variables controlling for the RER evolution.
3 Method and data
3.1 Econometric specification
The basic econometric specification for the model in (1) is
git = (ait pit di)

βa βp βd
0
+ ait  (ait pit di)

βaa βap βad
0
+ Z0itβZ + τ
0
βτ + εit, (5)
where git is a measure of growth in output per worker (or growth in average labor
productivity) in country i during period t; ait, is the size of effective aid in terms of
GDP;7 pit is the Burnside andDollar (2000) index of goodmacro policies; di is a measure
of structural characteristics (Dalgaard et al., 2004), proxied by the share of tropical area
in the country from Gallup, Sachs and Mellinger (1999); τ is a vector of time-dummies
(to control for common shocks); and εit is a zero-mean error component. Zit is a vector
containing other exogenous determinants of output per worker growth, specifically:
of sectoral output instead of sectoral labor productivity (to partial out the effect of changes in employ-
ment); and found the same results. For the rest of the paper, we choose to keep the focus on sectoral
labor productivity instead of sectoral levels or sectoral shares, for various reasons. First, analysis of Dutch
disease requires trying to approximate differences in competitiveness across sectors, rather than only dif-
ferences in the relative sizes of different sectors (and differences in output per worker across sectors are
more helpful in this sense than differences sectoral levels or shares). Second, put in a growth perspective,
the determining factor of the sectoral composition of the economy is necessarily some measure of sectoral
productivity: seeing sectors of the economy shrinking or expanding over time critically depends on the
trajectory of productivity in each sector (put differently, only sectors that learn to produce better goods
or services more efficiently are the ones that can expand sustainably). Third, when we explore posible
reasons behind our main findings, we find theoretical reasons in the literature to focus on variables linked
to costs and performance of firms. That implies that, if we aim to understand not only if aid causes Dutch
disease but also why, we need to to pay attention to factors that are relevant for firms, and differences in
productivity of any factor (labor for instance) are probably one of the first type of proxies that come to
mind.
7Effective aid is defined as the grant equivalent of official disbursements constructed by Chang,
Fernandez-Arias and Serven (1998), calculated as the sum of official grants and the grant element in con-
cessional loans.
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(a) the degree of financial depth, measured as the (lagged) ratio of M2 to GDP, (b) the
ICRG index of institutional quality, trying to reflect security of private property and
enforceability of contracts,8 (c) the level of output per worker at the beginning of every
period t, (d) the degree of ethno-linguistic fractionalization in the country (Easterly
and Levine, 1997), (e) the number of conflicts in which the government is involved
(UCDP/PRIO, 2006), and ( f ) an interaction term between these last two.
In a similar way, the econometric specification for the sectoral decomposition pro-
posed in equation (2), is
git,s = (ait pit di)
 
λa λp λd
0
+ ait (ait pit di)
 
λaa λap λad
0
+Z0it,sλZs + τ
0
λτ + ε
s
it, (6)
where git,s is a measure of output per worker in sector s, s 2 ftradables, nontradablesg,
and the new estimated coefficients are the λ’s.
To estimate the models in (3) and (4), which are extensions of the previous two
regressions meant to identify as directly as possible the presence of RER overvaluation
and Dutch disease, it is necessary to extend the vector Zit with variables reflecting
the evolution of the RER and the characteristics of debt in the recipient country (in
particular those related to the level of dollarization of financial liabilities). The variables
considered for this extension are (a) the rate of RER devaluation (and the square of
it), which helps to control for the effects that the RER has directly on growth,9, (b)
the amount of external debt measured as a proportion of GDP, and (c) the currency
composition of the external debt.
The central econometric concern for the estimation of all these regressions is the
endogenous character of aid: aid disbursements are obviously determined to some
extent by the recipient country’s growth process itself (Berthélemy, 2006; Nunnenkamp
and Thiele, 2006). All the recent empirical literature on foreign aid effectiveness has
turned to the use of instrumental variables (IV) to address the problem of endogeneity.
We follow this line and perform two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimations, using the
set of instruments in Dalgaard and Hansen (2001) and Dalgaard, Hansen and Tarp
(2004).10 Given that our 2SLS estimates ran into statistical problems (as we will discuss
8The ICRG indexes are available since 1984. When we use this measure directly, our sample gets
reduced by half. We extended the series backwards to complete the sample, and use this extended series
throughout. The ICRG index is in either case significant, and the overall, results in both cases remain
qualitatively the same. This reflects the fact institutional quality, as captured by these indexes at least,
tends to vary slowly in time. For instance, the change for the median country, among the 140 covered
between 1984 and 2001, has been only 1.3%.
9The square of the RER devaluation is included to model formally the idea that there exists an "equi-
librium RER", or a RER level that keeps the balance between keeping exports competitive and keeping the
level of inflation controlled. See for example Elbadawi et al. (2007, footnote 1, p. 1).
10These are Aid/GDP, lagged; (Aid/GDP) squared, lagged; (Policy  Aid/GDP), lagged; Policy 
(log Initial GDP per capita); Policy  (log Initial GDP per capita) squared; Policy  (log Population);
and a dummy for countries in the Central Francophone Africa zone. The instrumentation strategy is
fully described and motivated in detail in Dalgaard, Hansen and Tarp (2004), but in general it is aimed
to reflect donors’ overall preference to send aid to the smallest and poorest countries, those with better
macro policies and to account for some strategic interests of donors in specific groups of countries (former
149
in detail below), we also applied the GMM-DIF estimator suggested by Arellano and
Bond (1991) and the GMM-SYS estimator proposed by Arellano and Bover (1995) and
Blundell and Bond (1998).
3.2 Data on sectoral labor productivity
Our estimations require measures of average labor productivity in the tradable (ex-
portable) and the nontradable sectors. We build these measures with data from the
World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI) on labor force participation, sec-
toral employment and sectoral real Value Added (defined as the net output of a sector
–measured in constant USD– after adding up all outputs and subtracting intermediate
inputs).
The proxies we constructed for labor productivity in the tradable (exportable) sector
are (a) the non-services GDP per worker and (b) the sum of Agricultural and Industrial
Value Added per worker. The proxy constructed for the nontradables sector is based
on Value Added per worker in the Services sector.
This distinction between tradables and nontradables sectors is made under the as-
sumptions that the overall production in the economy comes from activity in agricul-
ture, industry and the services sectors; and that production of nontradables is concen-
trated in the services sector, while production of tradables takes place primarily in the
agricultural and industrial sectors. This assumption is supported by the survey in Tica
and Družic´ (2006, Table 1), who review a large number of empirical papers analyzing
the effects of productivity gaps on terms of trade, and report that none of those stud-
ies treats the services sector as producing tradables (the 58 papers reviewed by them
treat production of tradables as taking place in the agricultural sector, or the indus-
trial sector, or both). The argument gathers strength when it is placed in the context
of developing countries, where trade in agricultural and manufacturing goods (con-
taining for example exports of raw agricultural commodities, agroindustrial products,
minerals, and so forth) tends to be much higher than trade in services.
The WDI provide a measure of real Value Added per worker in the Agricultural
sector, but not in the other sectors. We therefore constructed proxies for Value Added
per worker in the Industrial and Services sectors. An important point is that an accu-
rate labor productivity measure requires an estimate of the number of workers actually
employed in the different sectors, rather than estimates of the number of workers in
the labor force or the potential number of workers in each sector. Accordingly, we con-
struct series for the effective sectoral allocation of labor based on sectoral employment
data from the WDI. The series for sectoral employment were built based on interpola-
tions of the employment data in the Agricultural, Industrial and Services sectors, and
completed to fill gaps towards the end of the sample period under the assumption that
colonies, important trade partners, or political allies, for example).
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the sectoral distribution of employment kept stable over time.11 For all the estimations
in the remainder of the paper then, the proxies used for levels of sectoral labor produc-
tivity levels are measures of real Value Added in the Agricultural, the Industrial and
the Services sectors, divided by the estimated number of employed workers in each
corresponding sector.
The sample covers a group of 69 developing economies over 40 years, the period
between 1962 and 2001. All the variables were averaged over periods of 4 years, to
capture the evolution of trends rather than the incidence of cycles, and to make the
results comparable to those in previous empirical studies. Our sample does not go be-
yond 2001 because many of the variables used in the regressions could not be updated
further than that for many countries in the sample.
Summary statistics of our variables are displayed in Appendix Table A1, and the
description of the countries and periods considered is given in Table A2.
4 Results
4.1 Impact of aid in the aggregate
The estimated effects of aid on growth of aggregate average labor productivity, that
is the results of regression (5), are displayed in Table 1. Column 1 contains the 2SLS
estimates.
The coefficients of interest (the coefficients on the aid variable and the 3 aid-interaction
terms) show that aid has a positive and direct impact on growth of aggregate labor
productivity, and that these benefits can be increased in countries with good policies,
whereas they are lowered in countries where the amount of tropical area is large (Dal-
gaard et al., 2004). This last finding can be interpreted as indicating that aid effec-
tiveness is limited in countries where location and climate are disadvantageous or, in
particular, in countries with large a amount of tropics, where the burden of diseases is
larger (as suggested by Gallup et al., 1999, for example) or where growth in agricultural
productivity is restricted (see Masters and Wiebe, 2000, for example).
The rest of the coefficients show that good policies, as captures by the policy index,
are good for growth by themselves. Initial conditions appear to matter (the coefficient
on the initial level of output per worker is significant), sound institutions (measured
by the ICRG index) have a positive correlation on growth, and a high number of con-
flicts does not seem to be correlated to higher rates of growth, just as do not either
more ethnical division in the country. The only puzzling effect in column 1 is the neg-
ative and significant effect of financial depth (measured by the lagged ratio of money
11As a control, we constructed a series for the sectoral composition of the labour force assuming that for
any given country, a larger fraction of the labour force was concentrated in sectors where the production of
Value Added was higher. This change of measure yields qualitatively equivalent results to those reported
in the following tables.
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Table 1: Aid and labor productivity
Dependent variable: Growth in GDP per worker
2SLS 2SLS/FE GMM-DIF GMM-SYS GMM-SYS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Aid/GDP 3.05 4.75 0.30 2.62 2.67
[1.0] [2.2] [0.8] [0.9] [0.9]
(Aid/GDP), squared  0.0055 0.038  0.058  0.038  0.036
[0.04] [0.06] [0.03] [0.02] [0.01]
(Aid/GDP)Policy 0.17  0.1  0.11  0.038  0.038
[0.08] [0.09] [0.05] [0.06] [0.06]
(Aid/GDP)Tropical area  3.20  5.29 0.035  2.32  2.38
[0.9] [2.3] [0.8] [0.9] [0.9]
Policy index 0.69 1.19 1.28 1.06 1.07
[0.2] [0.2] [0.2] [0.2] [0.2]
Tropical area  0.55  0.94  0.90
[0.5] [0.5] [0.5]
(log) Initial GDP per worker  0.49  1.90  6.06  0.82  0.76
[0.3] [0.7] [1.3] [0.3] [0.2]
ICRG institutions index 0.36 0.25 0.25 0.40 0.41
[0.09] [0.2] [0.2] [0.09] [0.10]
Fin. depth (M2/GDP), lagged  2.36  1.79  3.54  3.51  3.41
[1.1] [1.6] [2.2] [1.2] [1.2]
Ethnic fractionalization  0.42  0.36
[0.9] [1.0]
Number of conflicts  1.01  1.91  0.73  1.21
[0.6] [1.0] [0.9] [0.6]
Ethnic fract.Conflicts 1.38 2.58 0.34 1.36
[0.8] [1.2] [1.5] [0.8]
Observations 460 459 457 505 505
Number of countries 69 68 69 69 69
Specification tests:
Sargan test, overidentification (0.79) (0.92) (0.99) (0.99) (0.99)
Cragg-Donald test, underidentification (0.0) (0.0018) . . .
Anderson-Rubin test, joint signif. (0.062) (0.23) . . .
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test, endogeneity (0.022) (0.024) . . .
Hausman test for Fixed Effects . (0.36) . . .
Total number of instruments 26 20 137 179 151
AR(1) . . (0.0027) (0.0023) (0.0025)
AR(2) . . (0.55) (0.72) (0.71)
Hypothesis tests on the marginal effect (ME) of aid:
ME of aid > 0 (mean) 1.05 1.18 0.11 0.96 0.97
[0.43] [0.8] [0.29] [0.36] [0.31]
ME of aid > 0 (country A) 3.34 4.36 0.051 2.45 2.50
[0.96] [2.05] [0.72] [0.92] [0.84]
ME of aid > 0 (country B) 0.08  0.59 0.035 0.15 0.15
[0.32] [0.63] [0.21] [0.16] [0.15]
Notes. Robust standard errors in brackets, p-values in parentheses. *** , ** and * denote significance at 1,
5, and 10%. Each observation is an average over a period of 4 years. Data from 1962 to 2001. Regressions
include a constant, time-dummies and a dummy for countries in the Sub-Sahara and the East Asia regions.
Country A is a hypothetical country with a good policies (policy index at the 75th percentile), receiving
little aid (25th percentile) and located outside the tropics (25th percentile of the tropical area variable
distribution. Country B is a hypothetical country with a bad policies (policy index at the 25th percentile),
receiving large amounts of aid (75th percentile) and located in the tropics (75th percentile of the tropical
area variable distribution.
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and deposits, M2, to GDP). This can be due to an omitted variable bias, since a high
M2/GDP ratio might be correlated with high levels of other sources of foreign capital
(for example foreign bonds, or external debt), which act as substitutes of aid to some
extent.
The last part of column 1 in Table 3 shows a test for the hypothesis that the marginal
effect (ME) of aid, defined as ∂g∂a , is positive. Given that the ME of aid we can estimate
is
∂git
∂aidit
= βa + 2 βaa aidit + βap pit + βad di, (7)
it is necessary to choose a fixed point to estimate the marginal effect. The most obvious
point is the mean of the different variables composing it (that is, the mean levels of aid,
the macro policy index, and the percentage of tropical area in the country). However,
Figures 1 and 2 show that the distributions for aid and the share of tropical area are
highly asymmetric.
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Figure 1: Aid/GDP %, density plot
Figure 1 shows that the distribution of aid is skewed to the left and has a relatively
fatter right-hand side tail. This reflects the fact that countries receive in general some
(relatively low level of) aid; but, with a certain frequency, countries receive a much
larger amount of aid, for example in the form humanitarian aid after a natural disas-
ter, or for the reconstruction of an area after a period of conflict. Figure 2 shows the
distribution for the amount of tropical area in the countries in the sample, which is bi-
modal, and reflects the fact that most of the aid-recipients are located either in highly
tropical areas, or in places that are considerably far from the tropical lands. This is
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Figure 2: Tropical area index, density plot
relevant because, with this type of distributions, the average country may not reflect
the most typical characteristics, and evaluating the marginal effect at the mean can be
misleading.
Therefore, Table 1 also presents the marginal effects of aid evaluated at two other
points. The first is defined as a hypothetical country A, exhibiting a high level for the
quality-of-policy index (at the 75th percentile of the Burnside-Dollar policy index dis-
tribution); and also receiving a low amount of aid (equivalent to the level at the 25th
percentile in the aid distribution), and being located outside the tropics (at the 25th per-
centile in the distribution of tropical area). The second hypothetical point of evaluation
is a hypothetical country B, exhibiting low level for the index of good macro policies
(25th percentile); and also receiving large amounts of aid (75th percentile), and located
in a very tropical area (75th percentile). These two definitions are completely arbitrary,
but can be understood as an approximation of the upper and lower bounds for the
marginal effect of aid in a typical country.
It turns out that aid has a net positive and highly significant effect in the average
country. The effect is equally significant, but 3 times larger for a country A (with rela-
tively more favorable conditions), and statistically not different from zero for a country
B (with less favorable conditions).
As for the validity of the 2SLS regressions, the tests on the quality of instrumenta-
tion show overall good results: (1) a high p-value for the Sargan test of overidentifica-
tion does not allow to reject the hypothesis that the set of instruments employed are
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valid, (2) a low p-value for the Cragg-Donald test of underidentification implies that
the instruments are not weak, (3) the low p-value for the Anderson-Rubin test for joint
significance of the endogenous regressors cannot reject the hypothesis that the instru-
ments are jointly significant, and (4) the low p-value for the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test
of endogeneity of the instruments allows to reject the hypothesis that the endogenous
regressors can be treated as exogenous, indicating that the use of IV in this specification
is appropriate.
However, even though the specification is comprehensive with respect to the main
determinants of growth, it is possible that there are important unobserved individual
country characteristics that are being omitted in the regression. To control for this,
Column 2 in Table 1 presents the same regression as in Column 1, but estimates the
model including individual country fixed effects. The results are relatively similar to
the ones in Column 1 regarding the significance of the coefficients of interest, the tests
on the quality of instrumentation, and the significance of the marginal effect of aid
evaluated at different points. From the statistic for the (Hausman) test of fixed-effects,
it is not possible to reject the hypothesis that the country fixed effects are significant
and, thus, correctly included in Column 2.
This poses a serious problem for these first two regressions. The reason is that if
both the unobserved country characteristics and the lagged level of the dependent vari-
able are significant and belong into the regression, then the 2SLS regression in Column
1 is misspecified (because it lacks the fixed-effects terms), and the 2SLS/FE regression
in Column 2 gives inconsistent estimates (because differencing the data and estimating
the regression with the lagged level of the dependent variable on the right-hand side
introduces correlation between one of the regressors and the error term, by construc-
tion).
An appropriate estimator for a panel data model where (a) unobserved individual
fixed effects are relevant and (b) a lagged level of the dependent variable needs to be
included as a regressor, is the GMM-DIF estimator. This method estimates the regres-
sion in first differences, and instruments the lagged differences in the right-hand side
with lagged levels of the variables. The number of lags to be included can be chosen
arbitrarily, but following Roodman (2009), we try to reduce the problem of "too many"
instruments by restricting them to be only the ones starting from the second.
Column 3 in Table 1 presents the regression with the GMM-DIF estimator. The
results are quite different from the ones before. In particular, aid now has no significant
effect on growth. Column 3 reports however a high coefficient for the lagged level of
the dependent variable, which reflects a high level of autocorrelation. As shown by
Arellano and Bover (1995), lagged levels are weak instruments of current differences
when the series are highly persistent. The autocorrelation tests displayed in column 3
show high AR(1) for the error term in the model in differences (which is expected to
happen), but high AR(2) as well, supporting the conjecture that the dependent variable
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is highly persistent. In this case, first-differences cannot be strongly instrumented by
lagged levels.
The alternative is to use the GMM-SYS estimator, which supplements the model in
differences with equations in levels and instruments based on lagged differences. The
GMM-SYS estimates suggest that aid has a positive effect on growth, that the effect
is not dependent on the quality of macro policies but on the type of structural coun-
try characteristics, and that the overall effect operates with diminishing returns. The
estimates of the marginal effects of aid are similar to those in column 1. A higher p-
value for the absence of AR(2) shows an improvement in the quality of estimation and
instrumentation compared to the GMM-DIF estimation in column 3.
Finally, Column 5 in Table 1 drops the variables associated with country conflict
and division; this helps to reduce problems of multicollinearity and the total number
of instruments, does not change the significance of the rest of the variables in themodel,
and allows a more precise estimation of the marginal effects. We therefore regard it as
the preferred econometric specification.
4.2 Sectoral disaggregation of the impact of aid
Table 2 presents the sectoral decomposition of the aggregate effect of aid on growth.
To provide a benchmark, column 1 shows again the aggregate effects of aid on growth
(corresponding to Column 5 in Table 1, the preferred specification for the aggregate
model). Columns 2 and 3 contain estimates for the sectors likely to be producing most
of the exportable goods (the tradables sector). The proxy for output in the tradables
sector considered in Column 2 is output in the non-Services sector, and the one con-
sidered in Column 3 is the aggregation of Value Added in the Agricultural and the
Industrial sectors.
Themost important difference between these two regressions is that column 3 shows
a significant coefficient for the aid-squared term, while column 2 does not. But the rest
of the coefficients of interest are similar in size and significance in the two specifica-
tions. Despite the difference in the coefficient on the aid-squared term, the overall
conclusion from the marginal effects remains the same: aid is shown to have a positive
marginal effect in the tradables sector in the average country, a three times higher effect
in countries with more favorable conditions, and no significant effect in countries with
less favorable conditions.
Column 4 shows the estimates of the effects of aid in the Services sector, which is
taken as a proxy for the sector producing most of the nontradable goods in a develop-
ing economy. This column reveals a more independent impact from aid compared to
Columns 2 and 3 in the sense that the interaction term with tropical area is no longer
significant. Evaluated at the mean, the size of the marginal effects turns out to be
roughly equal in services and non-services sectors. For a country A the size of the mar-
ginal effect is even lower than in columns 2 and 3, while for a country B it becomes
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significantly positive.
Overall, these findings do not point to systematic differences in the impact of aid
on tradable and nontradable production. This is the main result of the paper. It can
be interpreted as providing empirical evidence against the hypothesis that aid is detri-
mental for external competitiveness and growth in average labor productivity, or that
aid causes Dutch disease. If aid was a cause of Dutch disease, two "symptoms" after
an inflow of aid would have to be a decline in the growth of the exportable (or trad-
ables) sector, and a relative increase in the growth rate of the nontradables sector. The
estimates of the marginal effects of aid in Columns 1-4 of Table 2 suggest the opposite:
evaluated at the mean (and at the country A levels, where estimates are statistically sig-
nificant), aid does not seem to cause a slowdown in the exportables sector compared
to the aggregate level, nor an acceleration of the nontradables sector compared to the
aggregate level.
Decomposing further the effect in column 3 (that is, decomposing the proxy for the
tradables sector), Columns 5 and 6 indicate that the positive effects of aid on growth of
the exportables sector actually come from the Industrial sector rather than the Agricul-
tural sector. This implies that the external competitiveness of manufactures, minerals
and agroindustrial products (all activities within the Industrial sector) is unlikely to
deteriorate in response to an inflow of foreign aid.
4.3 Real appreciation and the absence of Dutch Disease
Further analysis of the link between aid, growth and Dutch disease requires accounting
for variables that play a central role in this relationship. Columns 2 and 3 in Table 3
account for the effects of changes in the RER. The rate of RER devaluation is treated
as endogenous within the model. After controlling for it, the marginal effects of aid
estimated drop to half the size of the ones in the preferred specification (reproduced
in Column 1). The square of RER devaluation is included in Column 3 to capture
the idea that countries tend to benefit from a devaluated RER (because that tends to
increase exports’ competitiveness), but that after a certain point a too fast rate of RER
devaluation can be passed to higher inflation rates, which starts to limit the (initial)
benefits of RER devaluation.
Columns 4 and 5 in Table 3 account for the degree of external indebtedness and the
currency composition of debt. Column 4 introduces the ratio of external debt to GDP,
and Column 5 the percentage of dollarization in the country’s overall level of debt, as a
measure of the currency composition of the debt and the country’s financial exposure
to changes in the exchange rate.
From columns 2 to 5 it can be seen that the variables measuring RER devaluation,
the ratio of external debt to GDP and the measure of debt’s currency composition are
marginally significant or not significant individually. However, when all these new
variables are included at the same time, three of them become highly significant, and
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Table 3: Aid and labor productivity: Financial effects
Dependent variable: Growth in GDP per worker
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Aid/GDP 2.67 1.52 1.68 2.67 2.22 1.52
[0.9] [0.5] [0.5] [0.9] [0.9] [0.5]
(Aid/GDP), squared  0.036  0.016  0.0065  0.020  0.022  0.023
[0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.009] [0.009] [0.009]
(Aid/GDP)Policy  0.038  0.083  0.055  0.13  0.018  0.15
[0.06] [0.06] [0.07] [0.08] [0.06] [0.08]
(Aid/GDP)Tropical area  2.38  1.48  1.81  2.33  2.10  1.28
[0.9] [0.5] [0.5] [0.9] [0.9] [0.5]
Policy index 1.07 1.10 0.89 1.04 1.04 0.95
[0.2] [0.2] [0.2] [0.2] [0.2] [0.2]
Tropical area  0.90  0.72  0.58  0.87  1.11  0.87
[0.5] [0.5] [0.5] [0.5] [0.5] [0.5]
(log) Initial GDP per worker  0.76  0.89  0.84  0.98  0.98  1.11
[0.2] [0.2] [0.2] [0.2] [0.3] [0.2]
ICRG institutions index 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.47 0.46 0.53
[0.10] [0.10] [0.10] [0.1] [0.1] [0.1]
Fin. depth (M2/GDP), lagged  3.41  2.06  2.05  3.64  3.74  2.17
[1.2] [1.2] [1.2] [1.5] [1.6] [1.4]
Real exch. rate devaluation 0.099 0.45 0.42
[0.1] [0.2] [0.1]
Real exch. rate dev., squared  0.0097  0.0091
[0.003] [0.002]
External debt/GDP  0.0070  0.0077
[0.004] [0.004]
Debt currency composition (%USD) 0.40 1.62
[1.3] [1.0]
Observations 505 427 427 402 409 339
Number of countries 69 65 65 60 61 57
Number of instruments 176 220 264 200 200 303
AR(1) (0.0025) (0.0096) (0.013) (0.0084) (0.0083) (0.035)
AR(2) (0.71) (0.62) (0.81) (0.49) (0.49) (0.54)
ME of aid > 0 (mean) 0.97 0.44 0.42 0.74 0.61 0.37
[0.31] [0.2] [0.19] [0.28] [0.27] [0.17]
ME of aid > 0 (country A) 2.50 1.29 1.51 1.20 1.20 0.60
[0.84] [0.48] [0.48] [0.45] [0.49] [0.29]
ME of aid > 0 (country B) 0.15  0.12  0.22 0.10 0.023  0.024
[0.15] [0.12] [0.12] [0.11] [0.11] [0.11]
Notes. Robust standard errors in brackets, p-values in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at 1, 5,
and 10%. All regressions display GMM-SYS estimates, include a constant term, time-dummies, dummies
for countries in the Sub-Sahara and East Asia regions. Each observation is an average over a period of 4
years. Data from 1962 to 2001. Country A is a hypothetical country with a good policies (policy index at
the 75th percentile), receiving little aid (25th percentile) and located outside the tropics (25th percentile
of the tropical area variable distribution. Country B is a hypothetical country with a bad policies (policy
index at the 25th percentile), receiving large amounts of aid (75th percentile) and located in the tropics
(75th percentile of the tropical area variable distribution.
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the fourth marginally significant (Column 6).
All the additional variables in regression 6 in Table 3 are treated as endogenous.
This specification therefore provides a good basis to decompose the effect of aid on
growth and implement a more thorough test of the relationship between aid, growth
and Dutch disease. It is reproduced as a baseline regression in column 1 in Table 4,
where the results of the sectoral decomposition are displayed.
Table 4, similar to Table 2, provides no support for the case that aid causes Dutch
disease: in Columns 3 and 6, for example, growth in sectors producing most of the
exportables is shown to be positively affected by aid, and with a marginal effect larger
than in the overall economy. Again it is the Industrial sector where the impact appears
to be strongest These findings strengthen our evidence on the absence of Dutch disease
type of problems caused by aid, because they turn out to be robust to the inclusion of
the effects of changes in the RER and other relevant financial variables.
A second interesting finding from Table 4 is the statistical significance of variables
that reflect the exposure of the aid-recipient economies to changes in the RER, because
it can be seen as suggestive evidence in support of positive balance-sheet effects in
aid-recipient economies. The currency composition of foreign debt is significant only
in sectors that are producing most of the exportable goods, suggesting that the posi-
tive balance-sheet effects are more likely to benefit firms producing these (exportable)
goods. When this is combined with results from other studies showing that aid causes
real appreciation, the results in Table 4 suggest that one reason for aid not creating
Dutch disease type of problems might be that firms in those economies benefit from
(possibly aid-induced) appreciations of the RER, and this might probably be partially
due to having an important share of their debt denominated in foreign currency.12
5 Summary and Conclusion
This paper presents an empirical assessment of the hypothesis that aid is detrimental
for external competitiveness and growth in average labor productivity in the recipient
countries. This evidence is based on a sectoral decomposition of the effects of aid on
aggregate growth, and on an extension of the typical aid-growth econometric specifi-
cation to control for the effects of (a) changes in the RER and (b) financial characteristics
of the debt in the different sectors. The findings are robust to different specifications,
conditioning factors, and the endogenous nature of aid disbursements.
Our main results point to the absence of Dutch Disease effects: aid is found to have
a positive marginal effect on growth of output per worker, at the aggregate level, and
in both the tradable and the nontradable sectors. One possible explanation might be
12This evidence also opens space for discussion and revision of the finding that RER overvaluation
has contractionary effects (as suggested for example by Shi, 2006), and tends to support the importance of
balance-sheet effects mentioned in the literature on the contractionary effects of devaluations (see Frankel,
2005, for a recent survey on the topic).
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the existence of idle capacity in the recipient countries, which can help to promptly
meet the increase in aggregate demand caused by aid inflows. Another explanation,
explored empirically in the paper, is that Dutch disease type of problems need not ma-
terialize in an aid-recipient economy because firms in the tradable sector might benefit
from an aid-induced RER appreciation. This would be the case if their debt is denomi-
nated mostly in foreign currency. We find evidence suggesting that the sectors produc-
ing most of the exportable goods tend to benefit from aid, even after controlling for the
level of real appreciation that aid might cause and the amount of debt denominated in
foreign currency.
Taken together, the finding that aid may cause RER appreciation but not Dutch
disease type of problems, and the finding that the marginal effects of aid in countries
with bad policies and weak structural characteristics are close to zero but not negative,
suggest that the effectiveness of aid depends much more on the ability of donors to
reduce the negative incentives associated with the use of foreign aid in the recipient
countries, rather than on the ability to control the macroeconomic type of problems
supposedly undermining the effects of foreign aid on growth.
In practice, our findings suggest that the success of the planned scaling-up of aid
to the poorest countries does not depend so much on whether the resources are spent
or absorbed by local governments (in the sense of Killick and Foster, 2007), nor on the
limitations that donors and agencies put on them to guarantee the right use of the aid
resources, but rather on whether it is possible to find a way to create or maintain good
incentives in the recipient countries, and to overcome structural bottlenecks such as
low agricultural productivity in tropical areas.
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